Immortal Armor

Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches

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On the front cover: A calendar frieze representing the Athenian months, reused in the Byzantine Church of the Little Metropolis in Athens. The cross is superimposed, obliterating Taurus of the Zodiac. The choice of this frieze for books in *Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches* reflects this series' emphasis on the blending of the diverse heritages—Near Eastern, Classical, and Christian—in the Greek tradition. Drawing by Laurie Kain Hart, based on a photograph. Recent titles in the series are:

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Immortal Armor

The Concept of Alkē in Archaic Greek Poetry

Derek Collins

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Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches

Foreword

by Gregory Nagy, General Editor

Building on the foundations of scholarship within the disciplines of philology, philosophy, history, and archaeology, this series spans the continuum of Greek traditions extending from the second millennium BCE to the present, not just the Archaic and Classical periods. The aim is to enhance perspectives by applying various disciplines to problems that have in the past been treated as the exclusive concern of a single given discipline. Besides the crossing over of the older disciplines, as in the case of historical and literary studies, the series encourages the application of such newer ones as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, and comparative literature. It also encourages encounters with current trends in methodology, especially in the realm of literary theory.

Immortal Armor: The Concept of Alkē in Archaic Greek Poetry, by Derek Collins, concentrates on the uses of the heroic word *alkē* in Homeric poetry, applying methods of formulaic analysis originally developed by Milman Parry and Albert Lord in their research on oral poetics. Paying close attention to its narrative as well as its formulaic contexts, Collins achieves a sharp new definition of an essential concept: Homeric *alkē* is an autonomous force that drives a warrior to ultimate victory or defeat in battle. The exactitude of analysis that Collins brings to bear on this all-important heroic theme helps illuminate Homeric poetry as a precise and superbly cohesive system of communication. It also creates precious new insights into the distinctly organic relationship of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as the basis of the cultural ideology that we recognize as Hellenism.

Acknowledgments

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All Homeric translations are based on those of Lattimore 1951 and 1965, but with adjustments; all other translations are my own.

Introduction

When a warrior reaches the height of his fighting ability in the *Iliad*, he is said to be driven by ἀλκή (*alkē*). There is no sentimentality attached to the idea: *alkē* will either enable that warrior to vanquish an opponent and achieve glory, or it will cause him to expire in the attempt. Of the terms for strength in the *Iliad* that are applied to warriors in battle, among which we can include μένος (*menos*), σθένος (*sthenos*), βίη (*biē*), and δύναμις (*dunamis*), only *alkē* is described as an autonomous driving force.

The *Iliad* makes the absolutist impulse of *alkē*—that is, the achievement of victory or death—suitable as one basis on which to define kingship and leadership, which do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. As Tacitus[1] once observed of the Germans in a remark that could be applied to the *Iliad*, "reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt" (they choose kings from nobility, but leaders from valor). Agamemnon, the titular leader of the Achaeans, with his lapse of courage and of belief in victory, will be reproached by his councillors with not being given *alkē* by Zeus—in Tacitus's terms, Agamemnon is merely a king, not a leader. Achilles is the real leader of the Achaeans, so when both Thetis and Odysseus describe the Achaean plight as hinging on his *alkē*, there is no question that the *alkē* of Achilles, once expressed, will be a pivotal moment for the Achaeans.

This active characterization of *alkē* contrasts sharply with its "defensive" meaning,[2] when it appears figuratively as a kind of

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1. *Germania*, 7.

2. For a general overview of the meanings 'bulwark', 'defense', etc., see *LSJ*, s.v. ἀλκή, II.

armor—immortal armor—designed to protect a warrior from harm. There is, as a result, a flexibility in the conceptual formulation of *alkē* that entails at a given moment both its aggressive and defensive qualities. Translated into the divine sphere, the dual nature of *alkē* is most in evidence when Zeus bestows it upon a warrior, and the offensive or defensive value that it might be given then depends upon the perspective of the characters involved. Curiously, when Zeus's activities result in the dispensation of *alkē*, heroes engage in a struggle of interpretation to determine the advantage for whom *alkē* may or may not be present.

Whatever ambiguity there might be for heroes trying to forecast Zeus's intentions, the *Iliad* consistently places a premium on heroes to remember *alkē* (*mimnēskomai* + gen. of *alkē*) in the midst of battle. The price for not remembering it is certain defeat, and in some cases death. Memory in this context serves more than one function. As the repository of *alkē*, it is the mental source from which the physical activity derives. Yet it is also the mental faculty that must be activated in order for a warrior to express *alkē* in the outward ability to fight. In the psychic economy of the *Iliad*, a warrior must overcome the resistances to his own memory before he can overcome an adversary.

The essential activity that I have just described is taken over within the *Odyssey* and made the basis of Odysseus's rescue of the Ithacan throne. In a thematic usage of remembering *alkē* that extends into the story line, Odysseus will need to be reminded by Athena to remember his *alkē* in order to overcome the suitors invading his household. Within the *Odyssey*, the advantages of remembering *alkē* are reshaped and inverted, and it will be Agamemnon's failure to remember *alkē* that becomes the cause of his murder when he returns home from Troy. Through the theme of remembering *alkē*, the chaotic house of Atreus is contrasted with the temporarily degenerate house of Odysseus, and the endless cycles of murder in Agamemnon's home begun by Aigisthos are meant to play against the one final mass murder of the suitors by Odysseus and Telemakhos.

Yet *alkē* within the *Odyssey* retains some of its Iliadic character, and the violence of Odysseus against the suitors that should convert to peace needs to be relieved in the end by divine intervention. Fittingly, perhaps, for the retrospective view of the *Iliad* offered within the

Odyssey, it is Athena and Zeus who descend to quell the outbreak of war between Odysseus and the relatives of the suitors. In the *Iliad*, Athena had worn *Alkē* personified on her shield (5.740), and Zeus had bestowed *alkē* on whomever he pleased to sway the tide of battle (e.g. 8.140, 15.490). Now within the *Odyssey* both divinities conspire to control the unrestrained use of *alkē*, and to subordinate it to the larger aim of social harmony.

I have used the words *theme* and *formula* in my remarks above, and it is time now to define them as they will be used in the present work. By the term theme, I follow the definitions given by Albert Lord[3] and Gregory Nagy,[4] whose formulation derives ultimately from Milman Parry,[5] and use it to mean a basic unit of content that occurs regularly. The advantage of this definition is that it incorporates, but is not limited to, formulas defined in the strictest metrical sense. Moreover, this definition allows us to treat ideas that repeat themselves regularly in Homeric poetry as reflexes of tradition. Before I define tradition, however, as it will be used in the present work, I must deal in some detail with Parry's immense contribution to the study of formula and theme.

For Parry, the study of Homeric diction led him to conclude "that this diction, in so far as it is made up of formulae, is entirely due to the influence of metre."[6] Since Parry's doctoral theses, much work has been done by other scholars[7] to refine his notion of formula, especially as it extends to incorporate non-noun+epithet patterns. Although Parry's principal evidence for the Homeric formula was the noun+epithet pattern,[8] his definition of formula, namely "an expression regularly

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3. Lord 1960.68: themes are "groups of ideas regularly used in telling a tale in the formulaic style of traditional song." Cf. Lord 1991.41.
4. Nagy 1996b.18.
5. See esp. Parry 1928a and 1928b. Throughout the text I will cite the original dates of publication of Parry's work in brackets, but the page references will correspond to the 1971 edition.
6. Parry 1971[1928a].9.
7. As examples I cite in particular Hainsworth 1964 and 1968, Hoekstra 1965, Russo 1966, A. Parry 1966, and Nagy 1990a.18-35.
8. Parry 1971[1928a].

used, under the same metrical conditions, to express an essential idea,"[9] is general enough to be applied to many other formulas in Homeric diction.

The regularity of Homeric formulas—and I employ here, for the moment, Parry's definition—led him frequently to employ the terms "tradition" and "traditional," which correspond to the notion of the diachronic dimension of oral poetry. The term *diachronic* (as contrasted with *synchronic*) comes from the field of linguistics and refers to the historical dimension of oral poetry—in other words, its cultural continuity and reality through time.[10] In reformulating Kurt Witte's famous phrase that "die Sprache der homerischen Gedichte [ist] ein Gebilde des epischen Verses,"[11] Parry's study of the 'hexametric language' of Homeric poetry leads him implicitly—and I want to stress here the implicit nature of his judgment—to posit a diachronic dimension:

> To establish in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the existence of an artificial language is to prove that Homeric style, in so far as it makes use of elements of this language, is traditional. For the character of this language reveals that it is a work beyond the powers of a single man, or even of a single generation of poets; consequently we know that we are in the presence of a stylistic element which is the product of a tradition and which every bard of Homer's time must have used.[12]

I note with interest that Parry reached these conclusions, based solely on his study of Homeric poetry, before he turned to the living poetic traditions in the former Yugoslavia.[13] Ironically, Parry's meticulous study of Homeric formulas may have led him to undervalue precisely the diachronic dimension to which he alludes in the passage above.

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9. Parry 1971[1928a].16. The original French reads: "une expression qui est régulièrement employée, dans les mêmes conditions métriques, pour exprimer une certaine idée essentielle."
10. Nagy 1996b.17.
11. Witte 1913.
12. Parry 1971[1928a].6.
13. Parry's theses were published in 1928, and his first visit to Yugoslavia was in 1933. See Parry 1971.xxxv.

Despite the sensitivity to diachrony expressed above, Parry's study of Homeric poetry was aimed at determining its system of noun+epithet formulas, which is an eminently synchronic approach.[14] This approach led Parry to speak, for instance, of the "thrift" of the Homeric system, and he defined this as "the degree in which it is free of phrases which, having the same metrical value and expressing the same idea, could replace one another."[15] Parry's useful synchronic perspective on thrift is not counterbalanced by a diachronic perspective: "To know that a form, or a word, or an expression is not traditional, we must know what form, word, or expression *with the same metrical value* the poet could have used in its place."[16] This wording implies that traditional formulas for Parry are only those with unique metrical values. But how could anyone propose to determine, solely on the basis of Parry's observation of thrift, whether a form, word, or expression with the same metrical value was traditional?

Some confusion may arise from Parry's use of the word traditional. What Parry seems to say is that, from a synchronic point of view, the repeated usage of metrically unique noun+epithet formulas shows that they were *current* or *familiar*, or perhaps *preferred* over other formulas, but the existence of a metrically and semantically equivalent formula, even when such a formula can be explained by Parry's concept of analogy,[17] does not prove that it is less traditional. From a diachronic point of view, in each of these cases such a formula could be called traditional, if by traditional we mean that a formula is part of the common stock of oral-poetic devices upon which singers may draw.

In the case of formulas other than the noun+epithet pattern, which have more relevance to the present study, Parry was less certain of their significance:

> Formulae of categories other than that of the noun-epithet formula express such a variety of ideas that it would be much too difficult to find among them a large enough number of cases in which we could

14. Cf. Nagy 1990a.20.
15. Parry 1971[1930].276.
16. Parry 1971[1928a].174 (italics in original).
17. Parry 1971[1928a].68-75, with more examples at pp. 177-80.

> definitely say that the poet was expressing the same idea in different words of the same metrical value.[18]

Nevertheless Parry devoted much energy to the usage of non-epithet formulas in verse-making,[19] which can be shown to be just as important as noun+epithet formulas to the construction of Homeric verse. Parry also considered the larger implications that such formulaic verse-making has on the relationships of theme, formula, and meter. Although there has been much controversy over which of these "drives" the others in oral composition, Parry's own thinking on this point is clear:

> The oral poet expresses only ideas for which he has a fixed means of expression. He is by no means the servant of his diction: he can put his phrases together in an endless number of ways; but still they set bounds and forbid him the search of a style which would be altogether his own.[20]

In the same article from which this quotation is taken, Parry elaborates further on the process of composition: "*the formulas in any poetry are due, so far as their ideas go, to the theme, their rhythm is fixed by the verse-form. . . .*"[21] We can see from these passages that for Parry the story, or theme, motivates the formula, which is then used in conformity with metrical requirements.[22] Already in his French thesis, Parry had warned: "Possibly the greatest risk one runs in the study of traditional diction is that one may give the impression that the action of metre on diction is something mechanical."[23]

A convenient illustration of Parry's insight into the influence of tradition upon Homeric diction involves the epithet ἄλκιμος (*alkimos*) in the *Iliad*. This epithet is used five times for Patroklos in *Iliad* 16, while in *Iliad* 11 it is used three times, in *Iliad* 12 once, in *Iliad* 18

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18. Parry 1971[1928a].175.
19. See esp. Parry 1971[1930].266-324.
20. Parry 1971[1930].270.
21. Parry 1971[1930].272 (italics in original).
22. For Nagy 1990a.29, who revises Parry, the formula is not only conditioned by traditional theme, but meter itself is diachronically generated by formula.
23. Parry 1971[1928a].71.

twice, and in *Iliad* 19 once.[24] As noted by Parry,[25] *alkimos* occurs six times within the *Iliad* as a generic epithet,[26] not counting duplicate formulas as separate occurrences. Since *alkimos* for Parry is a generic and fixed epithet, its meaning should be ornamental and employed without regard to the immediate narrative context. For example, *alkimos* can be used of Telamonian Ajax (12.349, 362), Automedon (17.429), and Diomedes (6.437), as well as of Patroklos (11.605, 814, 837; 16.278, 307, etc.). In all of the instances of *alkimos* mentioned above, the adjective occurs in a larger, patronymic formula that extends from the masculine or trochaic caesura, and in one case from the beginning of the fourth foot, to the end of the line. For example, from the masculine caesura, we observe (17.429):

ἦ μὰν Αὐτομέδων, Διώρεος ἄλκιμος υἱός,

and similarly from the masculine caesura (12.349=362):

ἀλλά περ οἷος ἔτω Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας

where the patronym becomes adjectival and the equivalent metrical value of Αἴας and υἱός allows the former to be substituted for the latter. From the beginning of the fourth foot (6.437):

ἠδ' ἀμφ' Ἀτρεΐδας καὶ Τυδέος ἄλκιμον υἱόν·

and then from the trochaic caesura we have, for Patroklos (16.307):

ἡγεμόνων. πρῶτος δὲ Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμος υἱὸς

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24. All *Iliad* citations are taken from the edition of Monro and Allen 1920; all *Odyssey* citations are taken from the edition of Allen 1917.
25. Parry 1971[1928a].89, Table III.
26. See Parry 1971[1928a].64 on the distinction between *generic* and *distinctive* epithets. Generic and distinctive epithets belong to the larger category of *fixed*, as opposed to *particularized*, epithets, on which see Parry ibid.153-65.

in the nominative and, with the same metrical value, the accusative (16.278):

Τρῶες δ' ὡς εἶδοντο Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμον υἱόν,

In the *Iliad* as a whole the nominative patronymic formula for Patroklos is repeated seven more times (11.605, 814, 837; 12.1; 16.626, 665; 18.12), and in the accusative it is repeated three more times (16.827; 18.455; 19.24). But it is with its usage five times in *Iliad* 16 alone that we are primarily concerned, because it can be argued that here the epithet is not ornamental but particularized, yet for Parry an epithet is not both fixed and particularized at the same time.[27]

If we consider for a moment all the ways in which Patroklos can be named in *Iliad* 16, we are struck at once by the variety. Let us begin by summarizing the principal noun+epithet patterns for naming Patroklos in *Iliad* 16. We have, for example, from a break in the fourth foot to the end of the line, Πατρόκλεες ἱππεῦ (four times), in the vocative. Also in the vocative from the end of the first foot to the bucolic diaeresis, we read διογενὲς Πατρόκλεες (twice), and from the masculine caesura to the end of the line, Πατρόκλεες ἱπποκέλευθε (twice). These two formulas are then combined to make the vocative διογενὲς Πατρόκλεες, ἱπποκέλευθε (once), which extends from the end of the first foot to the end of the line. From the end of the first foot to the bucolic diaeresis there is, in the dative, Πατρόκλῳ μεγαλήτορι (once). In the accusative, from the masculine caesura to the end of the line, we have Πατροκλῆα μεγάθυμον (once). From the end of the first foot to the trochaic break in the fifth foot, there are the genitives Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο (thrice), and from the trochaic caesura to the trochaic break in the fifth foot, Μενοιτιάδαο alone (once). Whereas from the beginning of the line to a break in the fourth foot, there is Πάτροκλός τε Μενοιτιάδης (once). From the trochaic break in the first foot to a break in the fifth foot, there is also Μενοιτιάδεω Πατροκλῆος (once). And finally, as mentioned earlier, from the trochaic caesura to the end of the line, in both nominative and accusative, we read Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμος(ν) υἱὸς(ν) (five times). With Parry, we can see

27. Parry 1971[1928a].126-29.

from these examples that the flexibility and economy of this noun+epithet system inheres in the freedom from both semantic and metrical duplication. Each formula fulfills a different need. Yet the question remains not why *alkimos* is part of a patronymic formula for Patroklos, since metrical demands alone could reasonably account for that, but rather why does this particular patronymic formula appear in *Iliad* 16 five times. With all of the variations at hand that we have just seen, it is surely not metrically necessary five times.

I submit that the answer lies in the direction of traditional theme, and in this case, as this book aims to make clear, the theme of the epithet *alkimos* is tied to the larger theme of *alkē* as manifested in the *Iliad.* When we consider the broader range of meaning in epic represented by *alkē*, we shall see that its adjective *alkimos* reflects a pervasive military theme when applied to Patroklos in *Iliad* 16 and, at the same time, it is evocative of the immediate context. It will be the task of this book to explain the larger theme of *alkē* as it occurs in Homeric poetry, but some indication of the results can be given here to account for why Patroklos is called *alkimos* in *Iliad* 16. The preliminary answer is that *Iliad* 16, the *Patrokleia*, is the portion of the story in which Patroklos will achieve his *aristeia* on the battlefield. In saying this, however, I am not assuming that *Iliad* 16 is a compositional unit that can stand alone. On the contrary, the use of *alkimos* to describe Patroklos reflects the larger theme of *alkē* precisely because the Homeric poems emerge from a unified tradition.

The larger theme of *alkē* entails a special kind of military strength that characterizes a man who is at total war. As stated earlier, a warrior driven by *alkē* exhibits a pattern of behavior that values victory or death. However, the *Iliad* makes clear that not every man is at total war just because he is at Troy. Certain conditions must apply, such as wearing immortal armor, before one can rise to meet the challenge of handling *alkē*. Patroklos satisfies these conditions only in *Iliad* 16, and thus the repetition of the patronymic containing *alkimos* marks him as having achieved a new state.

When we consider formulas such as Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμος υἱὸς from the point of view of theme, we can see that Parry's inferences concerning tradition allow for more flexibility in his system than is sometimes attributed to it. Despite the divergence, according to Parry, in the usage of generalized and particularized epithets, he allows the

formula in general to be motivated by theme, which in turn is always motivated by tradition.[28] It is this standpoint that the present study makes its point of departure.

Following the arguments of Gregory Nagy,[29] I suggest that we reconsider the force that traditional themes exert on the use of generic and distinctive epithets. From a diachronic viewpoint, as Nagy suggests, we can imagine the development of a distinctive epithet, motivated by a traditional theme, that eventually becomes generic and is transferred from one hero or god to an entire class of heroes or gods.[30] While the epithet is still in a distinctive phase, such as the often-cited epithets τλήμων 'enduring' and πολύτλας 'much-suffering' used of Odysseus in the *Iliad*, it may be true that we can see the traditional theme behind it more clearly.[31] Parry himself made this observation about distinctive epithets.[32] From this perspective, both the generic and the distinctive epithets can reflect traditional themes, just at, we might say, different powers of resolution.

The first task of any investigation into the meaning of epithets and epithet formulas is to trace the traditional theme(s) of which they are the expression. The present study makes an attempt in this direction by focusing on the theme(s) of *alkē* that are developed in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* and archaic poetry generally. Here a word on methodology is in order. Rather than focusing on the themes of *alkē* in order to illuminate the usage of epithets, such as the term *alkimos* used in the patronymic of Patroklos, I have instead incorporated the usage of epithets into the broader analysis of theme. Working from the definition of theme as a basic unit of content that is repeated, my analysis posits that the content of archaic *alkē* is reflected both in coherent patterns of diction and in story action, and that this content is traditional.

This argument involves a redefinition (from that of Parry) of what is traditional as the themes or basic units of content that are reflected in repeatable patterns of diction and story action. I designate what is

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28. Parry 1971[1930].270.
29. Nagy 1979.1-5 and 1990a.22-23.
30. Nagy 1990a.23.
31. Nagy 1990a.23.
32. Parry 1971[1928a].82.

traditional, then, to be the felt habit that demands a certain repetition of ideas, regardless of whether those ideas emerge in diction or story action. As I observed in the case of Patroklos, I argue in general that there are indications of theme at work in the "ornamental" usage of epithets derived from *alkē*, and that the way to discover that theme must incorporate a complementary analysis of diction and story action. Once discovered in repeatable patterns, this theme can be said to be traditional.

The investigation followed here posits that all instances of *alkē* and terms related to *alkē* in archaic Greek poetry are part of a larger semantic network, and since both diachronic and synchronic dimensions converge in archaic epic, any place is as good as any other to begin the analysis. There is no beginning, middle, and end when it comes to a semantic system, even if at times we are able to establish some sense of chronological priority for individual attestations. To put this another way, any particular instance of *alkē* in archaic epic is as convenient a beginning as any other, because the traditional, nonlinear dimension of Homeric poetry is reflected at every stage of the linear narration. It will be useful at this point to summarize briefly the three chapters into which I have divided this book.

Chapter 1 focuses on the death of Patroklos in *Iliad* 16, because in the final moments of Patroklos's *aristeia* against Apollo, *alkē* and its adjectives are used directly and indirectly to characterize his actions. I argue that it is significant and conditional for Patroklos's *aristeia* that he be suited in the immortal armor of Achilles, which in turn leads to his death. In *Iliad* 17, Hektor steals the armor of Achilles from Patroklos and has it put on him. At that moment, the god Ares is said to enter into Hektor, filling him with *sthenos* and *alkē*. Presumably the same thing happens to Patroklos when he puts on Achilles' armor, although the passage with Hektor is the only place in the *Iliad* where a god is described as entering a warrior directly. In the commentary of Eustathius, when Hektor puts on Achilles' armor and Ares enters into him, Eustathius says that Hektor, like Patroklos, becomes *entheos* 'having a god within' (Eustathius on *Iliad* 17.210-14).

Drawing on the classical period's depiction of *entheos*, as well as comparative anthropological and psychological models, I argue that there is an important connection between *entheos*, Ares, and *alkē* that can be traced from the *Iliad* into the classical period. When a warrior

like Patroklos is described as being driven by *alkē*, as he will be in two similes that compare him to a leopard and a lion in *Iliad* 16, in effect the poetry is saying that his state is comparable to being possessed (*entheos*) by a divinity like Ares. What I have to say about possession, Ares, and *alkē*, is said in the most compressed manner by Aeschylus in his *Seven Against Thebes* about the warrior Hippomedon. In this description, we find that Aeschylus's interpretation of the war mentality converges strikingly with what is represented in Homeric tradition. This information is used, finally, to reevaluate the death of Patroklos at the hands of Apollo in *Iliad* 16, and to question the necessity of his death in light of his possession by Ares.

Chapter 2 is concerned with *alkē* as a divine signification and as a mark of Zeus-given sanction. There are several scenes where an event occurs that is perceived as an omen by a hero, and where the *alkē* from Zeus is consequently said to be present. Examples include a thundercrash in *Iliad* 8, and the breaking of Teukros's bowstring in *Iliad* 15. The first step is to isolate the factors that lead to the inference by heroes of a divine omen, and then those that lead specifically to the estimation that the *alkē* from Zeus is present. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to examine a poetic device commonly employed in Homeric poetry whereby the narrator is able to perceive which divinity is responsible for a certain event, while the characters involved can only know that *some* divinity is responsible. The perception of events by characters is then examined more closely in the broader context of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of Homeric poetry. Drawing on research in oral poetics, I argue that an individual character's perception cannot be treated apart from the collective poetic tradition from which it emerges. This perspective brings new light to the question of the *alkē* from Zeus, which seems to be inconsistently recognized by characters such as Nestor and Hektor at specific narrative moments. I suggest that the inconsistencies vanish if we view the *alkē* from Zeus as a conventional signifier that, over the course of the Homeric performance tradition, evolved to account for certain events in the narrative.

This chapter continues with a discussion of the relationship between the *alkē* from Zeus, *kudos* 'glory, divine victory', and *kleos* 'glory, epic song'. The differences between *kudos* and *kleos* are explored, and I argue that the central dilemma for Achilles whether to stay and fight at

Troy and gain *kleos*, or to return home to Phthia and die in obscurity, hinges on *alkē*. In two important passages we are told that Achilles has to put on (*duō*) *alkē* to help the Achaeans, and *alkē* in this sense is used as if it were a kind of armor. The combination *duō* + *alkē* is applied only to Achilles in this way, and thus Chapter 2 concludes by examining the broader implications for the premier warrior in the *Iliad* to have to put on his immortal armor/*alkē* in order to save the Achaeans and to win *kleos* for himself.

Chapter 3 examines four formulaic expressions involving *alkē*: *mimnēskomai* 'to remember' + gen. of *alkē*, *lanthanō* 'to forget, lose sight of' + gen. of *alkē*, *medomai* 'to be mindful of, contrive' + gen. of *alkē*, and **maō*[33] 'to be eager for, mindful of' + gen. of *alkē*. The verb *alexomai* 'to defend', which shares the same root as *alkē*, is also examined as it relates to several of the verbs just mentioned. The central argument of this chapter is that there is, in terms borrowed from linguistics,[34] a paradigmatic in addition to a syntagmatic association in Homeric poetry between memory and physical strength. Calls to arms are repeatedly expressed in terms of remembering *alkē*, while divinities like Hera and Athena are described as stirring the *alkē* of warriors through what are usually appeals to their memory. Attention is given to the mechanics of memory as represented in Homeric poetry, and I argue that a warrior must overcome himself by way of memory before he can overcome an enemy by way of *alkē*.

This chapter further utilizes linguistic and comparative analyses for the purpose of exploring the *Odyssey*'s retrospective view of the *Iliad*. It is only after a discussion of the verbs of memory just mentioned and *alkē*, that it makes sense to ask why Agamemnon's death is described in the *Odyssey* in terms of his failure to remember (*mimnēskomai*) *alkē*. In order to offer an answer to this question, I undertake a fuller examination of the usage of *alkē* in the *Odyssey* in general. I argue that *alkē* signifies for the *Odyssey* a militaristic way of life that has to be transformed in order to become more appropriate to a domestic setting.

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33. **maō* is attested in Homeric poetry only in the reduplicated perfect form *memona*.

34. The terms *paradigmatic* and *syntagmatic* are borrowed from Ferdinand de Saussure 1985[1916].170-75, and elaborated upon by Roman Jakobson 1956.

I suggest that within the *Odyssey* the *alkē* of the *Iliad* is not rejected—Odysseus is explicitly told by Athena that he needs to remember *alkē* in order to overcome the suitors—but that instead it is redeemed and put in the service of a civil rather than a military order.

The results of this study are aimed at two separate but complementary goals. The first is to show by close textual analysis the full range of meaning of archaic Greek *alkē*. Bruno Snell[35] once observed that all the words for power and strength in Homeric poetry, of which there are at least eleven,[36] are not generalized entities but instead retain non-overlapping meaning. Rather than insist, as Snell does, on an essential meaning for words like *alkē*, the present work attempts to show how the meaning of *alkē* unfolds within the context of an epic medium with an oral-poetic heritage. If this study accomplishes that, then it will have fulfilled its second goal, which is to demonstrate that *alkē* is stylized as a central organizing principle of the military world in Homeric poetry. Not merely one in a series, *alkē* defines the man who has committed his being to total war. As a measure of self-sacrifice, *alkē* then becomes the basis on which one may lay claim to political and military authority. Homeric poetry thus informs the most eminent warriors, kings, and finally Zeus himself with *alkē* in a continuum of legitimation that finds its ultimate source in the divine order.

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35. Snell 1975.28.

36. Snell 1975.28 himself lists eight: μένος, σθένος, βίη, κῖκυς, ἶς, κράτος, ἀλκή, δύναμις. To these we may certainly add ἀδροτής (or the correction ἀνδρότης), ἥβη and ἠνορέη.

1

Possession, Armor, and the Death of Patroklos

The death of Patroklos is an extraordinary event by most accounts.[1] The most unusual feature of his death is that the god Apollo directly intervenes and stuns Patroklos, enabling Euphorbos and finally Hektor to deal him the fatal blows. Nowhere else in the *Iliad* does a god so directly aid in the killing of a hero.[2] But there is also a more subtle, religious dimension to Patroklos's death. For example, we can detect elements of ritual involved in his encounters with Apollo.[3] On two separate occasions, Patroklos charges the god three times and then is repelled on the fourth. On the first occasion, Apollo is invisible and merely reproaches him with threatening words. These words, however, are not trivial. Apollo tells Patroklos that neither he nor Achilles is fated to overtake Troy. Apollo thus signals the futility of Patroklos's actions, which should dissuade him from continuing. One would think that no matter how enraged a warrior might be, a warning from a god himself would be a cause for concern. Yet on the second occasion, despite the warning and the evident presence of Apollo, Patroklos relentlessly charges the god again as if he had no control over his actions.

Another religious dimension to these events concerns Patroklos's physical and mental state during his encounter with Apollo. Patroklos is clearly not himself during these events. In several places, Patroklos is designated as equal to a *daimōn*, godlike, even equal to Ares. The *daimōn* in Homeric narrative generally represents an impersonal divine

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1. Whitman 1958.198-202. Cf. Janko 1992.408.
2. Whitman 1958.201-202.
3. Lowenstam 1975, Sinos 1980.55, and Nagy 1979.33.

force, and is sometimes equated with Fate. But the expression used of Patroklos, *daimōni isos* 'equal to a *daimōn*', is employed on specific occasions in Homeric poetry,[4] and implies a ritual identification of hero and god. This identification occurs at the peak of Patroklos's *aristeia*, before he is stunned by Apollo and eventually killed by Hektor. We shall be interested in the meaning of the contrast between the height of ritual identification attained by Patroklos with one god, and his subsequent death at the hands of another god.

Patroklos might have been brave elsewhere on the battlefield, but at least during a confrontation with other heroes there is the possibility of success. Confrontation with a divinity who has already indicated the fate of failure demands a different kind of explanation. I do not think the answer is that Patroklos is reckless here, merely full of war mania, or that he has become overconfident as a result of killing Zeus's son, Sarpedon.[5] There is a more immediate explanation to be found in the immortal armor (*ambrota teukhea*) of Achilles that Patroklos is wearing. This armor is special in the first place because it is divine and was fashioned by Hephaistos. More important, however, it communicates to its wearer a kind of power that has specific military and religious qualities.[6] It is to these that we must look for an

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4. For example *daimōni isos* is used of Diomedes at *Iliad* 5.438, 459, and 884 to characterize the height of his *aristeia*, during which he attacks Apollo, wounds Aphrodite, and charges against Ares. Achilles is described as *daimōni isos* in his confrontation with Hektor (20.447), who is closely protected and momentarily saved by Apollo. Achilles' general slaughter of the Trojans motivates the designation *daimōni isos* (20.493), and he is also described thus when he chases Trojans into the divine river Xanthos (21.18), and when the divine river Skamandros pleads with him to fight the Trojans on the plain, away from his corpse-filled stream (21.227). On the ritual antagonism between god and hero implied by the use of *daimōni isos*, see Nagy 1979.143-44.

5. *pace* Janko 1992.311.

6. In a different connection, Thieme 1952.23 argues that the adjective *ambrotos* as used of the armor of Achilles (e.g. at *Iliad* 17.194 and 202) does not mean 'divine', but rather 'Lebenskraft spendend', which is certainly a kind of power. Indeed it is tempting to see with Thieme, ibid., this meaning at work in the narrator's comment that "[Peleus] in turn, grown old, gave [the armor] to his son; but his son did not grow old in the father's armor" (ὁ δ' ἄρα ᾧ παιδὶ

explanation of Patroklos's physical and mental condition before his demise.

Let us begin with certain events after the death of Patroklos, and then retrace our steps in an effort to understand the position of Patroklos in book 16. After Hektor strips Patroklos's armor from him, the Trojans are in the process of carrying it back to Troy when Hektor withdraws from battle, catches up to them, and takes the armor himself. He has it fitted on him and we are told:

> δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης
> δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος, πλῆσθεν δ' ἄρα οἱ μέλε' ἐντὸς
> ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος
>
> *Iliad* 17.210-12

> Ares the terrible war god entered into him,
> and his limbs inside were filled with
> *alkē* and strength

This passage raises two central issues that we shall have to discuss in some detail. First, the passage describes the possession of Hektor by Ares. Possession, a phenomenon in which a divinity or a divine power temporarily invades a person, is a widely attested cross-cultural phenomenon, which we can document in Greece especially well during the classical period. Once a divinity is inside a person, he is thought to lose his consciousness of self, his self-awareness, and the divinity is believed to work through him.[7] Second, we have to examine the *alkē* that is communicated to Hektor in some detail, and explore the relationship between *alkē* and Ares. Archaic and classical Greek poetics represent *alkē*, rather than *sthenos* or any other kind of power, and Ares as intricate and predictable counterparts. The kind of strength or power

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δπασσε | γηρὰς· ἀλλ' οὐχ υἱὸς ἐν ἔντεσι πατρὸς ἐγήρα, *Iliad* 17.196-97), as well as in the fact that Patroklos will be stripped of Achilles' armor by Apollo (16.787-804) before he is killed. Without denying the plausibility of Thieme's argument, my discussion will focus more specifically on another kind of power (*alkē*) that will be seen to motivate Patroklos in battle.

7. See Lewis 1989 (1st ed. 1971) and Oesterreich 1974 (1st ed.1921).

that is distinctively figured in *alkē* is regularly associated with Ares, and the connection between them is expressed in military and religious terms.

The first thing to note with regard to this passage is that it dramatizes the possession of Hektor by Ares. The verb *duō* 'to enter, put on' is used in the sense here only in one other place in the *Iliad*, at 9.239, where *lussa* 'rage' is said to have entered Hektor (κρατερὴ δέ ἑ λύσσα δέδυκεν).[8] There is certainly a thematic parallelism to be found between *lussa* as a kind of rage generated by war, and Ares, the god of war, which can both enter into Hektor. But the parallelism is not strict. The description of Ares entering into Hektor stands alone in the *Iliad* as a graphic example of a mortal becoming possessed by a god.

I use the word "religious" above to convey the seriousness of the event, as well as to highlight an important but underemphasized aspect of this scene. Hektor does not merely feel stronger as a result of putting on the armor; rather, the armor acts as a vehicle for him to become possessed by Ares. This possession has already been hinted at earlier when, after Hektor withdraws to put on the armor, Zeus vows to invest him with *kratos* 'superior strength'. Zeus regards Hektor's actions as 'not in accordance with the order of things' (οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, 17.205), and so commits himself personally to delaying Hektor's inevitable death by strengthening him:

> ἀτάρ τοι νῦν γε μέγα κράτος ἐγγυαλίξω
>
> *Iliad* 17.206
>
> but I shall now put great *kratos* into your hands

The verb *engualizō* 'to put into the hands of' (compare, for example, *Iliad* 15.491, where Zeus is said by Hektor to put surpassing *kudos* 'glory of triumph'[9] into a warrior's hands, κῦδος ὑπέρτερον ἐγγυαλίξῃ) already signals a degree of personal contact between Zeus and Hektor. Zeus nods his head in fulfillment of his promise to Hektor

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8. Cf. Edwards 1991 on 17.210-12.

9. For this translation of *kudos*, see Benveniste 1969 II.68.

(17.209), and in this gesture we are also to understand that Ares has become the executor of Zeus's will.[10] The ultimate authority for investing Hektor with power comes from Zeus; but the realization of Zeus's promise is effected through the direct intervention of Ares.

The possession of Hektor by Ares can be compared to the anthropological phenomenon of spirit possession, which has been documented in a wide array of cultures.[11] The "trance state," to use I. M. Lewis's term, can be induced by a variety of stimuli, including drugs, alchohol, music, dancing, self-inflicted or externally imposed privations such as fasting, or by no external source at all.[12] According to Lewis, "possession" embraces a further range of phenomena such as illness and the indwelling of spirits. In Lewis's framework, possession incorporates and is characterized by trance states, but depends for its definition upon the cultural evaluation of the state of the possessed individual.[13] For the purposes of this work, I will use Lewis's definition of possession:

> Spirit possession thus embraces a wider range of phenomena than trance, and is regularly attributed to people who are far from being mentally disassociated, although they may become so in the treatments which they subsequently undergo. It is a cultural evaluation of a person's condition, and means precisely what it says: an invasion of the individual by a spirit. It is not thus for us to judge who is and who is not *really* "possessed." If someone is, in his own cultural milieu, generally considered to be in a state of spirit possession, then he (or she) is possessed.[14]

It will be useful to compare this definition, which depends upon the cultural interpretation of the phenomenon of possession, to that given

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10. At *Iliad* 1.524-27 Zeus tells Thetis that nodding his head is the *megiston tekmōr* 'greatest sign' that he can give as proof that he will accomplish what he says. Since Zeus never descends upon the battlefield in person in the *Iliad*, we should expect that another god would be designated to fulfill his promise.
11. Again Lewis 1989 and Oesterreich 1974.
12. Lewis 1989.34.
13. Lewis 1989.40.
14. Lewis 1989.40.

by Lewis's predecessor in the study of possession, T. K. Oesterreich. Rather than basing his analysis upon cultural interpretations, Oesterreich attempted to establish a universal psychological basis for possession:

> By the artificial provocation of possession primitive man has, moreover, to a certain degree had it in his power to procure voluntarily at a set time the conscious presence of the metaphysical, and the desire to enjoy that consciousness of the divine presence offers a strong incentive to cultivate states of possession, quite apart from the need to ask advice and guidance from the spirits.[15]

This conclusion of Oesterreich's massive study, which surveys material within as well as outside Christian tradition, emphasizes the circular nature of the motivation for cultivating states of possession. Invoking a metaphysical presence is possible and pleasurable, Oesterreich claims, and the pleasure derived from possession in turn motivates further possession. However, the psychological explanation of possession is not the central concern in the present work. Rather, in accordance with Lewis's observations, I am interested in the cultural evaluation of possession as it is articulated within different societies.

Although possession can occur in many cultures outside a religiously sanctioned context, especially in the case of illness, the Homeric poems vastly complicate the issue of religion. The Panhellenic nature of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* prevent them from explicitly reflecting religious phenomena taking place at the level of local cult.[16] Nevertheless the poems systematize religious phenomena, largely stripping them of their local elements, and re-present them in a generic form. Local cults devoted to Ares are rare in classical times,[17] but he was worshipped,

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15. Oesterreich 1974.377, and cf. ibid. 377n2: "In many cases it is probable that, exactly as in modern spiritualism, the imperious desire for direct communication with departed ancestors and other relatives also plays a part, particularly if we remember the extraordinary extent to which memory of the dead is cultivated in ancestor-worship amongst many peoples with whom the deceased are not excluded by death from the general communion of the living."

16. Nagy 1979.6 and 115-16.

17. Nilsson 1955.517.

among other places, in Sparta[18] and Thrace.[19] Whether possession phenomena took place within the cult worship of Ares in classical times is impossible to know because the historical evidence is silent on this point. Yet Ares' possession of Hektor in the *Iliad* is straightforward. So this raises the question to what extent Homeric epic reflects actual, local cult phenomena, especially in cases where there is no corroborating historical evidence. Moreover, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are generally silent, in contrast to poetry from the classical period, on the issue of divine possession. Even the oracle at Delphi, where possession of the prophetess by the god Apollo is a Panhellenic institution, is only mentioned once in the *Iliad* (9.404-5) and once in the *Odyssey* (8.79-82), and there is no accompanying description of possession itself. But the fact that we do not have historical parallels of possession by Ares to corroborate what is represented in Homeric epic does not detract from the anthropological reality of the phenomenon.

Hektor's possession by Ares at *Iliad* 17.210-12 has been commented on by Eustathius, who interprets this passage in a similar way to what I have been arguing. Some of his remarks on lines 17.210-12 bear careful scrutiny:

> Πάνυ δὲ σεμνύνει τὰ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλα ὁ ποιητής, εἰ οὕτω δυνάμεως ἐμπιπλῶσι τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς καὶ κάτοχον οἷον γενέσθαι Ἄρεϊ. τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῦται ἐν τῷ "δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης," ἤγουν ἔνθεος γέγονε πλησθεὶς Ἄρεος. ἔδυ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὰ τεύχεα Πάτροκλος,[20] οὕτως αὐτὸν Ἄρης. ἔστι δὲ νοεῖν ὡς τοιοῦτος ἦν καὶ Πάτροκλος καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ Ἀχιλλεὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχων ὅπλα.

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18. In Sparta, puppies were sacrificed to Ares Enualios (Pausanias 3.14.9 and Plutarch, *Roman Questions* 290d). In the *Iliad*, *enualios* is Ares' epithet (17.211), and is personified to represent war (18.309). Ares also had a temple at Athens (Pausanias 1.8.4), and was worshipped exclusively by the women at Tegea (Pausanias 8.48.4-5).

19. Cf. Herodotus 5.7. For more on Ares cults in Thrace generally, see Burkert 1985.169-70, Farnell 1909 V.400, and Harrison 1908.374-79.

20. Van der Valk 1987 IV.41 (on his lines 8-10) thinks that Eustathius erred by naming Patroklos here instead of Hektor. The following sentence, however, makes clear that Eustathius has in mind the parallel of Patroklos and Hektor becoming possessed by Ares when they wear Achilles' armor.

Eustathius on *Iliad* 17.210-14

> The poet greatly exalts the arms of Achilles: if he fills Hektor with power [*dunamis*], it is so that as such he becomes possessed [*katokhos*] by Ares. This is shown in the expression "and Ares entered into him" [*Iliad* 17.210]; that is, he has become *entheos* after being filled with Ares. Just as Patroklos enters into [*duō*] the armor, so Ares enters into him. We are to notice that such was the case with Patroklos, and before him Achilles, who has this same armor.

Eustathius tells us that once the god Ares has entered into Hektor, he is technically in a state of being *entheos* 'having a god within'. Although this term does not occur in the Homeric poems,[21] in later Greek it becomes a semitechnical religious term used to describe seers, prophets, bacchants, warriors, and others possessed by a deity.[22] The commentary of Eustathius also highlights another word for possession, *katokhos* from the verb *katekhō*, which in post-Homeric Greek can also mean 'to possess'.[23] The etymology of *katekhō* suggests that a person is 'held down' by a divinity;[24] but Plato suggests, in the case of the

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21. Homeric poetry employs other expressions, like *isotheos* 'equal to a god', and *daimōni isos* 'equal to a *daimōn*' to represent states of possession.

22. In poetry we find possession, for example, in Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 497, where the warrior Hippomedon is said to be possessed (*entheos*) by Ares; at *Agamemnon*, 1209, the chorus asks Kassandra whether she was 'seized by *entheoi* arts' (τέχναισιν ἐνθέοις ἡρημένη); at *Eumenides*, 17, Zeus is said to have made Apollo's breast (φρήν) *entheos*. In Sophocles, *Antigone*, 964, Dionysiac bacchants are called *entheoi* women. In Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 141, the chorus describes Phaedra's raving state as *entheos*. In prose, Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244b, the Sibyl is said to speak by 'mantic *entheos*' (μαντικῇ ἐνθέῳ); in the *Meno*, 99c, and the *Apology* 22c, *khrēsmōidoi* 'soothsayers', and *theomanteis* 'diviners' are described as *enthousiōntes* (from *entheos*); in *Ion*, 533e, the Muse is said to make men *entheoi*, and epic poets are called both *entheoi* and *katekhomenoi*.

23. Cf. the term *katokhos* 'possessed', from *katekhō*, as at Euripides, *Hecuba*, 1090. Note that there the entire Thracian people is referred to as *katokhos* by Ares (Ἄρει κάτοχον γένος).

24. Cf. the idea of being 'taken' (verb *lambanō*) by a god, as it is used for example of Dionysus at Herodotus 4.79.

poet, that *katekhō* means that he is 'suspended' (*eksartaō*) from the Muse.[25] The two expressions *entheos* and *katokhos* are often used interchangeably,[26] as they are in the scholion above, and the important point is that both can indicate the same kind of possession.

The state of being *entheos* has been treated by scholars in some detail.[27] Classical sources provide us with a varied picture of what *entheos* means, but there are some important features of the state that remain consistent. Plato suggests, for example, that the *entheoi* suffer at least a partial loss of awareness:

> οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες [verb *enthousiazō*, from *entheos*] λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν
>
> Plato, *Meno*, 99c

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25. In the *Ion*, Plato has Socrates argue that a rhapsode's proficiency is not due to art (*tekhnē*), but to divine power (*theia dunamis*), which can be compared to the power that a magnet exerts on iron rings (533d). Later in the dialogue, Socrates elaborates on this idea, explaining that the Muses, poets, rhapsodes or actors, and audiences, are all rings (*daktulios*) suspended (*eksartaō*) from one another in a descending order of influence (536a). Possession is then related by Socrates to being suspended: 'one of the poets is suspended from one Muse, another from another. We use the word "possessed" (*katekhō*) for it, but it is nearly the same thing, for he is held' (καὶ ὁ μὲν τῶν ποιητῶν ἐξ ἄλλης Μούσης, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλης ἐξήρτηται· ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται· τὸ δέ ἐστι παραπλήσιον· ἔχεται γάρ, 536ab).

26. For example, Plato, *Ion*, 533e.

27. Rohde 1903 II.18-22, Tambornino 1909.55-57, Pfister 1939.178-91, 1940.102 and *passim*, Dodds 1951.87n41, Nilsson 1955.577-78, Calvo Martinez 1973.160, Burkert 1985.109-11. For a view of possession that interprets *entheos* as metaphorical, see Smith 1965.410-13, esp. 410n23, in conjunction with Burkert 1985.391n1. Rohde (1903 II.19-20) seemed to have thought that *entheos* meant 'being in god' (he says that in possession the soul "ist nun bei und in dem Gotte," and that the *entheoi* "leben und sind in dem Gotte"), but the meaning 'having a god within' is the accepted interpretation (Pfister 1939.183 and 1940.102, Dodds 1951.87n41, Nilsson 1955.579n4, Calvo Martinez 1973.160, Burkert 1985.109). The latter meaning is used in the present work.

> the *entheoi*[28] say many true things, but they know nothing of what they say.

However, in the context of this passage, which argues that politicians pursue just as valid a course under opinion as they do under knowledge, knowledge (*qua* virtue) is represented as something of which one is necessarily unaware. Knowledge is further implied to be the consequences that result from what a politician says (99d), and therefore it, knowledge, cannot be known because they, the consequences, have not happened. In light of this line of thinking, the *entheoi*, who for Plato are divine seers (*theomanteis*) and prophets (*khrēsmōidoi*), are only unaware in the sense that they cannot know the outcome of what they say.[29]

Plato offers the idea that an *entheos* poet or seer first has to have his 'consciousness of self' (νοῦς)[30] taken from him, and only then can he become a vehicle for the divinity. In his dialogue *Ion*, Plato has Socrates expound on what makes Ion such a proficient Homeric rhapsode:

> κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστι καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεος τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ

Plato, *Ion*, 534b

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28. In this case, the term *entheoi* refers to *khrēsmōidoi* 'soothsayers', and *theomanteis* 'diviners' (*Meno*, 99c).

29. Cf. Oesterreich 1974.342.

30. I translate *nous* as 'consciousness of self' rather than 'mind' or 'consciousness' generally, following Rohde 1903 II.20n1. When Plato or others speak in the case of seers (*theomanteis*) or prophets (*khrēsmōidoi*) of a loss of *nous*, they do not mean a total loss of consciousness, as that would imply that the person is unconscious or comatose. It is more accurate to say that 'consciousness of self' is lost in possession, and that a measure of consciousness remains through which the divine source communicates.

> for a poet is a light, winged and sacred thing, and he is not able to compose before he has become *entheos* and put out of his senses, and his consciousness of self [*nous*] is no longer in him.

Elaborating on this point, Plato has Socrates state further that the divinity that caused the possession is what speaks through the poet. Poets and seers become, in this interpretation, mere instruments through which divinity communicates directly with mortals. After suggesting that poets cannot have their skills by dint of a learned art because they only specialize in compositional forms (such as the *dithurambos*, *enkōmia*, *huporkhēma*, *epē*, and the *iambos*) and are not accomplished in all forms, Socrates asserts that the source of this knowledge must be a divinity:

> διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρῆται ὑπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμῳδοῖς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι οὐχ οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτω πολλοῦ ἄξια, οἷς νοῦς μὴ πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φθέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
>
> Plato, *Ion*, 534cd

> On account of this the divinity takes away their consciousness of self [*nous*] and uses them as servants, just as with soothsayers [*khrēsmōidoi*] and divine seers [*manteis theioi*], so that we who hear them may know that they, whose consciousness of self [*nous*] is not present, are not the ones who say such things of great value, but the divinity itself is the one speaking and addresses us through them.

This passage refines Plato's conception of the process of poetry and divination but insists, as in the passage above from the *Meno* (99c), that the state of being *entheos* can only take place with the loss of an individual's consciousness of self (*nous*).

Another striking, but late, testament to the psychological state of the *entheos* comes from the scholia on Euripides' *Hippolytus*, 141. At 141, the chorus describes Phaedra as *entheos*, and asks her who is responsible for her condition. In the scholia to this passage, we read an even more embellished description of the person who is *entheos*, but

here again we see the idea that consiousness of self (*nous*) is absent and supplanted by that of the divinity:

> ἔνθεοι λέγονται οἱ ὑπὸ φάσματός τινος ἀφαιρεθέντες τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ φασματοποιοῦ κατεχόμενοι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐκείνῳ ποιοῦντες.
>
> Scholia to Euripides, *Hippolytus* 141 (Dindorf)

> *entheoi* are said to be those who have had their consciousness of self [*nous*] taken away by an apparition, and being possessed [*katekhomenoi*] by the god who made the apparition they do his bidding.

Unlike the other examples that we have seen, the chorus of the women of Troezen describe Phaedra as *entheos* because she is fasting (136) and mentally unstable[31] (144). Although the context here is not one of war, poetry, or prophecy, the chorus's references to Pan, Hekate, the Korybantes, and the mountain mother (142-44) as possible sources for the *entheos* of Phaedra, are all appropriate to ritual or ecstatic possession.[32] From their point of view at least, Phaedra's behavior is understandable in terms of being *entheos*. It is not clear from Euripides' text, as it is in the scholion, whether the god who caused the *entheos* of Phaedra actually performs her actions, or whether she acts in accordance with the commands of the possessing god. But what is clear is that, from the point of view of the chorus, Phaedra's behavior

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31. I derive the translation 'mentally unstable' from the metaphorical usage of the verb *phoitaō* at 144. The chorus reports at 131-32 that Phaedra is "distressed on a bed of sickness and keeps indoors" (τειρομέναν νοσερᾷ κοίτᾳ δέμας ἐντὸς ἔχειν οἴκων), which suggests that the usage of *phoitaō* at 144 cannot mean literally 'to roam about'. I take *phoitaō* to refer to Phaedra's mental condition.

32. See the summary by Calvo Martinez 1973.166-71.

suggests a lack of volition and perhaps a loss of *nous*,[33] which are conditions prerequisite to becoming *entheos*.

If we return for a moment to Eustathius's commentary on *Iliad* 17.210-12, we can see that his view of what happens to Hektor as a result of wearing Achilles' armor fits the pattern of becoming *entheos* and *katokhos*. Eustathius draws attention to the phrase 'and Ares entered into him' (δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης, 17.210) as evidence for his claim that Hektor has become *entheos* by Ares. Eustathius makes a further comparison that will be of great help to us in bridging this discussion of Hektor to that of Patroklos later. He suggests that if Achilles' armor affects Hektor in this way, then it must also have affected Patroklos and Achilles in a similar way. We shall return to this observation about Patroklos when we examine his death in more detail.

Before we examine the state of *entheos* more carefully, we need to consider the manner in which the *Iliad* highlights Hektor's war mania by comparing him to a maddened Ares. Ares and Hektor are often pictured in the *Iliad* as fighting together.[34] But unlike other warriors who are compared to Ares, Hektor is compared to him particularly with regard to becoming maddened on the battlefield. Already at *Iliad* 5.717, we are introduced to Ares' capacity to become maddened (and thereby his capacity to make others maddened), when Hera advises Athena that they should not easily let him become maddened (εἰ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἐάσομεν οὖλον Ἄρηα). At *Iliad* 5.831, Athena dismissively calls Ares 'this maddened one' (τοῦτον μαινόμενον) as she advises Diomedes not to be afraid of him. In the *Shield* of Hesiod, Ares is pictured maddened, raging and shouting next to a grove sacred to Apollo (99-100, where Ares κεκληγὼς περιμαίνεται ἱερὸν ἄλσος | Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος). In all of these instances we can detect both secular and sacred dimensions in the usage of the verb *mainomai* 'to rage, become maddened'. In the *Shield* passage especially, it is clearly a deliberate evocation of ritual

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33. Rohde 1903 II.20n1, commenting on this scholion, says that the *entheos*, who is in the power of the possessing divinity, and through whom the divinity speaks and acts, lacks self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*). This is the main point of the chorus's remarks about Phaedra.

34. For example, at *Iliad* 5.703-4.

madness to have Ares raging about (*perimainomai*) a grove sacred to Apollo.

In a more striking context, the image of a maddened Ares appears again in the *Iliad,* where it is used in the context of Hektor's battlefield rage:

> τὰ φρονέων νήεσσιν ἔπι γλαφυρῇσιν ἔγειρεν
> Ἕκτορα Πριαμίδην, μάλα περ μεμαῶτα καὶ αὐτόν.
> μαίνετο δ' ὡς ὅτ' Ἄρης ἐγχέσπαλος ἢ ὁλοὸν πῦρ
> οὔρεσι μαίνηται, βαθέης ἐν τάρφεσιν ὕλης.
>
> *Iliad* 15.603-6
>
> With this in mind [Zeus] drove against the hollow ships
> Hektor son of Priam, even though he himself raged.
> Just as when spear-shaking Ares raged or destructive fire
> rages in the mountains, in the deep thicknesses of the forest.

The words translated above as 'rage' are all derivatives of the verb *mainomai* 'to become maddened', which is a verb that can be associated in post-Homeric literature with ecstatic religion and possession.[35] Traces of this meaning are difficult to detect but already exist in Homeric poetry. At *Iliad* 6.132, *mainomai* is used of Dionysus, the god of ritual madness and possession *par excellence*, in a context where the translation 'rage', in the military sense of rage on the battlefield, would be inappropriate. Here something closer to 'ritually maddened' fits the sense better. I suggest that traces of this religious, or more specifically, ritualizing mentality in connection with Ares are evident in the description of Hektor in the passage above. Although I agree in part with Calvo Martinez[36] that Ares is "quizá la divinidad menos ritualizada de todas," nevertheless I think that Ares' connections with ritual, especially as implied by the verb *mainomai* used to describe

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35. For example, see Sophocles, *Antigone*, 1151; Euripides, *Bacchae*, 130; Plato, *Phaedrus,* 244b, *Ion*, 536d; Herodotus 4.79.3; Heraclitus B 15 and 92 DK; Aelian, *Varia Historia*, 3.42; Theocritus 26.13, etc.
36. Calvo Martinez 1973.164.

him, are more embedded in Greek poetry and therefore more difficult to detect.

As an example of the more subtle connection of Ares with ritual, we can see in the passage about Hektor above that Homeric narrative makes a point of noting that he himself raged, or was maddened. The suggestion here is that in other contexts Hektor is enraged or made maddened by a divinity, such as Ares, which is an inference brought out most clearly in the direct comparison to Ares. The point of this passage is not that Hektor can achieve ritual madness or a state of possession on his own, because that would by definition be something different than being *entheos*. It is rather to suggest that the prowess of Hektor is comparable to that attainable under the influence of a divinity. Moreover, the divinity that is most apt to influence Hektor, or the divinity to which Hektor can readily be likened, is Ares. The comparison between Hektor and Ares in this passage actually supplements the passage at *Iliad* 17.210, where Ares possesses Hektor. The description above of Hektor being maddened himself, by way of the comparison of his madness to that of Ares, is meant to highlight Ares' absence here as a possessing divinity. In contrast, at *Iliad* 17.210 Ares' role in ritual possession is dramatized in positive terms.

We are now in a position to reconsider the description of Hektor's possession by Ares at *Iliad* 17.210-12. The description of Ares entering into Hektor captures vividly enough the process by which he becomes possessed, even though he is not described explicitly as being *entheos* or *katekhomenos*. That Hektor has become possessed by Ares can also be confirmed by its effects. Traces of Ares' power working through Hektor are detectable in the ensuing battle in which Hektor confronts Automedon. In order to emphasize Hektor's unique physical and mental state, the *Iliad* presents Automedon as having virtually the same kinds of strength and power. Let us review the description of Hektor after being fitted with Achilles' armor:

δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης
δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος, πλῆσθεν δ' ἄρα οἱ μέλε' ἐντὸς
ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος

Iliad 17.210-12

> Ares the terrible war god entered into him,
> and his limbs inside were filled with
> *alkē* and strength

We can compare this passage directly with what is said of Automedon as he prays to Zeus before confronting Hektor:

> ὁ δ' εὐξάμενος Διὶ πατρὶ
> ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος πλῆτο φρένας ἀμφὶ μελαίνας

Iliad 17.498-99

> and he after praying to father Zeus
> was filled with *alkē* and strength about his black breast

We recall that, in the case of Hektor, Zeus had decided to invest him with *kratos* and, after nodding to seal his commitment, implicitly designated Ares to perform the transfer of power. Here Automedon makes a direct appeal to Zeus, and the power is transferred without the mediation of Ares and without possession.

Yet the differences between Hektor's possession by Ares and Automedon's investment without possession are revealed in their subsequent confrontation. At 17.525 Hektor casts his spear at Automedon but the latter reacts quickly:

> πρόσσω γὰρ κατέκυψε, τὸ δ' ἐξόπιθεν δόρυ μακρὸν
> οὐδει ἐνισκίμφθη, ἐπὶ δ' οὐρίαχος πελεμίχθη
> ἔγχεος; ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μένος δβριμος Ἄρης

Iliad 17.527-29

> for he bent forward, and behind him the long spear
> stuck in the ground, and the butt-end of the spear
> shook; there and then strong Ares took away its force [*menos*]

These words suggest that Hektor's spearcast was not only propelled by his own strength, but also by that of Ares. In light of Hektor's possession by Ares, we have here suggestive evidence that the god

himself is acting through him, and in turn through what he touches. As we saw earlier, this is a standard feature of being possessed, where the recipient of divine intervention becomes the instrument through which the divinity works.

Before turning to Patroklos's death, we need to consider another dimension of Ares' powers of possession. This dimension concerns what we might call the poetics of *alkē*, which was one of the kinds of power communicated to Hektor by Ares at *Iliad* 17.210-12. At first glance there is nothing unusual about *alkē* being conveyed to Hektor, since it appears with some frequency as a concept of strength or power in the *Iliad*. But not all *alkē* in this sense is the same. We need to explore whether there is a dimension to *alkē* that is peculiar to Ares. Indeed, a dimension of this kind is attested elsewhere in Greek poetry, in the *Seven Against Thebes* of Aeschylus. There we read about the warrior Hippomedon outside the gate of Onka Athena:

> αὐτὸς δ' ἐπηλάλαξεν, ἔνθεος δ' Ἄρει
> βακχᾷ πρὸς ἀλκὴν θυιὰς ὡς, φόβον βλέπων.
>
> Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 497-98
>
> And he gave the war cry; possessed [*entheos*] by Ares
> he rages in *alkē* like a bacchant, glancing fear.

Compressed into these brief lines we find a built-in link between Ares, Bacchic or Dionysiac frenzy, and the power of *alkē*. Aeschylus brings together several important threads here that are only implicit in the *Iliad*. The first is that Hippomedon is explicitly characterized as having been made *entheos* by Ares. As in the *Iliad*, Ares himself has already been pictured by Aeschylus elsewhere in the *Seven* as *mainomenos* 'maddened' (343), and we saw earlier how that verb can signal ritual possession. We may recall that in the *Iliad* *mainomenos* is used of both Ares and Dionysus. Hippomedon's condition engendered by the possession is then implicitly compared with Dionysus, by way of the verb *bakkhaō* 'to rave like a bacchant'. The comparison is next made explicit with the phrase 'like a bacchant' (*thuias hōs*). In this way, while Aeschylus signals the ritual dimension of Ares' powers of

possession on the one hand, he also brings Dionysus's province of ecstatic religion into contact with the realm of war on the other.[37]

The powers of possession in war and in ecstatic religion are combined in Hippomedon and what he exudes thereby is *alkē*. The parallelism between Ares' possession and *alkē* in this passage on the one hand, and *Iliad* 17.210-12, where Hektor's limbs fill with *alkē* after being possessed by Ares on the other, confirms that *alkē* is the force that falls under Ares' special preserve. In the passage above, *alkē* most likely represents a kind of strength or power exhibited in war or battle, as Hippomedon is preparing to attack whichever Theban warrior is chosen to meet him at the Onka Athena gate. The expression *pros alkēn* (498), which I have inadequately translated as 'in *alkē*', represents a physical, rather than a moral or intellectual, quality, as it comes between terms (*bakkhaō* and *thuias hōs*) that reflect the action of a bacchant. Scholia on line 498 also treat *alkē* in a physical sense, and compare it to *makhē* 'combat' and *polemos* 'war'.[38] Aeschylus shows us that Ares, by possessing Hippomedon, specifically enhances Hippomedon's readiness for combat, and thus a direct link is established between Ares and *alkē*. In the *Iliad*, *alkē* is never explicitly connected with Ares, with the possible exception of Hektor's possession by Ares at 17.210-12, where his limbs are filled with *alkē*. However, there are indirect links in the *Iliad* between Ares and *alkē*.

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37. The connection between Ares and Dionysus is made explicit by Euripides in the *Bacchae* (302-4): "Αρεως τε μοῖραν μεταλαβὼν ἔχει τινά. | στρατὸν γὰρ ἐν ὅπλοις ὄντα κἀπὶ τάξεσιν | φόβος διεπτόησε πρὶν λόγχης θιγεῖν. "[Dionysus] shares in a portion of Ares. For terror (*phobos*) has struck a host, arrayed in armor and order of battle, before a spear is touched." Compare Pindar, *Dithyramb* 2.16-17, where during a celebration of Bromios (Dionysus) in the palace of the daughters of Ouranos, "the spear of Enualios is brandished" (κεκίνηται τό τ' Ἐνυαλίου ἔγχος). The actual identification of Ares with Dionysus (Bacchus), as for example in Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, 1.19.1, by means of the name Ἐνυάλιος, may be significant but the evidence is too late to be of help here. See Dodds 1960 on *Bacchae* lines 302-4. For more on the association between Ares and Dionysus in tragedy, see Zeitlin 1993.177-78 and especially Lonnoy 1985.

38. See the glosses in Smith 1982.228 (498f and 498g). Cf. Hesychius (ed. Latte), s.v. ἀλκή, where μάχη is listed as one of the synonyms.

Around the shield of Athena, for example, four personified forces are garlanded: *Phobos* 'Terror', *Eris* 'Strife', *Alkē* 'War-Strength' and *Iōkē* 'Onslaught' (5.739-40). As elements of war these forces stand in a general relationship to Ares. But there is one discrete connection. In both the *Iliad* (13.299) and Hesiod's *Theogony* (934), Phobos is actually a child of Ares.[39] We may also note that the outcome of a fight (*ponos*) between Euphorbos and Menelaos can be represented in the *Iliad* either by *alkē* or *phobos* (17.42), where the sense seems to be that they will either fight fiercely (*alkē*), or withdraw ignominiously (*phobos*). As Hans Trümpy[40] has shown, in Homeric narrative *alkē* and *phobos* regularly function together as opposites. Ares is once portrayed in the *Iliad* as war or fighting personified, by means of his epithet Enualios (18.309), and this in turn further connects him with the *alkē* and *phobos* of combat. *Eris* and *Iōkē* are nowhere mentioned as genealogically or otherwise directly related to Ares, although their forms of influence are appropriate to him.

Within the *Iliad*, there is an important dimension to *alkē* in its relationship to Ares that we have not yet explored. This dimension concerns the indomitable or uncontrollable nature of *alkē*. There are two instances of *alkē* in this sense in the *Iliad*, and their implications are critical for the understanding of the word's usage in general. The first example comes from book 21, where Agenor is sent into battle with Achilles by Apollo. Agenor, however, is outmatched. But for the grace of Apollo, who shrouds Agenor in mist and removes him from the battlefield, Achilles would have killed him. Agenor's condition is compared to that of a leopard before an overpowering hunter:

> εἴ περ γὰρ φθάμενός μιν ἢ οὐτάσῃ ἠὲ βάλῃσιν,
> ἀλλά τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένη οὐκ ἀπολήγει
> ἀλκῆς, πρίν γ' ἢ ξυμβλήμεναι ἢὲ δαμῆναι

39. Aeschylus, in the *Seven Against Thebes*, in lines immediately following those describing Hippomedon above, depicts Phobos vaunting before the Onkan gate (500). Certainly the genealogical relationship (as attested for example in the *Theogony*) of Ares and Phobos is meant to be evoked here.
40. Trümpy 1950.220.

Iliad 21.576-78

> even if a man anticipating her should lunge or throw [a spear],
> although pierced with the spear she does not desist from
> her *alkē*, before either closing with him or being overthrown

The underscored portion could be taken to mean that the leopard's will to fight is so great that it, and its physical expression as *alkē*, drive it on to kill or be killed. But it is more plausible, as I shall clarify further with a second example, that *alkē* here is an autonomous force that directs the leopard. What is most important here, however, is that until now we have not seen described any of the consequences of exhibiting *alkē*. A warrior is said to have *alkē*, or to exhibit it, but this is the first time that its actual effect is mentioned. Its effect, as in the passage above, is that it relentlessly drives one to overcome an adversary or to be overcome by him. In this sense, *alkē* is insurmountable and blind once it has taken hold. A warrior such as Agenor, about whom the leopard simile is used, will fight his opponent Achilles until one or the other of them is killed. And it is just this virtue, or perhaps weakness, of *alkē* that motivates Apollo at the last moment to withdraw Agenor from conflict (21.597-98).

The second example of *alkē* in its aspect as an uncontrollable combative force finally returns us to Patroklos, whose death we have been laying the groundwork to explain. It will be useful first to summarize some of the arguments made up to this point. Since Patroklos confronts Apollo in book 16 dressed in Achilles' immortal armor, we began by examining the ways in which that armor affects its bearers. We saw a graphic description of what happened to Hektor (*Iliad* 17.210-12) when he had the armor fitted to him. Ares entered into him and his limbs were filled with *alkē* and *sthenos*. Hektor's physical and mental condition after this possession was described by Eustathius as *entheos*, which is not a Homeric term, but is one that classical Greek literature especially employs with a near technical regularity to describe the same phenomenon. Hektor's condition of being *entheos*, then, from the point of view of the classical material at least, can be characterized as lacking *nous* 'consciousness of self', and as allowing the god, in this case Ares, to work through him.

Upon further examination of *alkē*, we noticed that this word stands in a peculiarly apt relationship to Ares. In a passage from Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes* (497-98), we saw how the warrior Hippomedon was described in virtually the same terms as Hektor in the *Iliad* (17.210-12), where Ares had possessed them both and given them *alkē*. Subtle and indirect connections between Ares and *alkē* in the *Iliad* were examined, but as we saw there was no direct linkage between the two in epic poetry. Finally we examined how, in one of two important instances of *alkē* in the *Iliad* (21.578), *alkē* can represent a fighting force that cannot be controlled. It is with this aspect of *alkē* in mind that we are now best prepared to consider the death of Patroklos.

The *Iliad* already marks Patroklos for death in book 11, in terms that will now be very familiar. Achilles is on the stern of his ship observing the fighting (*ponos*) and onslaught (*iōkē*)[41] between the Achaeans and Trojans (11.601). He sees Nestor carrying the Achaean Makhaon, whom he does not recognize, off the battlefield, and at that moment he calls Patroklos out of his shelter:

ὁ δὲ κλισίηθεν ἀκούσας
ἔκμολεν ἶσος Ἄρηϊ, κακοῦ δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλεν ἀρχή.
τὸν πρότερος προσέειπε Μενοιτίου ἄλκιμος υἱός.

Iliad 11.603-4

and he, hearing him from the hut,
came out equal to Ares, and this at once was the beginning of his evil.
The *alkimos* son of Menoitios addressed him first.

While neither the expression *isos Arēi* 'equal to Ares', nor the adjective *alkimos*, are restricted in the *Iliad* to Patroklos, these words mark him in a manner that will become more resonant as the narrative proceeds.

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41. Note that this is the same term that we saw earlier, personified and garlanded around the shield of Athena (5.740). The language, too, is similar and homophonic: at 5.740, we read *kruoessa Iōkē* 'chilling Onslaught', while at 11.601, it is *iōka dakruoessan* 'tearful onslaught'.

Patroklos has several other epithets in the *Iliad*, such as *diogenēs* (5 times), *hippeus* (4 times), and *hippokeleuthos* (3 times), but this is the first time he is called *alkimos*. He will be called *alkimos* five more times in book 16 alone,[42] which is clearly meant to emphasize that book 16 is his *aristeia*. Book 16 is, after all, called the *Patrokleia*. But from our point of view, the intensified usage of *alkimos* in book 16 is meant to heighten Patroklos's religious identification with Ares. In the passage above from book 11, Patroklos has not yet been given Achilles' armor, so it foreshadows events to come that here he is already called *isos Arēi*. After he puts on the armor in book 16, we should expect that the identification with Ares will become intensified.

When Achilles gives his immortal armor to Patroklos, agreeing to let him take his place in battle before the Trojans, he warns him to come back after he has driven them from the ships lest an Olympian attack him (16.91-4). Of course, Patroklos will not heed this warning. But the reason for this, I suggest, lies in what happens to Patroklos after he puts on the armor. The description of Patroklos fitting himself with the armor (16.130-38) does not mention that Ares, as in the case of Hektor later, enters into him. However, as Eustathius observed in the passage quoted earlier, there is a symmetry between Patroklos and Hektor wearing Achilles' armor (Eustathius on *Iliad* 210-14). Since the armor is the same, if Ares enters into Hektor and fills his limbs with *alkē* and *sthenos*, then we may infer that the same thing happens to Patroklos. Patroklos does not take Achilles' ash spear, as it is too unwieldy for anyone but Achilles (16.140). But Patroklos does pick up two other spears to complete his outfit, and as if to intensify the references to Ares, they are both described as *alkimos* (ἄλκιμα δοῦρε, 16.139).[43]

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42. The general distribution pattern of *alkimos* as applied to Patroklos also reflects the military importance for him of book 16: it occurs in book 11 (3 times), book 12 (1 time), book 16 (5 times), book 18 (2 times), and book 19 (1 time).

43. Shannon 1975.84 emphasizes the symbolism of mortality and destruction of Achilles' ash spear (μελίη, e.g at *Iliad* 16.143), and its thematic importance for the relationship between Achilles and Patroklos. I draw attention to the fact that although Patroklos does not take Achilles' *Pēliada meliēn* 'Pelian ash spear' at 16.140, the spears (*doru*) that he does take are marked with the adjective *alkimos*, which connotes the possibility of destruction by way of its

After Patroklos returns to the field of battle, he kills twenty-seven Trojans, an exceptional number,[44] which I infer to result from his possessed state in Achilles' armor. Patroklos seems unstoppable. As we have seen, this is exactly to be expected from the *alkē*, communicated to him through the armor by Ares, that now drives him. So uncontrollable is Patroklos's onslaught that he kills, with the begrudging acquiescence of Zeus, Zeus's son Sarpedon. Glaukos, Sarpedon's companion, then marshalls the Lykians, and in words that are more revealing than even Glaukos knows, he says that *Ares* has struck Sarpedon down by means of Patroklos's spear (τὸν δ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλῳ δάμασ' ἔγχεϊ χάλκεος Ἄρης, 16.543).

Patroklos next encounters Apollo in what will be the first of two parallel confrontations. On the first of such, three times Patroklos tried to mount the Trojan wall and three times Apollo battered him back (16.702-3). Then Apollo speaks to Patroklos and tells him that it is neither his, nor Achilles', destiny (*aisa*) to take Troy (16.707-9). One would expect that in the context of a warning from Apollo, Patroklos would back down. He does back down momentarily, but then Apollo stirs on the Trojans, which in turn motivates Patroklos to reengage. The narrator comments on how misguided Patroklos is here, saying that the mind (*noos*) of Zeus is always stronger, and that he can terrify (*phobeō*) even the man who is *alkimos* (16.689). In his state of being *entheos* by Ares, Patroklos has lost his *nous* 'consciousness of self', and has been given over to the will of Ares working through him. That will, reflected in Patroklos by the use of the term *alkimos*, is what drives Patroklos to his death.

Patroklos throws a stone and hits Hektor's charioteer, Kebriones, knocking him from his chariot and killing him. At this point, the *Iliad* describes Patroklos in terms of *alkē* by way of a simile reminiscent of the one about Agenor quoted earlier. This is the second, and most explicit, description of *alkē* as an autonomous driving force, which I alluded to earlier. For our purposes, it is tragically significant that it used of Patroklos, and it further supports my claim that it is the *alkē* of

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association with the power of *alkē*.

44. Janko 1992.411.

Ares that prevents Patroklos from heeding the warning of Apollo. After killing Kebriones, Patroklos rushes in to strip his armor:

> οἷμα λέοντος ἔχων, ὅς τε σταθμοὺς κεραΐζων
> ἔβλητο πρὸς στῆθος, ἐή τέ μιν ὤλεσεν ἀλκή

Iliad 16.752-53

> having the spring of a lion, who while ravaging stables
> has been hit in the chest, and his *alkē* destroys him

Unlike the previous example of Agenor (*Iliad* 21.576-78), where the consequences of *alkē* were described as driving a leopard to overcome or to be overcome, here *alkē* represents the cause of death itself. Even though the lion is wounded, which can be interpreted as an allusion to Patroklos's condition, its *alkē* prevents it from disengaging from battle and tending to its own needs. Like the warrior Hippomedon in Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes*, the *alkē* that drives Patroklos here, if the simile above allows us to draw such an inference, is the outward expression of being possessed by Ares. Patroklos's own person has been eclipsed by that of Ares and, like the wounded lion, he is no longer aware of his own needs at this point (he lacks *nous* 'consciousness of self'). The simile also makes it clear that both the lion and Patroklos *are being driven*—not that they are driving themselves—to their deaths. Apparently the only limit on *alkē* while in this state of possession is the death of the being in which it is active.

But the death of Patroklos is not accomplished without the aid of Apollo, and this raises several interesting parallelisms. Neoanalytic scholars have noted that the death of Patroklos at the hands of Hektor and Apollo, in addition to Euphorbos, parallels the death of Achilles at the hands of Paris and Apollo.[45] According to the *Aithiopis*, the Ethiopian hero Memnon slays Antilokhos, and in turn is slain by Achilles at the Skaian Gate. Then after Eos, Memnon's mother, bestows immortality upon him, Apollo and Paris collude to kill Achilles at the

45. Scheliha 1943.264, and Kullmann 1960.315-16, with further bibliography. See also the summary in Janko 1992.312-14.

Skaian Gate. Patroklos is hit from behind by Apollo and Euphorbos, and then killed by Hektor, also at the Skaian Gate. Hektor, too, is slain at the Skaian Gate at the hands of Achilles and Apollo. Now what is interesting here is that Patroklos, Memnon, Hektor, and Achilles all wear immortal armor forged by Hephaistos.[46] If we can take the description of Ares possessing Hektor at *Iliad* 17.210-12, when he puts on Achilles' armor, to be the model, then we have to ask whether there is any deeper connection between wearing full immortal armor, becoming possessed by Ares, and dying.

We can further refine the question by separating Achilles and Memnon from the group, because they alone seem to be capable of killing leading warriors with or without the aid of Apollo. In the *Aithiopis*, Memnon kills Antilokhos on his own, and then Achilles kills him. Achilles then kills Penthesileia.[47] In the *Iliad,* Apollo merely forsakes Hektor (22.213), thus passively enabling Achilles to kill him. The parallelisms between Memnon and Achilles extend further. Although Memnon dies at the hands of Achilles, he is semidivine and so his mother Eos, by permission of Zeus, can make him immortal. Achilles is also semidivine, and the *Aithiopis* tells us that his fate, like Memnon's, is to have his mother Thetis transport him to the White Island. We can infer from this that Achilles is made immortal as well.

Patroklos and Hektor by contrast are not semidivine, and thus their situations call for a different explanation. Apollo does not actively contrive to kill Hektor, as he does Patroklos, but he does not actively help him either (again 22.213). This is an important distinction because Apollo's active aid to Hektor, which leads to Patroklos's death, foregrounds this entire encounter as highly unusual. Why should a divinity aid in the killing of a mortal? Nowhere else in the *Iliad* does

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46. In the Proclus summary of the *Aithiopis*, Memnon is said to wear *hēphaistoteukton panoplian* 'Hephaistos-made armor'. Patroklos, Hektor, and Achilles wear the same armor; Hephaistos makes a second set for Achilles. Cf. Pestalozzi 1945.43.

47. Note, however, that in Proclus summary of the *Aithiopis*, after Achilles kills Penthesileia, who is called the 'daughter of Ares', and then Thersites, who had reproached Achilles for loving her, Achilles sails to Lesbos and sacrifices to Apollo, Artemis, and Leto to become purified from bloodshed by Odysseus.

Apollo intervene to strike a warrior,[48] nor does any other god for that matter. In my view Apollo's intervention is necessary to counterweigh the threat of Patroklos's possession by Ares.[49] Before Apollo's intervention, Patroklos indeed kills Sarpedon, a son of Zeus, which indicates that he has achieved a state at least as powerful as that of a semidivine hero. After Sarpedon's death, Zeus "ponders many things with regard to the murder of Patroklos" (πολλὰ μάλ' ἀμφὶ φόνῳ Πατρόκλου μερμηρίζων, *Iliad* 16.647), then sends Apollo to retrieve Sarpedon's body, and this indirectly leads Apollo to stop Patroklos's onslaught.

Since both Hektor and Patroklos wear Achilles' armor, we expect that some of their actions should take on a similar character. At one point, in fact, after Athena disguised as Deïphobos has encouraged Hektor, he says something reminiscent of the animal similes used of Patroklos:

> νῦν αὖτέ με θυμὸς ἀνῆκε
> στήμεναι ἀντία σεῖο. ἕλοιμί κεν, ἤ κεν ἁλοίην
>
> *Iliad* 22.252-53
>
> now my *thumos* has driven me in turn
> to stand against you. I must take you, or I must be taken

The passive language in the first sentence, and the "kill or be killed" mentality in the second, can be compared to what *alkē* was said to do to Patroklos by way of the lion (16.752-53) and leopard (16.567-78) similes used of him. Neither Hektor nor Patroklos has control over their actions and this state of affairs is to be expected if we understand them to be *entheoi* by Ares. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that neither Patroklos nor Hektor received Achilles' ash spear to complete their

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48. Whitman 1958.201-2.

49. I am suggesting that Patroklos's possession by Ares may represent, within the religious economy of the *Iliad*, a direct threat to the sovereignty of Olympian divinity as represented by Zeus and Apollo. Hence they aid in his death. Cf. Lewis's 1989.26-28 and 107-8 discussion of the politics of what he calls 'peripheral possession' *vis-à-vis* a given centralized religious organization.

panoply, which might have prevented them from fully actualizing the capacity of the armor. And although we know from the *Aithiopis* that divinely armored Memnon and Achilles will also die, within the *Iliad* only Patroklos and Hektor die so armored. I conclude from this that the *Iliad* is emphasizing their mortality, and is underscoring their inadequacy to maintain themselves for long in a divine capacity.

There is one further distinction to make between the deaths of Patroklos and Hektor. Patroklos's death is more ritualized in general than that of Hektor. I use the term *ritualized* here to denote a formalized pattern of interaction between a hero and a divinity, rather than to suggest that Homeric narrative is presenting a series of religious rites that can be correlated with a given historical practice in cult. At the same time, I recognize that the formulaic nature of Homeric poetry itself may also be the source for repeated dictional patterns, rather than actual religious ritual. But even formulaic diction and thematic repetition suggest a kind of ritualizing mentality,[50] and the singular nature of Homeric poetry makes it difficult to judge finally what may, or may not, represent historical ritual.

In *Iliad* 16 Patroklos charges Apollo three times, only to be repelled on the fourth, on two separate occasions (16.702-5, and 784-7). The "thrice . . . but the fourth time" pattern occurs elsewhere in the *Iliad* (e.g. 13.20, 22.165 and 208), and occurs on two other occasions between a warrior and Apollo at 5.436-39 (Diomedes), and at 20.445-48 (Achilles).[51] But unlike the single "thrice . . . but the fourth time" encounters between Diomedes/Achilles and Apollo, Patroklos undergoes this experience an unprecedented two times. This does not merely distinguish Patroklos from Diomedes and Achilles; rather, in my view it casts his encounter with Apollo in more overtly ritualizing terms. In the fourth attempt on both occasions Patroklos is marked by the

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50. Cf. the remarks of Whitman 1958.250: "Thematic motifs, such as descriptions of sacrifices, ship-launchings, feasts, funerals, arming, and combat, are on the whole fixities of the poems, as indeed they were of the world from which the poems arose, and the recitation of such passages is as ritualistic, in a way, as were the performances of the acts which they describe."

51. Cf. Whitman 1958.200; Janko 1992.400, on lines 16.702-6, merely calls these patterns "traditional," and does not comment on their ritual value.

expression *daimoni isos* 'equal to a *daimōn*' (16.705 and 786). But it is on the second and fatal charge that Patroklos is also called 'equal to swift Ares' (θοῷ ἀτάλαντος Ἄρηϊ, 16.784). By occurring at this final moment before Patroklos's death, the *Iliad* seals the identification of hero and god. At this moment Patroklos has become Ares.

However, the *Iliad* does not represent this state of affairs as tenable. Indeed, if there is a consistent theme behind the deaths of Patroklos and Hektor, both of whom die suited in Achilles' immortal armor, it is that achieving a state of *entheos* by Ares is an inherently unstable condition. Unlike the examples of *entheoi* individuals discussed earlier, where we saw how seers, prophets, and poets could undergo temporary periods of possession, the warrior presents a different case. The possession of seers, prophets, and poets results in well-defined outcomes: the seer has a vision, the prophet prophesizes, and the poet sings poetry. However, Homeric epic represents the possessed warrior as killing, and continuing to kill, until he is stopped by being killed. This ideology is prefigured or reflected in the concept of *alkē*, which engenders a "kill or be killed" mentality, and is said to drive an animal (warrior) relentlessly to its death. Taking the case of Hektor (*Iliad* 17.210-12) as a model, *alkē* is conveyed to a warrior by Ares when he dons immortal armor.

Outside the *Iliad*, the deaths of Memnon and Achilles in immortal armor indicate that even semidivine warriors who achieve a state of possession by Ares will eventually die. Within the *Iliad*, however, only Patroklos and Hektor die in immortal armor, which suggests that mortals are incapable of handling the divine forces conveyed to them through possession. On the other hand, when Patroklos reaches the peak of his *aristeia* in his struggle against Apollo, his condition is likened to that of Ares (16.784). He has achieved a state of divinity. Unlike Achilles, who, except for Apollo withdrawing his help, is alone capable of killing Hektor, it takes Apollo, Euphorbos, and Hektor to kill Patroklos. The fact that Patroklos charges Apollo on two separate occasions, and in the meantime kills the semidivine Sarpedon, reinforces the notion that Patroklos is as unstoppable as a divinity, and thus Apollo, and at a further remove Zeus, must intervene to aid in his destruction. This final battle between what are virtually two gods stands alone in the *Iliad*. Even Diomedes, who can wound Aphrodite (5.335-37), almost kill the semidivine Aineias but for Apollo's intervention (5.445), and who later with Athena's help can wound Ares himself

(5.856-67), nevertheless backs down at Apollo's command (5.443). However, through possession by Ares Patroklos is able to encounter divinity as divinity himself, and thus his final military exploit, which the *Iliad* seems to cast in ritual terms, represents an attainment of religious grace– a mortal has momentarily transcended his mortality– before the sudden reversal by Apollo can lead to his death.

The ritual dimension of Patroklos's death can be carried further. As mentioned earlier, in the course of his *aristeia* Patroklos kills Sarpedon, a son of Zeus who in several respects resembles Memnon.[52] Patroklos is thereby cast in a role similar to that of Achilles, who in the *Aithiopis* slays Memnon, and then is slain. Just as Memnon's mother Eos immortalizes him, Achilles' mother Thetis bears him off his funeral pyre to the White Island. But this kind of immortalization is impossible for Patroklos, because he is neither semidivine, nor has a divine sponsor.[53] Yet, on the level of cult as opposed to that of myth, the *Iliad* insists on the similarity between Patroklos and Achilles by having Patroklos's ghost ask to have his bones buried with Achilles' (23.83-4). When Achilles orders that a grave mound be built and that Patroklos's bones be set in a golden jar to await burial, until "Achilles himself covers him in Hades" (23.243-44), there is a suggestion that these two heroes may share a cult at Troy. Achilles tells the Achaeans not to build a large mound for him and Patroklos, but only a modest one, and to return to it at a time when they can make it broad and high (23.246-47). Although this is not direct evidence for cult, Achilles' words presuppose that the Achaeans will continue to tend his and Patroklos's funeral mound after the war is over. It is also significant in this regard that the funeral games for Patroklos take place next to the funeral mound. In Homeric narrative, athletic games function as part of funerary rites[54] and certainly prefigure later patterns of cult worship, even if they do not yet assume the seasonal character of, for example,

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52. Kullmann 1960.318, Pestalozzi 1945.13-15 and 44-45, Janko 1992.313, with further bibliography.

53. A different tradition, attested in Pausanias (3.19.13), does represent Patroklos on the White Island with Achilles.

54. Cf. the games in honor of Amarynkeus (*Iliad* 23.630-31) and of Achilles (*Odyssey* 24.85-6).

the games in honor of Demophoön in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (265-67).[55] I suggest that the immortalization of Patroklos to be achieved in cult, as represented indirectly by the *Iliad* in the funeral games, thus presents compensation for Patroklos's inability to be immortalized like Achilles in myth.

In the early fifth century B.C.E., the ritual dimensions of Patroklos's death, in the sense of sacrifice, were further elaborated upon by classical audiences. At least one stamnos vase painting, attributed to the Triptolemos Painter, represents a sacrificed ram as Patroklos.[56] The ram is lying with its throat cut between the feet of two warriors, only one of whom (on the right) is named, and the name given is Hektor. Behind these two warriors stand two older men, named Phoinix and Priam respectively. The events appear similar to the events described in *Iliad* 17, where Ajax and Hektor battle over the body of Patroklos. Thus the unnamed warrior could be Ajax. The other side of the vase, however, represents the Embassy scene in *Iliad* 9, and Diomedes, Odysseus, and Phoinix (all named), flank a seated and recalcitrant Achilles. For the sake of plot consistency, it is possible that the unnamed warrior standing over the ram Patroklos on the other side could be Achilles himself, although this is uncertain. Whatever the solution to this problem, the interpretation of Patroklos as a sacrifice in place of Achilles is fraught with even more difficulties.[57] Nevertheless this vase

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55. Rohde 1903 I.19 suggests that many aspects of the funerary rites and games for Patroklos recur in later times in customs reserved for hero cult. Yet because funerary rites and games are not repeated on a regular basis in Homeric poetry, Rohde rules out the existence of hero cult *per se* in Homer. I concur with Nagy 1979.116-17, that in Homeric poetry we are dealing with intimations of cult practices, which, because of the Panhellenic nature of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, are deliberately made generic and "universal." Rohde's argument *ex silentio* cannot be taken to exclude the possibility that the funeral games for Patroklos, and the common burial ground for him and Achilles, reflect hero cult ideology. For more on hero cult in Homer, see Hack 1929 and Price 1973.

56. Discussion in Schmidt 1969 and Griffiths 1985.

57. Schmidt 1969.149-50 cautions against applying modern concepts of sacrifice to this painting. There is no evidence either in the *Iliad*, or in the surviving fragments from the Achilles trilogy of Aeschylus, to whom Schmidt

painting shows that Patroklos's death, beginning with its representation in the *Iliad*, might have conveyed more ritual dimensions to a classical audience than we are able to recover.

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attributes the idea for the painting, for Patroklos to have been sacrificed. Griffiths 1985.49-50, compares the ram to the common folk motif of spiriting a person away and substituting an animal in their place, as Artemis does for Iphigeneia.

2

The Alkē from Zeus and the Ambiguities of Signification

In the *Iliad*, *alkē* can manifest itself in an event that marks a change in fortune of one adversary to another. The perception of *alkē* seems peculiarly attached to a defining event, or to a change of state, which suggests that from the point of view of the observer *alkē* can be represented simultaneously as both a cause and effect. This defining event, or change of state, is often directly equated with the presence or absence of *kudos*, which is glory granted by Zeus, and *kleos*, which is glory granted through song.[1] As we shall see presently, the defining event need not be interpreted by Homeric characters as "unusual" or "unnatural" in our senses of those terms. These distinctions carry little value for warriors in Homeric poetry. But an event can be thought, quite "naturally" to warriors, to be the result of divine influence. The event must be decisive in some manner; in other words, at a given moment the course of action has to be believed by those involved to have been changed. The important question here is exactly what the sufficient nature of such a change is that would indicate the presence or absence of *alkē*.

At the beginning of *Iliad* 8, Zeus convenes all the immortals upon Olympus with the aim of ordering them not to intervene on either side in the war. After receiving an assurance from Athena that they would only offer counsel to the Argives, Zeus dresses himself in gold clothing and travels to mount Ida, his consecrated space (*temenos*, 8.48), from which he will oversee the events at Troy. At high noon, Zeus sets two portions of doom (*kēr*) in his golden scales and it weighs heaviest for

1. On the distinction between *kleos* and *kudos*, see Benveniste 1969 II 58-9.

the Achaeans (8.70-72). At that moment he thunders (*ektupe*) and hurls a lightning flash (*daiomenon selas*) over the Achaeans (8.75-76). The Achaeans seem to interpret these events as ominous as all except Nestor and Diomedes begin to flee toward their ships, but nowhere is such an interpretation made explicit. Even Odysseus retreats despite Diomedes' taunt to him not to be a coward (8.94-96). Diomedes then pairs up with Nestor, whose horse has been wounded, and Nestor is given the task of driving Diomedes' chariot. Diomedes wishes to remain in battle, and with Nestor's guidance he is soon able to kill Hektor's chariot-driver with a spear cast (8.119-21).

We come now to the moment of decision, and the reason for all of the detail above will now be made clear. At the death of Eniopeus, Hektor's chariot-driver, Zeus recognizes that the Achaeans are getting the upper hand and that Hektor and his new driver, Archeptolemos, will be fatally penned against Ilion (8.130-32). He intervenes directly to reverse matters:

> βροντήσας δ' ἄρα δεινὸν ἀφῆκ' ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν,
> κὰδ δὲ πρόσθ' ἵππων Διομήδεος ἧκε χαμᾶζε·
> δεινὴ δὲ φλὸξ ὦρτο θεείου καιομένοιο,
> τὼ δ' ἵππω δείσαντε καταπτήτην ὑπ' ὄχεσφι
>
> *Iliad* 8.133-36

> he thundered terribly and hurled bright lightning,
> and sent it down to the ground in front of Diomedes' horses;
> and a terrible flame of blazing sulphur went up,
> and the two horses in fear cowered under the chariot

This sudden strike of lightning causes Nestor to lose hold of the reins and to become afraid. But what is it exactly that makes Nestor afraid? We should pause here briefly and reflect on the events that have just taken place. When Zeus first thundered from Ida and hurled a lightning flash amid the Achaeans (8.75-6), Nestor was preoccupied at that moment with his ailing horse, which had just been hit by an arrow from Alexandros. We are told explicitly that Nestor stays with his horse against his will (οὔ τι ἑκών, 8.81), so we can infer that he too, as a result of the lightning, wanted to flee the battlefield. Yet when

Diomedes storms through the warriors and stands in front of Nestor's horses, he quickly persuades Nestor to drive his chariot while he continues fighting the Trojans. Nestor does not protest this in the least, which seems to contradict his apparent unwillingness to remain on the battlefield (again, 8.81). Diomedes even boasts that his Trojan horses, which he says he took from Aineias, understand their plain, and know how to pursue and withdraw rapidly (οἷοι Τρῶῖοι ἵπποι, ἐπιστάμενοι πεδίοιο | κραιπνὰ μάλ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διωκέμεν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι, 8.106-7).

We have to accept that Nestor is persuaded by the forcefulness of Diomedes' plea that they remain in battle, despite the ominous thunderstroke "toward the Achaeans" (μετὰ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν, 8.76), and in spite of the fact that the lightning flashes out of a sun-filled sky at midday (8.68). Oddly, neither Diomedes, nor Nestor, perceives that there has been in these events any divine intervention meant to impede their action. But when the lightning strikes the ground in front of the chariot horses, and Nestor loses hold of the reins, he suddenly realizes that some other force is at work. It is unclear whether the pivotal event for Nestor was the explosion of lightning on the ground, or the fact that the horses balked in fear, or something else altogether: we may recall that these are the same horses that Diomedes had boasted were familiar with the plain and with the tactics of battle (8.106-7). Perhaps it was their sudden change of behavior that finally persuaded Nestor. However that may be, Nestor responds to the changed circumstance now "afraid in his *thumos*" (8.138):

> Τυδεΐδη, ἄγε δὴ αὖτε φόβονδ' ἔχε μώνυχας ἵππους.
> ἦ οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅ τοι ἐκ Διὸς οὐχ ἕπετ' ἀλκή;
> νῦν μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ Κρονίδης Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀπάζει
> σήμερον· ὕστερον αὖτε καὶ ἡμῖν, αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσι,
> δώσει· ἀνὴρ δέ κεν οὔ τι Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαιτο
> οὐδὲ μάλ' ἴφθιμος, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐστι
>
> *Iliad* 8.139-44

> Son of Tydeus, come and put your single-hoofed horses to flight.
> Do you not recognize that the *alkē* from Zeus is not with you?
> For now Zeus, son of Kronos, gives glory [*kudos*] to this man

today; another day, if he wishes, he may give it to us also;
for no man may block the intention of Zeus
not even a strong one, since Zeus is much greater

This statement by Nestor is revealing in several respects. First, it comes after a series of events that should already have signalled to Nestor that divine intervention was at hand. Second, the divine nature of the event is apprehended immediately by Nestor, and no mention is made of the lightning crash itself. Nestor does not pause to ponder why lightning would crash out of a sunny sky, or why it would crash in front of his chariot. In other words, somehow the event itself is important only for what it signifies, but not for what it is, and furthermore there is no mystery for Nestor in that signification. His thought process is instantaneous: he does not reason through the event explicitly, and then logically conclude that it could only have happened by divine intercession. He apprehends the divine machinery behind the event immediately, or at least he pretends to that understanding, and he expresses himself in terms that are conventional.

Nestor's response is conventional because it is typical of heroes in the *Iliad* to judge the measure of battlefield events in terms of Zeus's gift of glory now to one hero (or host), and now to another. One of the terms most frequently employed in this manner is *kudos*, the word that Nestor compares with *alkē* in the passage above. In general terms, the entire plan of the *Iliad* unfolds according to the will of Zeus (*Iliad* 1.5), and glory (*kudos*) is Zeus's exclusive dispensation to heroes, which is why the thought of winning glory (*kudos*) by oneself is represented as "beyond the fate of Zeus" (ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν, see *Iliad* 17.321-22). From this perspective, *alkē* can be categorized with other terms that represent Zeus's influence on the course of events. But there is a more intimate connection to be explored between *alkē* and *kudos*. According to Nestor in the passage above, *alkē* is a force that is linked to *kudos*, which is Zeus-given glory, and *kudos* in turn is the visible manifestation of Zeus's intentions. For Nestor this makes *alkē*, along with *kudos*, a visible representative of the highest divine sanction, but it is realized only negatively by its absence.

Emile Benveniste has worked out a detailed portrait of some of the Homeric terms for force, among them *kudos* and *alkē*.[2] While he gives a rich interpretation of *kudos*, which I will examine below, his examination of *alkē* is more restricted. For Benveniste, "to face danger without ever drawing back, not to yield under attack, to stand firmly in the hand-to-hand combat, that is *alkē*."[3] This definition limits *alkē* to the realm of moral and/or physical strength, particularly in a defensive sense. But there are two important dimensions of *alkē* as yet unaddressed. First, as we saw in the quote from Nestor in the passage above, *alkē* comes from Zeus (ἐκ Διὸς . . . ἀλκή, 8.140), which suggests that it is linked directly with the divinity most responsible for ordering the cosmic and human worlds. We shall have more to say about this later. Second, as Nestor tells us in the same passage, *alkē* is recognizable to mortals in the fluctuation of certain events, and in this sense it functions like *kudos*.

As the course of action vacillates, always between the extremes of being advantageous or disadvantageous from the point of view of a given observer, *alkē* and *kudos* are said by this observer to be present or absent, respectively. Benveniste offers an elaborate definition of *kudos*, which captures well its vacillating nature:

> Royal or heroic *kudos* forms a part of the charms of power that the gods instantaneously grant or take away according to their preferences for one or another of the warring parties, in order to reestablish the equilibrium of battles, or to save a given leader who has honored them with offerings, or to maintain their own rivalries. These changing favors reflect the shifting game of the gods' factions, which Zeus arbitrates. *Kudos* passes therefore from one person to another, from the Achaeans to the Trojans, then from Hektor to Achilles—an invisible and magical attribute, surrounded by prodigies and a prodigy

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2. Cf. Benveniste 1969 II.57-74. My discussion of *kudos* follows Benveniste closely, although I depart significantly, as will be made clear above, from his interpretation of *alkē*.

3. Benveniste 1969 II.73 (my translation). The original reads: "faire face au péril sans jamais reculer, ne pas céder sous l'assaut, tenir fermement dans le corps à corps, voilà l'*alkē*."

> itself, an agent of triumph, which Zeus alone possesses permanently and which he bestows to kings and heroes for a day.[4]

I have cited this discussion of *kudos* because it turns out that much of the description can be applied to *alkē* as well. In the passage cited earlier where Nestor discusses *kudos* and *alkē*, we are reminded that he was prompted by a lightning flash that struck the ground in front of his and Diomedes' chariot. Whichever aspect of this event triggered Nestor's recognition of the event as a divine sign, the important point is that he expresses it first in terms of *alkē* from Zeus (8.140). Then he re-expresses or reinterprets, as it were, the *alkē* from Zeus in terms of *kudos* (8.141). To paraphrase Nestor, if one is given *kudos* by Zeus, then one will also exhibit *alkē*.

For Nestor the lightning flash signifies the absence of *alkē* (and, we can infer, of *kudos*) in Diomedes. We may recall Benveniste's statement, given above, that *kudos* is "surrounded by prodigies and a prodigy itself," and see that in this instance it can apply to *alkē*. Although Nestor has no direct knowledge of Zeus's involvement, Zeus had indeed decided to cause the lightning to prevent Hektor from being penned between the ships and Ilion (8.131). This flexibility in the appearance of *alkē*, dispensed according to the preference of Zeus, once again resembles that of *kudos* in Benveniste's formulation. Therefore like *kudos*, *alkē* is also a *charme de puissance* (to use Benveniste's term) that is at the discretion of Zeus to make manifest in a decisive event.

As a result of the lightning flash, Nestor recommends that he and Diomedes flee the battlefield (ἄγε δὴ αὖτε φόβονδ', 8.139). The

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4. Benveniste 1969 II.67 (my translation). The original reads: "Le *kudos* royale ou héroïque fait partie de ces charmes de puissance que les dieux accordent ou retirent intantanément, selon leurs préférences, à l'une ou l'autre des parties en guerre, pour rétablir l'équilibre des combats, pour sauver tel chef qui les a honorés d'offrandes, ou pour soutenir leurs propres rivalités. Ces faveurs changeantes reflètent le jeu mouvant des factions au camp des dieux, que Zeus arbitre. Le *kudos* passe donc de l'un à l'autre, des Achéens aux Troyens, puis d'Hector à Achille, attribut invisible et magique, entouré de prodiges et prodige lui-même, instrument du triomphe, que Zeus seul détient en permanence et qu'il concède pour un jour aux rois ou aux héros."

language here is instructive since, as Benveniste points out,[5] *alkē* is frequently inversely connected with *phobos* 'flight, terror' and *phobeisthai* 'to flee'. The best representation of the pairing of *alkē* and *phobos* is around the shield of Athena, where *Phobos* 'Flight', *Alkē* 'War-Stength', *Eris* 'Strife', and *Iōkē* 'Onslaught' (5.739-40) hang like garlands. The inverse association of *alkē* and *phobos* can also be observed in the ensuing dialogue between Diomedes and Nestor. Diomedes refuses to flee, saying that Hektor will never say that he, Diomedes, was put to flight (*phobeumenos*, from *phobeisthai*, 8.149) before him. Nestor replies to this by saying that the Trojans would never believe Hektor if he called Diomedes a 'coward' (*kakon*) and 'without *alkē*' (*analkida*, from *alkē*, 8.153).

Nestor's question to Diomedes, "Do you not recognize that the *alkē* of Zeus is not with you?" (ἦ οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅ τοι ἐκ Διὸς οὐχ ἕπετ' ἀλκή;, 8.140), implies by its negatives that advantageous circumstances presume that the *alkē* of Zeus is present. But the "advantageous circumstances" just mentioned are not limited to a strong defensive stance. On the contrary, in this particular case the presence of *alkē* would mean further victory for Diomedes, given that he has just killed Hektor's charioteer, Eniopeus (8.119). In contrast to Benveniste's interpretation,[6] Nestor's use of *alkē* implies that it can also represent offensive aggression. We may conclude that if the *alkē* from Zeus is with someone, then he will have the upper hand in a confrontation, regardless of the relative strength of his position.

The question of whether the *alkē* from Zeus is with someone or is present in certain events highlights several issues which bear directly on the discussion that follows. The first concerns the exact circumstances under which a given event appears to involve the *alkē* from Zeus. Not every event is characterized by the presence of *alkē*, nor is every divine intervention perceived as involving the *alkē* from Zeus, and so our first task will be to isolate those factors that mark an event in this particular manner. My thesis here will be that the *alkē* from Zeus is perceived when the sway of battle appears to take a decisive turn, usually against the stated intentions of a warrior, as in the

5. Benveniste 1969 II.74.
6. Benveniste 1969 II.73.

example of Nestor in *Iliad* 8 discussed earlier. However, this conclusion depends upon how warriors perceive the events in which they are involved, and therefore our analysis must broaden to include the issues of subjectivity and objectivity on the part of the characters and narrator in Homeric epic. From this vantage point, I shall offer a diachronic explanation for the *alkē* from Zeus as a conventional signifier that can be better understood if we treat Homeric tradition as an evolved poetic medium.

To return to an argument I made earlier, *alkē* and *kudos* can both represent Zeus's intentions (his *noos*, as Nestor describes it, 8.143), and these intentions can be made manifest in concrete events. This association is expressed more explicitly in a scene from *Iliad* 15, where Zeus is said to put *kudos*, by means of bestowing *alkē*, directly into the hands (*engualizō*, 15.491) of a warrior. Etymologically, the use of the term *engualizō* 'to put into the hand' (from ἐν- + γύαλον 'hollow') here is striking, because it creates conceptually a vivid depiction of how the superordinate power of Zeus reaches the battlefield warrior. But let us examine the relevant events in *Iliad* 15 more closely.

At the death of the Achaean Lykophron, Ajax exhorts his brother Teukros to retrieve his 'arrows of sudden death' (*ioi ōkumoroi*) and the bow given him by Apollo (15.440-41). Teukros does so, immediately shoots and kills Kleitos, Hektor's chariot-driver, and then aims at Hektor himself. We are told at this moment, by the narrator, that Teukros would have killed Hektor had his aim been true, and had the latter not been under the protection of Zeus (15.459-61). The narrator details further that Zeus broke the bowstring causing Teukros's arrow to fly askew (15.463-65). Teukros, shuddering (*rhigeō*) at this, interprets the unexpected event in terms of a divinity (*daimōn*) that "cut completely across the intention of our battle" (πάγχυ μάχης ἐπὶ μῆδεα κείρει | δαίμων ἡμετέρης, 15.467-68). Similarly his brother Ajax interprets the event in terms of a divinity (*theos*) that begrudges the Danaans (ἐπεὶ συνέχευε θεὸς Δαναοῖσι μεγήρας, 15.473). Although Ajax does not name the divinity responsible, I note that his use of *theos*, without an article, is more consistent with the conventional designation of Zeus as *theos* (as for example at *Iliad* 13.727-33), than

with an unspecified divinity.[7] The interesting point here, with respect to these varying interpretations of Teukros and Ajax, is that they do not have the insight of the narrator into Zeus's responsibility for breaking Teukros's bowstring.

In order to make sense of the differences in perception between Teukros and Ajax on one hand, and the narrator on the other, we must pause to consider the larger problem of narrator/character subjectivity with Homeric narrative. The discrepancy in the interpretation of an event between the narrator and Homeric characters, where the narrator names the divinity responsible for an action while the characters involved can only speculate that *some* divinity is responsible, raises a distinction first pointed out by Øve Jörgensen.[8] In the example above, the narrator attributes the action to Zeus, even explaining Zeus's motivation, while Teukros and Ajax attribute it to an unnamed *daimōn* or *theos*. After a detailed analysis of dozens of Homeric examples, Jörgensen concludes that the narrator is usually distinguished from the characters by his direct knowledge of the divinity responsible for a given miraculous intervention, whereas the characters can only surmise that some divine entity, phrased in more or less specific terms, motivated the event.[9] We should keep in mind Jörgensen's qualification, 'usually' (*gewöhnlich*), because, as I am about to show, sometimes Homeric characters do get the divine designation "right." The issues raised by Jörgensen relate specifically to the question of framing subjectivity within narrative. Jörgensen himself formulated the problem more in terms of narrative by characters in the first person (*Selbsterzählung*), versus narrative by the narrator (*Dichtererzählung*), as a way ultimately of explaining Odysseus's apparent lack of knowledge of which divinities helped or hindered him when he narrates

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7. Cf. François 1957.32.

8. Jörgensen 1904.364. See ibid., pp. 364-65 for more examples of the narrator/character discrepancy in interpretation from both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

9. Jörgensen 1904.364: "Der Dichter macht also zwischen sich selbst und den Personen, die er als redend einführt, den Unterschied, dass diese die Persönlichkeit der eingreifenden Gottheit gewöhnlich nicht erkennen, während er selber stets aufs genaueste weiss, ob etwa Athene oder Here das betreffende Wunder gemacht hat." Cf. Ehnmark 1935.65-67.

his experiences to King Alkinoos in books 9-12 of the *Odyssey*.[10] As Jörgensen points out, in books 9-12 of the *Odyssey*, the *Apologoi*, Odysseus only refers to abstract divinity as responsible for his ordeals and not specifically to Athena or Poseidon, whom he nevertheless knows are responsible for certain events.[11] I shall take up the question of subjectivity or perspectivism within narrative below, but for the moment let us return to Teukros's failed bowshot.

At the sight of Teukros's wayward arrow (15.484), Hektor makes an impassioned speech to the Trojans, Lykians, and Dardanians, in which he connects *alkē* with Zeus and glory (*kudos*):

> Τρῶες καὶ Λύκιοι καὶ Δάρδανοι ἀγχιμαχηταί,
> ἄνέρες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θοῦριδος ἀλκῆς
> νῆας ἀνὰ γλαφυράς· δὴ γὰρ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
> ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος Διόθεν βλαφθέντα βέλεμνα.
> ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτος Διὸς ἀνδράσι γίγνεται ἀλκή,
> ἠμὲν ὀτέοισιν κῦδος ὑπέρτερον ἐγγυαλίξῃ,
> ἠδ' ὅτινας μινύθῃ τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλῃσιν ἀμύνειν
>
> *Iliad* 15. 486-92

> Trojans, Lykians, and Dardanians who fight close,
> be men, dear friends, and remember your eager *alkē*
> along the hollowed ships; for I have seen with my own eyes
> how the arrows of their best man were thwarted by Zeus.
> Easily recognized is the *alkē* that comes to men from Zeus,
> either in those into whose hands he puts the greater glory [*kudos*],
> or those whom he diminishes and does not want to defend

10. The distinction between the speech of characters and the narrator is made at Jörgensen 1904.364. Cf. ibid. 366: "wo der Dichter erzählt, weiss er immer (mit der einzigen Ausnahme *Iliad* 21.47) die auftretende Gottheit zu benennen (das hat Here, Apollon, Hephaistos, Zeus u.s.w. gethan), wo wir aber eine unbenannte Gottheit finden, . . . haben wir die für die erste Person stilisirte Rede."

11. Jörgensen 1904.368.

The first thing to note in this passage is the relationship between *alkē*, Zeus, and *kudos*. In the context of exhorting his men to remember (*mimnēskomai*) their *alkē*, which is an expression that I shall treat in more detail later, Hektor reminds his men that the *alkē* that comes to men comes from Zeus. He rephrases this idea by saying that *kudos* is 'put into their hands' (*engualizō*) by Zeus. This reminds us of Nestor's statement to Diomedes, quoted above, that, as a result of the lightning flash in front of their chariot, the *alkē* of Zeus (and, thus, *kudos*) was no longer with him. Now what is different between the experiences of Nestor and of Hektor, is that earlier in *Iliad* 15, Apollo comes to Hektor and tells him that Zeus has sent him to stand by and to defend Hektor (15.254-57), whereas Nestor receives no such communication. This intervention is adduced by one scholar[12] to explain Hektor's apparent "insight." Yet problems remain. On the one hand, with Nestor we had to infer what he understood exactly to be the divine signification, whereas Hektor tells us specifically that it was the thwarting of Teukros's arrows. How does he know this? On the other hand, both Hektor and Nestor respond to their respective events with the same programmatic language linking the event to *alkē* and *kudos* from Zeus. Why does Hektor not think, for example, that Apollo, rather than Zeus, is responsible?

The explanation lies in part in the systematic connection between a perceived sway in events, and the interpretation of that sway as a manifestation of *alkē* and *kudos* from Zeus. The passages examined suggest strongly that this is a conventional mode of designation. And if *kudos*, as Benveniste[13] observes in the passage quoted earlier, is an "instrument of triumph," then *alkē* can also be considered such an instrument. *Kudos* and *alkē* are part and parcel of a perceived sway of events in or out of one's favor. We may also observe that, once again, we find here an alternative construction between defeat and victory (expressed at 15.491-92) that reminds us of Nestor's remarks to Diomedes in *Iliad* 8. For both Nestor and Hektor, the perceived sway of events is absolute. Yet there is an important difference between Nestor and Hektor in this respect. In the case of Nestor, the lightning

12. François 1957.32.

13. Benveniste 1969 II.67.

flash before his chariot represented a total absence of *alkē* from Zeus as far as Diomedes' intentions were concerned. In contrast, the failed bowshot of Teukros represents a total presence of *alkē for* Hektor, which is indicated by the adjective *arignōtos* 'easily recognized' (*Iliad* 15.490) that he uses to describe the *alkē* from Zeus. This detail should draw our attention more closely to the circumstances surrounding Hektor's perception in order to clarify the basis on which he makes his judgment.

However, before we explore Hektor's perception of Teukros's failed bowshot in more detail, it is first necessary to digress somewhat to treat the issue of subjectivity, or conscious experience, within Homeric narrative more generally. I shall argue that any discrepancies in the perception of an event, whether by characters or by the narrator, should be approached only after subjective experience within Homeric narrative has itself been placed in a diachronic perspective. Jörgensen's formulation of the narrator/character discrepancy in perceiving the divine cause of an event lays a crucial foundation for, but does not resolve, the question of subjectivity. In Homeric poetry, there is a further complication to be added to the task of understanding subjectivity, however, in that a character may signify a single cause for an event by means of several apparently discrete ideas.

A good illustraton of this kind of multiple signification occurs in *Iliad* 21, when Achilles encounters Priam's son Lykaon near the banks of the river Xanthos. The narrator tells us how Achilles had once taken Lykaon and sold him as a slave in Lemnos (21.40), but eventually Lykaon was able to get back to Troy. For eleven days Lykaon celebrated his return:

δυωδεκάτῃ δέ μιν αὖτις
χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος θεὸς ἔμβαλλεν

Iliad 21.46-7

but on the twelfth day once again
god threw him into the hands of Achilles

This is the one instance, as Jörgensen[14] notes, where the narrator does not name the divinity responsible. However, the narrator is not alone in leaving the divine cause vague. Lykaon takes Achilles' knees in supplication, and then says to him:

> νῦν αὖ με τεῇς ἐν χερσὶν ἔθηκε
> μοῖρ' ὀλοή· μέλλω που ἀπεχθέσθαι Διὶ πατρί,
> ὅς με σοὶ αὖτις δῶκε
>
> *Iliad* 21.82-84

> now again destructive fate [*moira*] put me into
> your hands. I am likely hated by Zeus the father,
> who once again gave me to you

For Lykaon, fate (*moira*) and Zeus are both represented as causes of his second encounter with Achilles. The signification is multiplied by Lykaon once again, when later in his plea to Achilles he says:

> οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω
> σὰς χεῖρας φεύξεσθαι, ἐπεί ῥ' ἐπέλασσέ γε δαίμων
>
> *Iliad* 21.92-3

> for I do not think
> that I shall escape your hands, since [a] *daimōn* brought me to them

These passages make clear that Lykaon can marshall as causes for his plight fate (*moira*), Zeus, and an unspecified *daimōn*, which are discrete causal entities, without any sense of contradiction. These causes are not successive possibilities that Lykaon considers, rather they are collectively the cause as he sees it for his situation.

To round out our survey of references to the cause of Lykaon's encounter with Achilles, we add here Achilles' own perspective, which he boasts to Lykaon:

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14. Jörgensen 1904.366 and above n10. The same point is made in François 1957.33.

νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅς τις θάνατον φύγῃ, ὃν κε θεός γε
Ἰλίου προπάροιθεν ἐμῆς ἐν χερσὶ βάλῃσι

Iliad 21.103-4

now there is no one who escapes death, when god
throws him into my hands in front of Ilion

These examples suggest that we must go beyond Jörgensen's narrator/character discrepancy to explain how Homeric poetry delimits conscious experience. However, the "conscious experience," whether it be of the narrator or of individual characters, has to be viewed within the context of the oral-traditional medium from which the *Iliad* itself emerges. Rather than consider the problem from the individual points of view of the narrator, Lykaon, and Achilles, we should consider it from the point of view of Homeric tradition as represented in the *Iliad.* When we do this, a more unified vision emerges.

First, as to the statements of the narrator and Achilles that *theos* is the cause, I have already noted earlier that the use of *theos* without an article can specifically refer to Zeus (*Iliad* 13.727-33). There Poulydamas tells Hektor that god (*theos*) has granted one man the deeds of war (13.730), to another the ability to dance (731), to another the ability to play the kithara and sing (731), and to another, he says without any sense of contradiction, *Zeus* has granted a noble mind (732-33). Thus *theos* without an article can function as the equivalent of Zeus. Next *moira* and *daimōn* may be paired in a sense, because *daimōn* can be used in a general way to mean 'fate'.[15] If this line of reasoning is correct, then what remains is to parallel *theos*/Zeus and *moira/daimōn* and we will establish that these two pairs of entities occupy a unified semantic field. Such a parallelism can indeed be found, for example, when Achilles' divine horse, Xanthos, tells him that the day of his death is near because of great *theos* and powerful *moira*

15. See *Iliad* 8.166 and 17.98 and 104. Cf. Chantraine 1952.52.

(*Iliad* 19.410).[16] For Xanthos, who speaks with a voice given to him by Hera, Achilles' situation is simultaneously the result of *theos* and *moira*, which means that there is semantic parallelism and overlap.

These examples are meant only to be representative, not exhaustive. What they demonstrate, however, is that all four entities can designate a generic notion of fate or destiny. I submit that, in the passages in question, the narrator, Lykaon, and Achilles are all saying the same thing about why Lykaon has encountered Achilles a second time: simply that the encounter was prefigured in the order of things, whether that order be called Zeus, *theos*, *moira*, or *daimōn*. In saying this, I am not saying that the conscious experiences of the narrator and Lykaon and Achilles are the same in book 21. Instead, I am arguing that their meanings converge from the point of view of the traditional poetry itself. What appear to be multiple signifiers, from the synchronic point of view of the narrator and of individual characters, can be coordinated to one signified from the diachronic[17] point of view of the oral-traditional heritage of the *Iliad*.

The result of these observations for the question of framing subjectivity within Homeric narrative, which was our starting point for this digression, is that it too is fraught with a synchronic/diachronic tension. If we focus too closely on an individual character's conscious experience in Homeric poetry, we may lose sight of the historical dimension that also comprises that experience. In the passages just examined, the narrator, Lykaon, and Achilles have to be viewed as single incarnations of *personae* that have been represented, perhaps for centuries, in oral-poetic performances of which our *Iliad* is merely one manifestation. The several *personae*, therefore, are not "individual" representations in the sense that they have to be viewed as the product of a collective poetic tradition. What might appear to us as the

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16. I also note here Agamemnon's remark that he is not responsible for his actions against Achilles, but rather Zeus, *Moira*, and *Erinys*, collectively are (*Iliad* 19.86-7). This kind of multiple, yet unified, attribution follows exactly the pattern of Lykaon.

17. Following Nagy 1990b.4, I use the terms *synchronic* and *diachronic* from the standpoint of an outsider thinking about an oral traditional system, not from the standpoint of an insider thinking within that system.

consciously differentiated thought and feelings of characters should always be balanced against a poetic tradition which is, by definition, collective. With respect to the question of why Lykaon encounters Achilles a second time, the narrator's, Lykaon's, and Achilles' views converge because their perceptual experiences or subjectivities are the expression of a comprehensive Greek epic tradition, rather than the expression of separate, unique psyches.

With these points in mind, we are now in a position to return to Hektor's perception of the presence of the *alkē* from Zeus when Teukros misfires his arrow in *Iliad* 15. Earlier we had questioned the circumstances that apparently gave Hektor a special vision into the divine world "behind" phenomena. How is it that Hektor knows that exactly Zeus, and not some other divinity like Apollo, was responsible for the misdirection of Teukros's arrows? This is a question of no small import, because, as Jörgensen established, Hektor should only have approximate but not exact knowledge of the god responsible. We are informed by the narrator that Teukros shuddered upon shooting because his bowstring broke, the bow fell out of his hands, and his arrow flew awry (15.463-65). But when Teukros explains to his brother Ajax what happened, he says more specifically that a divinity (*daimōn*) had struck the bow from his hands, and that his bowstring had been freshly twined and mounted by him only that morning (15.468-70). What is decisive for Teukros's suspicion of divine intervention is that his bowstring was new and should not under normal circumstances have broken. Yet Hektor, apart from seeing (and we can only infer this from his words) the bowstring break, the bow fall, and the arrow fly crookedly, is in no position to know what Teukros knows about his new bowstring. For that matter, it is also significant that Hektor only mentions that Teukros's arrows were thwarted (15.489), and not all of these other details.

We could press the point further by suggesting that, as far as Hektor is concerned, Teukros is an unfailing marksman, or that the bow given him by Apollo was incapable of failing, or the like. This line of reasoning, however, is not quite accurate, and actually raises an irony. Hektor and Teukros have already encountered one another earlier on the battlefield, when Teukros shot an arrow at Hektor but missed because none other than Apollo thwarted it (8.309-11). However, there the details of Apollo's action are reported by the narrator, and Hektor

appears unaware that there was any divine interference. Teukros is no unfailing marksman when it comes to Hektor in any case. Earlier in that same encounter where Apollo intervened, in fact, Teukros had shot an arrow at Hektor and missed, apparently through his own fault, hitting another warrior instead (8.302-3). So Hektor appears to have no definite basis from prior experience on which to believe that Teukros would hit him this time.

Another possibility is that Hektor might have surmised the divine agent to be Zeus on the strength of Zeus's general support of Hektor. In several places in the *Iliad*, the narrator tells us that Zeus gives greater glory (*kudos*) to Hektor (for example, at 12.437 and 15.644), in particular because his days are short-lived (15.610-13). When Teukros's arrows misfire, Hektor may interpret this unexpected reprieve as an increase of *alkē* and *kudos* for himself, and as a loss of Zeus's support for Teukros. In a more specific sense, however, it is reasonable to conclude that the basis for Hektor's mention of Zeus is his subjective interpretation that he was saved. In other words, Hektor believed that his life was spared when he saw Teukros's arrows fly astray. For if we return to the crucial moment, we recall that the narrator says that Hektor would have been killed had Zeus not interceded. There Hektor was actually said by the narrator "not to escape the shrewd intention of Zeus" (οὐ λῆθε Διὸς πυκινὸν νόον, 15.461). And, as I will suggest below, the divide here between the perspectives of narrator and character may not be as great as it at first seems.

To use the term "subjective judgment" with regard to Hektor does not mean that such a judgment is without a rational basis. The rationality in Hektor's thinking here depends on an aspect of the meaning of *alkē* that can also mean, as mentioned earlier and as Benveniste[18] showed, 'defensive force'. All Hektor needed to believe was that he would have been killed and that at the last moment the inevitable outcome was thwarted. We may recall Hektor's twofold interpretation of the *alkē* of Zeus:

> ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτος Διὸς ἀνδράσι γίγνεται ἀλκή,
> ἡμὲν ὀτέοισιν κῦδος ὑπέρτερον ἐγγυαλίξῃ,

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18. Benveniste 1969 II.73.

ἠδ' ὀτινας μινύθῃ τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλῃσιν ἀμῦνειν

Iliad 15.490-92

> Easily recognized is the *alkē* that comes to men from Zeus,
> either in those into whose hands he puts the greater glory [*kudos*],
> or those whom he diminishes and does not want to defend

For Hektor, *alkē* from Zeus is recognizable either in a warrior gaining *kudos*, which in this context means being granted victory on the battlefield, or in the defeat of an opponent, which means that the latter has been diminished (*minuthō*),[19] and that his actions have been brought to naught. In Hektor's interpretation, an opponent like Teukros who has been diminished signifies that Zeus has chosen not to defend (*amunō*) him. If Zeus has not defended Teukros, then he has reciprocally saved Hektor.

In this respect the defensive aspect of *alkē*, from the cosmic point of view of Zeus, is brought out most clearly. From the point of view of Homeric heroes, the idea that *alkē* functions protectively is reflected in formulaic expressions such as *duō* 'put on' + *alkē* (*Iliad* 9.231, 19.36, both used of Achilles), and *epiennumi* 'to clothe' + *alkē* (*Iliad* 7.164, 8.262, 18.157, all used of the two Ajaxes). This protective aspect of *alkē*, imagined as if it were a kind of armor, is realized in the *Iliad* in both a mundane and a cosmic dimension. From the perspective of heroes, putting on or clothing oneself in *alkē* is either expressed as a condition for victory,[20] or as a characteristic of warriors who have

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19. The verb *minuthō* 'diminish' is used in two places in the *Iliad* particularly to mark Zeus's ability to reduce the achievements of men. Cf. *Iliad* 16.392, where Zeus is said to send water to diminish (*minuthō*) the works (*erga*) of men. And at 20.242, Aineias tells Achilles that Zeus increases (*ophellō*) and diminishes (*minuthō*) the virtue (*aretē*) of men.

20. At *Iliad* 9.230-1, Odysseus tells Achilles that "there is doubt whether we shall save our well-benched ships, or if they will be destroyed, unless you put on *alkē*" (ἐν δοιῇ δὲ σαωσέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι | νῆας ἐΰσσέλμους, εἰ μὴ σύ γε δύσεαι ἀλκήν). At 19.34-6, what is a request for Odysseus becomes a demand on behalf of Achilles' mother, Thetis, who says to her son that "you summon the Achaean heroes to the assembly, renounce your anger against

proven themselves in battle.[21] From the perspective of Zeus, however, the presence or absence of *alkē* is represented as his choice.[22] There is no *alkē* from Zeus when Zeus chooses to withdraw his protection, and his protection or *alkē* can manifest either in victory for one adversary, or in the obstruction of that adversary's opponent.

We may add to these observations that, in the case of Hektor, the apparent inconsistency in his accurately stated knowledge that the *alkē* from Zeus is present can also be understood in the light of empirical research in living oral traditions. In oral song traditions, inconsistencies have to be understood within the context of the synchronic and diachronic dynamics of the tradition in which the songs are created. Albert Lord has given us much insight into the nature of "inconsistency" in oral poetry, especially as it relates to thematic structure:

> In a traditional poem, therefore, there is a pull in two directions: one is toward the song being sung and the other is toward the previous uses of the same theme. The result is that characteristic of oral poetry which literary scholars have found hardest to understand and to accept, namely, an occasional inconsistency, the famous nod of a Homer.[23]

In the passage in question, Hektor's apparently direct knowledge of Zeus's intervention can be explained as an "inconsistency" resulting from several tensions. First, there is the pattern of encounters with Teukros and Hektor, where on at least two other occasions Teukros's arrow misses Hektor (8.302-3, 309-11). So we can expect that here, too,

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Agamemnon, the shepherd of the people, arm yourself immediately for war, and put on *alkē*" (ἀλλὰ σύ γ' εἰς ἀγορὴν καλέσας ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς, | μῆνιν ἀποειπὼν Ἀγαμέμνονι, ποιμένι λαῶν, | αἶψα μάλ' ἐς πόλεμον θωρήσσεο, δύσεο δ' ἀλκήν). These passages are discussed further below, pp. 74-5.

21. The Ajaxes are formulaically said to be 'clothed in eager *alkē*' (θοῦριν ἐπιειμένοι ἀλκήν, *Iliad* 7.164, 8.262, 18.157), as if *alkē* were a kind of armor, while they are in the process of accomplishing a military feat.

22. Note the use of the verb *ethelō* 'to want' in both Nestor's (8.142) and Hektor's (15.492) description of the *alkē* of Zeus.

23. Lord 1960.94. Cf. Foley 1991.46-7 and Nagy 1995.

Teukros's arrows may miss Hektor. Then there is the conventional discrepancy between the narrator's and the characters' knowledge of divine intervention. Although Jörgensen[24] cites one Iliadic instance (21.47, discussed earlier) where the narrator does not name the divinity responsible, he has shown that as a rule the knowledge of divine transaction for the characters is approximate, while that of the narrator is exact. Finally we have, as I have been arguing, the association between *alkē*, *kudos*, and Zeus, as these are applied to a sudden change in perceived fortune. When Hektor sees Teukros's bowshot thwarted, he understands this to be a shift of events in his favor, and thus expresses himself in the conventional terms of Zeus-given *alkē* and *kudos*. All of these factors converge in the passage in question and make it appear that Hektor has unusual insight.

I am, of course, not suggesting that all of these factors are traditional themes in Lord's[25] definition of the term. Instead, I am suggesting that these factors form a composite of traditional material that operates along similar synchronic and diachronic axes as themes. We are dealing here with different kinds of traditional material operating at different levels within Homeric poetry. As Lord makes clear in the passage just quoted, the traditional themes and formulaic language at the disposal of a singer are employed under the constraints of a given performance, but also with regard to the use of that same material in previous performances. In the confrontation between Teukros and Hektor, the traditional theme might be said to be Teukros, the Archer, shooting at Hektor.[26] The narrator/character discrepancy is also traditional, in that

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24. Jörgensen 1904.366.

25. Lord 1960.68: "Following Parry, I have called the groups of ideas regularly used in telling a tale in the formulaic style of traditional song the 'themes' of the poetry." I prefer to broaden Lord's observation by using the term "traditional material" to convey the idea that not only themes, in Lord's sense of that term, but a host of other poetic structures (e.g. narrator/character subjectivity, relationship between cause and effect, etc.) can also operate according to the traditional principles that Lord outlines for themes.

26. The thematic nature of their encounter can be illustrated as follows. In Teukros's two encounters with Hektor in *Iliad* 8, the language describing Teukros's bowshot is formulaic. At 8.300-1 we read: Ἦ ῥα, καὶ ἄλλον ὀϊστὸν ἀπὸ νευρῆφιν ἴαλλεν | Ἕκτορος ἀντικρύ, βαλέειν δέ ἑ ἵετο θυμός

it is a regular feature of Homeric poetry, but it is not a theme in the sense of repeated diction or of a type-scene. At the level of diction, the association between *alkē*, *kudos*, and ultimately, Zeus, as a way of signifying a sudden change in fortune, is also traditional, in the sense that we find these ideas repeatedly clustered together. Overall, as Lord argues further, the consistency emerges from the oral tradition, rather than in any particular surface arrangement of traditional material:

> Where the association is not linear, it seems to me that we are dealing with a force or "tension" that might be termed "submerged." The habit is hidden, but felt. It arises from the depths of the tradition through the workings of the traditional processes to inevitable expression. And to be numb to an awareness of this kind of association is to miss the meaning not only of the oral method of composition and transmission, but even of epic itself. Without such an awareness the overtones from the past, which give tradition the richness of diapason of full organ, cannot be sensed by the reader of oral epic. The singer's natural audience appreciates it because they are as much part of the tradition as the singer himself.[27]

"He spoke, and sent another arrow from his bowstring straight at Hektor, and his *thumos* was eager to hit him." Cf. 8.309-10: Τεῦκρος δ' ἄλλον ὀϊστὸν ἀπὸ νευρῆφιν ἴαλλεν | Ἕκτορος ἀντικρύ, βαλέειν δέ ἑ ἴετο θυμός "Teukros sent another arrow from his bowstring straight at Hektor, and his *thumos* was eager to hit him." When Teukros encounters Hektor for the third time, although the description is different, the underlines indicate the elements that reappear: Τεῦκρος δ' ἄλλον ὀϊστὸν ἐφ' Ἕκτορι χαλκοκορυστῇ | αἴνυτο, καί κεν ἔπαυσε μάχης ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν, | εἴ μιν ἀριστεύοντα βαλὼν ἐξείλετο θυμόν "Teukros took up another arrow for bronze-helmed Hektor, and would have stopped his fighting by the Achaeans' ships, had he hit him during his valor and taken his *thumos* away" (15.458-60). These three examples show that Teukros's encounter with Hektor is thematic in respect of diction and basic idea, and yet the third example diverges from the first two in that the *thumos* now belongs to Hektor rather than Teukros. It is the felt habit of tradition, I submit, that demands the presence of *thumos* as well as the other elements in the diction of the third example, even while a different meaning can be created in the process.

27. Lord 1960.97.

As long as every character's, as well as the narrator's, subjective experiences are viewed as the result of a larger, collective poetic tradition, then "inconsistencies," such as Hektor's apparent knowledge of Zeus's actions, begin to correspond at a deeper level of unity. This is because ultimately at some level, it will be the collective tradition that speaks and not the narrator or individual characters.

If a decisive change in events in the midst of battle can signal the presence of *alkē* from Zeus, and therefore of glory (*kudos*), steadfast fighting can also be represented in the *Iliad* as *alkē* and as another kind of glory, *kleos*. Building on the defensive or protective dimension of *alkē* that we have observed, we can find clues in a speech of Agamemnon that exhibiting this aspect of *alkē* may be worth the highest honor that a warrior can attain in the *Iliad*. Exhorting the Danaans to prepare to fight the Trojans, Agamemnon stirs them with a speech that will recall Hektor's exhortation to his troops (15.486-92), quoted earlier:

> ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε καὶ ἄλκιμον ἦτορ ἔλεσθε,
> ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας·
> αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἠὲ πέφανται·
> φευγόντων δ' οὔτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτέ τις ἀλκή

Iliad 5.529-32

> Dear friends, be men and seize your stout [*alkimon*] heart,
> respect one another in the strong fighting;
> by respecting men more are safe than are killed;
> but in fleeing there is no glory [*kleos*] and no *alkē*

This speech reintroduces a contrast between flight and *alkē* that we have seen before.[28] Although the verb *pheugō* 'to flee' is used here rather than *phobeisthai*, the idea is the same. Significantly, in the lines directly preceding the passage above, we are told that the Danaans "stood firm against the Trojans and did not take flight" ([*phebesthai=phobeisthai*] Δαναοὶ Τρῶας μένον ἔμπεδον οὐδὲ φέβοντο,

28. See again Benveniste 1969 II.74 on the inverse relationship between *alkē* and *phobos*.

5.527). But the verb *pheugō* and *alkē* are coordinated elsewhere in the *Iliad*, in a brief statement Nestor makes upon observing the Trojans flee (*pheugō*) before Achilles:

> αὐτὰρ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
> Τρῶες ἄφαρ κλονέοντο πεφυζότες, οὐδέ τις ἀλκὴ
> γίγνεθ'·
>
> *Iliad* 21.527-29

> but before him
> the Trojans quickly scattered in their flight [*pheugō*], and there was
> no *alkē*

There is no *alkē* when there is flight, and the opposite of flight, as represented by *alkē*, can mean standing firm, or continuing to fight, but in any case not caving in to the enemy. In Agamemnon's speech above, he expects that his men will stand firm and he expresses it by the use of the adjective *alkimos*, derived from *alkē*, which I have translated as 'stout'. We have seen this word used in other contexts where the meaning was more akin to 'warlike'. Here, however, the meanings 'warlike' and 'stout' can merge, and the differences between offensive and defensive actions amount to the same thing.

Yet the collective action that Agamemnon demands from his men has to be exercised with control, and the control involved in remaining *alkimos* is expressed by means of the verb *aideomai* 'to respect, have regard for'. In respecting (*aideomai*, from *aidōs*) one another in the fighting, Agamemnon says, unnecessary casualties and loss of life can be avoided. We actually find the association between remaining *alkimos* and having respect (*aidōs*) for fellow warriors on the battlefield attested again in *Iliad* 15, when Ajax rouses the Argives:

> ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ,
> ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας.
> αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἠὲ πέφανται·
> φευγόντων δ' οὔτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτέ τις ἀλκή
>
> *Iliad* 15.561-64

> Dear friends, be men, and put respect [*aidōs*] into your *thumos*,
> respect [*aideomai*] one another in the strong fighting;
> by respecting [*aideomai*] men more are safe than are killed;
> but in fleeing there is no glory [*kleos*] and no *alkē*

This passage should be compared with Agamemnon's speech (5.529-32), quoted above. Save for the second half of the first line, they are identical. In the first line (15.561), the alternation of the half-line formula καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ "and put respect (*aidōs*) into your *thumos*," with Agamemnon's καὶ ἄλκιμον ἦτορ ἔλεσθε "and seize the stout (*alkimon*) heart" (5.529), suggests that the semantics of having a heart characterized by *alkē* is interchangeable with the notion of putting respect (*aidōs*) into one's heart. This is a dimension of *alkē* that we have not seen before. In the last chapter, I showed how *alkē* could represent an irreversible mental and physical state in warfare, of which the only results were to kill or be killed by an enemy. Here we see a refinement added to *alkē*: it consists in having respect for one's fellow warriors in battle, in effect to protect them and thereby to obtain *kleos*. Although the *Iliad* does not provide more insight into the nature of this battlefield *aidōs*, clearly one aim of such *aidōs* is to avoid unnecessary deaths. The phrase αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἠὲ πέφανται "by respecting men more are safe than are killed" (5.531, 15.563) suggests that *alkē* is never meant to reach such a peak that it becomes reckless. Being driven to death by *alkē* in battle may characterize a warrior in his *aristeia*, such as Patroklos, in the simile where he is compared to a lion (16.752-53). However returning from battle with as many of one's companions-at-arms as possible is highly valued as well.

As pictured in these passages from Agamemnon and Ajax, the opposite of standing firm and fighting with respect for one's companions is flight, and in flight (*pheugō*), there is no *kleos* or *alkē* (5.532, 15.564). For Agamemnon in particular, the issue of fleeing (*pheugō*) or staying to fight and win *kleos* and exhibit *alkē* actually has a deeper resonance in the *Iliad*, as he himself will suggest later that the Achaeans should flee and return home (9.27). At the end of an exhausting and uncertain day of battle, the Achaeans become stricken with *Phuza* 'Flight', the companion of *Phobos* 'Terror' (9.2), and Agamemnon suggests that they give up the fight and flee (verb *pheugō*, 9.27). We have already seen how the verb *pheugō* in particular can

signal a complete absence of *alkē*, in a speech where Agamemnon had said, in complete contradiction to his position here, that "in fleeing there is no *kleos* or *alkē*" (5.532). Diomedes rises in opposition, expresses his right to speak in the assembly, and says that he will be the first to fight with Agamemnon's folly (9.32). I give the relevant portion of his speech:

> ἀλκὴν μέν μοι πρῶτον ὀνείδισας ἐν Δαναοῖσι,
> φὰς ἔμεν ἀπτόλεμον καὶ ἀνάλκιδα· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
> ἴσασ' Ἀργείων ἠμὲν νέοι ἠδὲ γέροντες.
> σοὶ δὲ διάνδιχα δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω·
> σκήπτρῳ μέν τοι δῶκε τετιμῆσθαι περὶ πάντων,
> ἀλκὴν δ' οὔ τοι δῶκεν, ὅ τε κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον
>
> *Iliad* 9.34-39

> you reproached my *alkē* first among the Danaans,
> saying that I was unwarlike [*aptolemos*] and lacking *alkē* [*analkis*];
> all these things
> the young men of the Argives know, and the elders know them.
> The son of devious-devising Kronos has given you gifts by halves:
> with the scepter he gave you to be honored above all,
> but he did not give you *alkē*, which is the greatest *kratos*

There is a great deal of information embedded in this statement. The slight that Diomedes refers to goes back to *Iliad* 4.368ff., where upon surveying his fighting troops Agamemnon scolded him for holding back near the chariots and horses. Although Agamemnon never explicitly refers to Diomedes' *alkē* there, clearly Diomedes understood his harangue to be a direct affront to it. Even more invidiously, Diomedes compares his supposed lack of *alkē* (adj. *analkis*) with being altogether unwarlike (*aptolemos*), and we might not be wrong to detect a note of hyperbole here. Agamemnon's scolding at 4.368ff. is directed at Diomedes' apparent reserve, not at his total unfitness for battle (cf. 4.399-400). As Richard Martin[29] has suggested about the exchange between Diomedes and Agamemnon in *Iliad* 9, Diomedes is represented

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29. Martin 1989.24-26.

at this point as a young man in the process of being taught the craft of speaking well in the assembly by Nestor, and his hyperbole reflects his youth.

Since Nestor approves of the substance of Diomedes' criticism of Agamemnon (ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 9.59), we should explore Diomedes' remarks in more detail. When Diomedes redirects the charge of his supposed lack of *alkē* back at Agamemnon he touches, significantly, on the powers of kingship. The scepter of kingship signifies political power and, among other things, conveys the authority rightfully to be heard in an assembly. Surely there is more that could be said about the scepter, but whatever its symbolic importance, it ranks second in Diomedes' scale of value. To him *alkē* is preeminent, and in this case the word must be made to bear its most elevated meanings: its relationship to Zeus implies that it is an ordering force, and this brings into parallel the functions of Zeus *vis-à-vis* the universe, and of the king *vis-à-vis* the socio-political domain. Thus *alkē* is equated with *kratos* 'superior force' (9.39), and *kratos* is distinguished by being the exclusive preserve and dispensation of Zeus. Diomedes' statement that *alkē* is the greatest *kratos* in fact echoes what Agamemnon had just said of Zeus about a dozen lines earlier. In claiming that Zeus had deceived him into thinking that he could take Troy, Agamemnon says that Zeus has broken the crests of many cities before and will do so again, "because his *kratos* is greatest" (τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον, 9.25). If the *kratos* of Zeus is greatest, and the *alkē* from Zeus is also the greatest *kratos*, then we can infer that the *alkē* from Zeus represents the highest expression of military and cosmic virtue. However, in being granted to kings, *alkē* also represents the military strength by the demonstration of which a king rightfully takes his place at the top of the social and political order. As we have seen throughout this chapter, *alkē*, as it comes from Zeus, is always actualized in the concrete reality of an event. In parallel to this kind of objectification is the *alkē* of kings, who, we are to infer, have similarly demonstrated or realized their superior strength in action. Whatever historical Greek referent that we may adduce for the process of becoming king—dynastic, tyrannical, or other—the *Iliad* stylizes the ascension as one in which Zeus, as the repository of aristocratic virtue, gives *alkē* and the *skēptron* 'scepter' to a king.

Just as an event cannot be changed once it has happened, so *alkē*

becomes, once it has been demonstrated or granted, a permanent reality. This explains why Diomedes cannot fathom Agamemnon's actions: they are not consistent with a king who has demonstrated or been granted, and therefore continues to exhibit, *alkē*. What is at stake in Diomedes' criticism of Agamemnon is the very substance of kingship, whose foundation is sanctified by the cosmic organization of Zeus. So to account for Agamemnon's actions, Diomedes claims not merely that Agamemnon lacks *alkē*, but that Zeus did not grant it to him. In other words, Diomedes charges that Zeus could not have found Agamemnon worthy of kingly responsibility—and therein, by the way, lies the real insult—which cuts deeper than a general critique of his competence. If Zeus had, in Diomedes' estimation, granted *alkē* to Agamemnon, then there is no way that Agamemnon could have urged his men to flee. This criticism weakens and even potentially renders fraudulent Agamemnon's claims to leadership. Nestor knows this, and this is why he quickly enjoins the Achaean guards to disperse their men and lead them back to their stations (9.66-68). Had Nestor allowed the frenzy of acclamation for Diomedes' words to continue, the Achaeans might have mutinied, or attempted a forcible deposition.

As we saw earlier, the criticism of Agamemnon by Diomedes is presented as sound and just in the words of Nestor, who tells Diomedes that he has spoken with wisdom and in fairness (*kata moiran*, 9.59). Indeed it is not long after being criticized that Agamemnon makes his offer of restitution to Achilles (9.120ff.), and nothing more is heard of Agamemnon's request to flee Troy. I might suggest that Agamemnon's offer of restitution to Achilles, which is judged to be strongly worthy of consideration by Nestor (9.164), goes some distance toward recovering his own *alkē*, and toward laying the foundation for the *kleos* and *alkē* of the Achaeans that he had passionately spoken of earlier (5.529-32). In a curious twist, the idea that there will be *kleos* and *alkē* for the Achaeans in not fleeing, which Agamemnon now reinforces by staying with his men and offering to repair his relationship with Achilles, becomes the central dilemma for Achilles himself. As we shall see below, the most sought-after possession for Achilles becomes the *kleos* of the Achaeans, but the means to that *kleos* can be furnished only if, as he is told, he exhibits his *alkē* and does not flee. Several examples should suffice to make this clear.

The first point to make is that *kleos* in the *Iliad* specifically

represents glory conferred by poetry, understood as epic poetry.[30] A prominent example of this occurs in *Iliad* 9, where Achilles is pictured singing the 'glories (*klea*, plural of *kleos*) of men' (ἄειδε δ' ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν, *Iliad* 9.189) while Patroklos listens.[31] The *Iliad* is pervaded with the ideology of *kleos* conferred by poetry as the compensation for great military deeds.[32] Hektor, for example, can boast that if he kills a warrior, whoever is 'best of the Achaeans' ('Αχαιῶν . . . ἄριστος, 7.50), he will have a *kleos* that will never perish (τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κλέος οὔ ποτ' ὀλεῖται, 7.91). Indeed, the *Iliad* is so conscious of itself as a *kleos*-giving medium that it can even be ironic when it represents a Trojan, Iphidamas, as fighting in pursuit of *kleos* from the *Achaeans* (μετὰ κλέος ἴκετ' 'Αχαιῶν, 11.227).[33]

The second point relevant to Achilles is that he has a special relationship to *kleos* by being both the central character in a *kleos*-giving epic, our *Iliad*, but also by being represented within epic as singing *kleos* (9.189, quoted above) himself. However, the value of *kleos* for Achilles is made most explicit when he expresses to Odysseus the two options left him:

εἰ μέν κ' αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι,

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30. Nagy 1974.231-55 and 1979.15-18.

31. This portrait of songmaking represented within the *Iliad*, should be compared with the words of the poet of the *Iliad* himself, when he says, addressing the Muses, that poets know nothing and only hear the *kleos* from the Muses (ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἷον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν, 2.486). The poet at *Iliad* 2.484ff. is enjoining the Muses to tell him who were the commanders of the Danaans who went to Troy. He then recites the *Catalogue of Ships*, which is an all-encompassing *kleos* that corresponds on a microcosmic level to the *Iliad* itself on a macrocosmic level. Outside the *Iliad*, compare the representation of Demodokos in the *Odyssey* who also sings the *klea andrōn* 'songs of men' (8.73).

32. Cf. Whitman 1958.335n36: "Homer is deeply conscious of the relation between the reality of action and the tradition of song which records it; cf. Helen's remark, *Iliad* 6.358. Action in a way exists for the sake of the poetic landmark, which is another way of looking at heroic *kleos*. Action is the road to grandeur and eternity."

33. Nagy 1979.16-17.

ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται·
εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
ὤλετο μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν
ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.

Iliad 9.412-16

If, staying here, I fight around the city of the Trojans,
my homecoming [*nostos*] is destroyed, but my *kleos* will be everlasting;
But if I return home to the dear land of my fathers,
my noble *kleos* is destroyed, and my lifetime will be long,
and my end in death should not come to me quickly.

The important point here is that Achilles' options, in his view, are reduced to a safe homecoming (*nostos*), or to an early death but with the compensation of an everlasting *kleos*. Although Achilles is the one warrior in the *Iliad* represented as singing the *kleos* of men (9.189), he recognizes that his own *kleos* is in the hands of the poets who will remember him, whoever they are. Most importantly, the idea that there will be no *kleos* for Achilles if he leaves dovetails with the idea that there is also no *alkē* in flight. Whether one departs from Troy by pursuing one's *nostos* or by fleeing (*pheugō*), both are the antipodes to having *kleos* and *alkē*, or to gaining *kleos* through *alkē*.

The key to the winning of *kleos* for Achilles is directly signalled in two places as contingent on his *alkē*. The first occurs in the Embassy scene from which Achilles' statement above is taken. In his opening bid to persuade Achilles to rejoin the fighting, Odysseus says that the Achaeans are facing a considerable difficulty:

ἐν δοιῇ δὲ σαωσέμεν ἢ ἀπολέσθαι
νῆας ἐΰσσέλμους, εἰ μὴ σύ γε δύσεαι ἀλκήν

Iliad 9.230-31

there is doubt whether we shall save our well-benched ships, or if they will be destroyed, unless you put on *alkē*

We have noted the expression *duō* 'put on' + *alkē* in another context, but here it takes on a conditional meaning: for Odysseus, it means saving the Achaeans' ships and maybe their entire enterprise; for Achilles, it means losing his *nostos* but acquiring an everlasting *kleos*. Once again I draw attention to the alternative construction between victory and defeat that we have seen in other passages involving *alkē*. Whenever *alkē* is involved, the outcome of an event is polarized into absolutely positive or negative terms.

The association between 'putting on' (*duō*) *alkē* and winning *kleos* is repeated later in the *Iliad*. In book 18, Achilles tells his mother that, as a result of the death of Patroklos, he is finally ready to return to battle. In language that recalls his own words at 9.413, he says:

> νῦν δὲ κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀροίμην
>
> *Iliad* 18.121
>
> but now may I win noble *kleos*

Thetis then requests that he wait until she returns with new armor for him from Hephaistos (18.134-37). Once she has returned with Achilles' new armor, Thetis tells him to renounce his argument with Agamemnon, and then:

> αἶψα μάλ' ἐς πόλεμον θωρήσσεο, δῦσεο δ' ἀλκήν
>
> *Iliad* 19.36
>
> arm yourself immediately for war, and put on *alkē*

As a preparation for warfare, 'putting on' (*duō*) *alkē* is the phrase used by both Odysseus and Thetis to characterize what Achilles needs to do to save the Achaeans. It should be emphasized that the expression *duō* 'put on' + *alkē* is used only of Achilles in the *Iliad*, as if his *alkē* were like the immortal armor of Hephaistos that he puts on in book 19. Achilles himself views his return to battle, as highlighted in what he says at 9.413, as gaining *kleos* for the long term. But the means by which he shall win that *kleos* is his *alkē* (along with the immortal armor

from Hephaistos), as both his mother and Odysseus pointedly tell him.

If we turn for a moment to a fragment of Hesiod, we will see that the association between Achilles and *alkē* actually has a deeper thematic resonance for the tradition represented by the *Iliad*, but which extends beyond the Homeric tradition. Reflecting on some of the royal families whose stories are part of epic, Hesiod tells us:

> ἀλκὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσι,
> νοῦν δ' Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ' ἔπορ' Ἀτρεΐδῃσι
>
> Hesiod F 203 MW

> for Olympios gave *alkē* to the sons of Aiakos,
> and intelligence to the sons of Amythaon, and gave
> wealth to the sons of Atreus

This comparison between *alkē*, *nous* 'intelligence', and *ploutos* 'wealth' is illuminating because it represents *alkē* as an absolute quality, perhaps even a virtue, which can characterize a royal lineage. However, *alkē*, *nous*, and *ploutos* are all made parallel in the Hesiod fragment, which suggests that *alkē* here is a distinguishing feature that can also be treated like an inherited possession. What is more interesting, perhaps, for its divergence from Homeric usage, is that this fragment appears to represent a royal line in terms of one outstanding quality.

The notion that Zeus (Olympios) gives *alkē* to someone is certainly Homeric and should be familiar; but in Homeric poetry Zeus gives *alkē* to individual warriors or kings, not to entire families. Although this kind of generic usage of *alkē* occurs in Hesiod,[34] the association of *alkē*

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34. A certain 'destabilization' of meaning is detectable in Hesiod. In the only two other places where *alkē* is attested, its meaning is distinctly that of 'defense', albeit in a physical and moral sense. At *Theogony* 876, against the winds of Typhoeus there is said to be "no *alkē* of evil for those men who are caught by them on the sea" (κακοῦ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἀλκὴ | ἀνδράσιν οἳ κείνῃσι συνάντωνται κατὰ πόντον). Again at *Works and Days* 200-1, we read that, as regards the Fifth (Iron) Generation of mankind, Shame (*Aidōs*) and Just Retribution (*Nemesis*) will return to the immortals and "baneful pains shall be left for mortal men; and there will be no *alkē* of evil" (τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα

with a "son" of Aiakos is already present in the *Iliad*. The epithet *Aiakidēs* 'son of Aiakos', is used in the *Iliad* both of Peleus, Achilles' father (as, for example, at 16.15 and *passim*), and of Achilles (as at 9.191, and *passim*). Though the plural, as Hesiod uses it, is perhaps meant to include Peleus and Achilles, Achilles is certainly the most famous son of Aiakos from the point of view of the *Iliad*. As Achilles tells us in the *Iliad*, his lineage begins with Zeus, who is the father of Aiakos, then Aiakos is father of Peleus, and Peleus of Achilles (21.188-89). The *Aiakidai* are thus direct descendants of Zeus and are all characterized by *alkē*, which in the *Iliad* is repeatedly said to come from Zeus. But there is only one *Aiakidēs* in the *Iliad* who has the responsibility to 'put on' (*duō*) his *alkē* to save the Achaeans, and there is only one *Aiakidēs* whose *alkē* is on display in the *Iliad* generally. Within epic, as Agamemnon and Ajax both express it, Achilles in the end has both *kleos* and *alkē* by not fleeing and returning home. But even outside Homeric epic *kleos* and *alkē* can converge. As the fragment above from a song of Hesiod shows, Achilles, by staying to fight and die at Troy, has gained a *kleos* that itself refers to his *alkē*. For Achilles, the memory of his *alkē* as represented both within and without the Homeric tradition is his *kleos*.

λυγρὰ | θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι· κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή). The first instance of *alkē* can be understood as some kind of physical protection, which is a usage that is identifiably Homeric; the second instance has clearly shifted somewhat, and suggests an ethical application of *alkē* that is not present in Homeric poetry.

3

The Remembering of Alkē and the Danger of Forgetting

There are several expressions in Homeric poetry involving *alkē* and memory that we are now in a position to consider. The first is *mimnēskomai* 'to remember' + gen. of *alkē* (e.g. at *Iliad* 6.112, 8.174, 11.287; *Odyssey* 4.527, etc.), the second is *lanthanō* 'to forget, escape the notice of' + gen. of *alkē* (e.g. at *Iliad* 6.265, 11.313, 13.269 and 835, 16.602, etc.), the third is *medomai* 'to be mindful of' + gen. of *alkē* (*Iliad* 4.418, 5.718), and the fourth is **maō* 'to be eager for' + gen. of *alkē* (*Iliad* 13.197, 17.181). Intrinsic to all of these expressions is the notion that *alkē* can have a conceptual or a mental aspect, which is treated as if it could be misplaced if the necessary concentration were lost to keep it in mind.[1] This aspect of *alkē* seems to contrast sharply with the dimensions of *alkē* that we have seen before, where *alkē* describes the demonstration of physical activity or prowess. On a physical level, *alkē* represents the skill and experience achieved through martial activity, and it is frequently employed to designate that activity itself. On the level that we are about to consider, however, *alkē* is represented as a content of memory, and expressions like *mimnēskomai* + *alkē* and *lanthanō* + *alkē* emphasize the intellectual ability to recall

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1. In this connection, we should also compare the expression *methiēmi* 'let go of' + gen. of *alkē* (*Iliad* 4.234, 12.409 and 13.116). The verb *methiēmi* can also be used with other nouns in the gentive, such as *polemos* 'war' (*Iliad* 4.240, 351, etc.), *makhē* 'battle' (*Iliad* 12.268), and *biē* 'force' (*Iliad* 21.177=*Odyssey* 21.126). Taken together, these nouns reflect the same nexus of meanings that we have repeatedly seen for *alkē* itself, as a 'force pertaining to war', 'war prowess', or the like.

and thereby to redeploy such activity. But there is an interesting dichotomy between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in this respect. In the *Iliad*, the ability to remember and to reemploy *alkē* has to be treated on its own terms. But in the *Odyssey*, remembering *alkē* does not refer to feats in the *Odyssey* but rather to feats accomplished in the Troy Tale. Without arguing specifically that the *Odyssey* imitates or is based on the *Iliad* as we have them,[2] I nevertheless submit that the *Odyssey*'s perspective on war as represented by its deployment of *alkē* necessitates comparison with the perspective presented in the *Iliad*. In this way, we shall see that the remembering of *alkē* as it operates in the *Odyssey* can offer its own retrospective view of *alkē* as it was actualized in the *Iliad*.

Before we turn to the relationship between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in respect of remembering *alkē*, we must first examine the connection between memory and *alkē* as they occur in the *Iliad*. As we shall see, the *Iliad* preserves a close relationship at the level of diction and theme between the strength of memory and the physical strength exhibited in *alkē*. Effort is constantly made by individuals to coordinate these two planes of activity in the midst of battle in order to triumph over an adversary. The repeated patterning of these ideas suggests that we are dealing with a traditional association between memory and warfare preserved in the *Iliad*, where success in battle depends upon an unfailing memory. Conversely, as we shall see, the inability to remember leads to defeat and even death.

Let us begin with the least common Iliadic expressions linking memory and *alkē* and then move forward to the most common. The *Iliad* preserves two expressions that are not found in the *Odyssey* relating mental faculties and *alkē*, where the connection is not at first obvious between memory and martial strength. The first of these is *medomai* 'to be mindful of' + gen. of *alkē*. When Sthenelos wants to reproach Agamemnon for criticizing Diomedes, the latter recommends instead that they "be mindful of their eager *alkē*" (ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ νῶϊ μεδώμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς, *Iliad* 4.418) and concentrate on defeating the Trojans. The same line occurs again when Hera becomes afraid lest Hektor slaughter too many Achaeans, and she recommends to Athena

2. For a recent discussion of how certain features of the *Odyssey* structurally resemble the *Iliad*, see Cook 1995.28-32, with further bibliography.

that they should "be mindful of their eager *alkē*" (ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ νῶϊ μεδώμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς, *Iliad* 5.718). Etymologically *medomai* is related to *mēdomai* 'to intend, plot' and *mēdea* 'counsels', and there is considerable overlap between the two in meaning.[3] As Benveniste has shown, the root *med-* has widespread importance in Indo-European languages because it covers an array of activity from thinking to medicine, to judging and authorizing law. However, if Benveniste is correct, the activity implied by the root *med-* is not a general kind of thinking, but a deliberative and conscious act employed regularly to resolve a particular problem.[4]

As I am interested here in the relationship implied between the mental faculty presupposed by *medomai*, and its corresponding object *alkē*, Benveniste's definition now gives us a basis on which to interpret that relationship. For example, the verb *medomai* can be used in Homeric poetry with other nouns such as *polemos* 'war' (*Iliad* 2.384, 9.650, etc.), *nostos* 'homecoming' (*Iliad* 9.622, *Odyssey* 11.110, etc.), *koitos* 'bed' (*Odyssey* 3.334), *dorpon* 'evening meal' (*Iliad* 18.245, 24.2), and *kaka* 'evils' (*Iliad* 4.21, 8.458). In each of these cases, the verb *medomai* presupposes the necessary capability on the part of the subject to accomplish or to realize the thing desired. In conjunction with Benveniste's formulation, then, we may conclude that the mental faculty involved in *medomai* + gen. of *alkē* means not only 'to be mindful of' or 'to contrive' *alkē*; in addition, it suggests that the capacity to produce *alkē* for its application to a given situation is also present. To put it another way, to bethink oneself (*medomai*) of *alkē* can be understood as the mental equivalent of physically employing *alkē*. This is not to state, however, that the mental and physical components of action are identical; rather, the expression *medomai* + gen. of *alkē* treats the two components as if they were on the same continuum, differing only in their degree of realization.

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3. On the parallelism in meaning between *medomai* and *mēdomai*, compare *Iliad* 4.21, where Hera and Athena are said to have 'devised evils' (*kaka* + *medesthēn*), with *Iliad* 7.478, where Zeus also 'devised evils' (*kaka* + *mēdeto*). See also Frisk 1960 s.v. μήδομαι, Chantraine 1968 s.v. μέδω, and Benveniste 1945.6 and 1969 II.123-32.

4. Benveniste 1969 II.129.

A second expression that is not attested after the *Iliad* is the perfect form *memona* + gen. of *alkē*, which for reasons given below I will translate as 'to be eager, mindful of' *alkē*. The actual forms of *memona* + gen. of *alkē* that are attested in the *Iliad* are the dual participle (*memaote*, 13.197), and the singular participle in the accusative (*memaōta*, 17.181). The reduplicated form *memona* presumably derives from the unattested **maō*, and corresponds exactly to Latin *memini* 'to remember', which can be compared to Greek *memnēmai* 'to remember', derived from *mimnēskomai*.[5] These words for memory are also related through the root *men-* to Greek *menos* 'strength' (cf. Latin *mens*, Sanskrit *mánas-*, Gothic *ga-mun-ds*, etc.), about which I will have more to say later. The perfect form *memona* suggests that the mental capacity that is needed for a given task has already been summoned, and its participial form implies that the realization of *alkē* is in progress. Perhaps this can be seen in the attestations themselves, where the two Ajaxes in the midst of lifting a dead compatriot are called 'mindful of eager *alkē*' (μεμαότε θοὺριδος ἀλκῆς, 13.197), and where Hektor boasts that he may stop some Danaan, even if he, the Danaan, is especially 'mindful of *alkē*' (ἀλκῆς μάλα περ μεμαῶτα, 17.181). And finally, when Achilles tries to prevent Aineias from attacking him, Aineias retorts that Achilles cannot turn him away (*apostrephō*) with words, because he is 'mindful of *alkē*' (ἀλκῆς δ' οὔ μ' ἐπέεσιν ἀποτρέψεις μεμαῶτα, *Iliad* 20.256). In each of these instances, the suggestion is that whatever mental capacity was needed to summon *alkē* has been accomplished, but also that *alkē* itself is now being, and will continue to be, demonstrated in practical action. Being in the process of realizing or demonstrating *alkē* means that an individual has the advantage, and this in turn presupposes that he has full control of his mental faculties. It is just this mental control, in fact, that Aineias at *Iliad* 20.256 fears losing as a result of Achilles' *words* (*epos*, plural). The power of Achilles' words, and the underlying importance of mental control, can be inferred from Aineias's fear that even if he has *alkē*, Achilles might say something that would thwart his physical attack.

The participial forms of *memona* + gen. of *alkē* have a correlate in the participial forms of *memona* + *alexō* 'to defend' (verb from *alkē*)

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5. Chantraine 1968 s.v. μέμονα and Frisk 1960 s.v. μέμονα.

combinations that we also find only in the *Iliad*. The verb *alexō* (cf. Sanskrit *rákṣati* 'to protect') derives from the root $*h_2l$-*ek*-,[6] which gives rise to a mulitiplicity of Homeric forms such as *alexētēr* 'defender' (*Iliad* 20.396), *alexikakos* 'keeping away evil' (*Iliad* 10.20), *alexanemos* 'keeping away the wind' (*Odyssey* 14.529), and so on. The noun *alkē* derives from the related root $*h_2el$-*k*-,[7] which is clearly etymologically related to the root of *alexō* and, as we have seen, *alkē* can also have as one of its meanings the notion of 'defense'. For the moment, however, I draw attention to the fact that the combination of participle of *memona* + *alexō* fulfills on the verbal level what *memona* + gen. of *alkē* fulfills on the nominal. After Zeus scolds Hera for intervening in his affairs, Hephaistos encourages his mother to endure it, because at one time he himself "was minded to protect" her (ἀλεξέμεναι μεμαῶτα, *Iliad* 1.590), before Zeus threw him from Olympos. In this example, the protection that Hephaistos intended to offer was overshadowed by the greater strength of Zeus, making Hephaistos's stance appear passive with regard to Zeus. But the verb *alexō* can also denote the active process of defending, which from another point of view becomes indistinguishable from the military activity represented by *alkē* in general. In a passage that describes Aineias attacking Idomeneus, the distinction between defensive and offensive engagement is made ambiguous by the multiple ways in which the text refers to Idomeneus:

> βῆ δὲ μετ' Ἰδομενῆα μέγα πτολέμοιο μεμηλώς.
> ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰδομενῆα φόβος λάβε τηλύγετον ὥς,
> ἀλλ' ἔμεν', ὡς ὅτε τις σῦς οὔρεσιν ἀλκὶ πεποιθώς,
> ὅς τε μένει κολοσυρτὸν ἐπερχόμενον πολὺν ἀνδρῶν
> χώρῳ ἐν οἰοπόλῳ, φρίσσει δέ τε νῶτον ὕπερθεν·
> ὀφθαλμὼ δ' ἄρα οἱ πυρὶ λάμπετον· αὐτὰρ ὀδόντας
> θήγει, ἀλέξασθαι μεμαὼς κύνας ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρας.
>
> *Iliad* 13.469-75

6. Chantraine 1968 s.v. ἀλέξω.
7. Chantraine 1968 s.v. ἀλέξω.

He [Aineias] went over to Idomeneus who was greatly set on war.
But fear did not take hold of Idomeneus like a child alone,[8]
but he stood his ground, as when a boar in the mountains, confident
in *alkē*,
which stands his ground against a great mob of men coming
to the sheep pasture, bristles up his back;
and his two eyes shine with fire; he grinds his teeth,
mindful of warding off/fighting the dogs and men.

The ambiguity of the verb *alexomai* 'to ward off, fight against' in this passage arises from the description of Idomeneus first as 'set on war' (*ptolemoio memēlōs*), and then by way of comparing him to a boar that is 'confident in *alkē*' (*alki pepoithōs*), which is an expression that elsewhere in Homeric poetry can designate either offensive (as at *Iliad* 17.61, *Odyssey* 6.130), or defensive (*Iliad* 5.299, 17.728, 18.158) fighting action. The apparent differences in meaning between *alkē* as an aggressive fighting force and *alexō* as a defensive action, can be resolved to an extent if we accept that the very process of defending as signalled by *alexō* implies the kind of offensive fighting conveyed by *alkē*. The immanent meaning shared by these two terms is one of fighting, but whether that fighting is a defensive or an offensive action is left to be determined by the perspective from which it is viewed. The contextual evidence, as for example in the passage above describing Idomeneus, thus supports at some level the similarity in meaning that must have existed before the hypothetical differentiation of the roots **h*$_2$*l-ek-* and **h*$_2$*el-k-* occurred.

In the two remaining instances of *memona* + *alexō* in the *Iliad*, there appears another term, *menos* 'strength', which is etymologically related to *memona*. The word *menos*, as I mentioned earlier, also derives from the root *men-* (cf. Latin *mens*, *memini*), which resurfaces in words having to do with the mind or memory. In a further specialization of meaning, *men-* also furnishes the basis for the noun *mania* 'madness',

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8. The semantics of Homeric τηλύγετος are not without controversy. However, despite the remarks of Coughanowr 1972.220 on this passage, what is being emphasized in the boar simile is that although Idomeneus is alone, he remains steadfast against Aineias. Hence my translation here of τηλύγετος as 'a child alone'.

and the verb *mainomai* 'to be maddened'. More importantly for the moment, however, is that the root *men-* is related to the root *mnē-*, which forms the basis of verbs like *mimnēskomai* 'to remember', from which we derive the perfect form *memnēmai* 'to remember' and *mnaomai* 'to mention, to woo'.[9] The importance of the root *mnē-* for archaic Greek poetry has been stressed by Vernant[10] and, following him, Detienne[11] as well as others.[12]

For Vernant, the act of remembering (as signified in the *mnē-* of *Mnēmosunē*, goddess and personification of Memory) represents a profound mental exertion that succeeds in recovering the atemporal reality behind phenomena:

> . . . the act of remembering seeks, not to situate events in a temporal framework, but to reach the essence of being, to discover the original, primordial reality from which the cosmos emerges and which allows one to understand the process of becoming in its entirety.[13]

This evaluation suggests that the thought process signalled by *mnē-* represents a special kind of mental activity and, along with the roots *med-* and *men-*, delimits a particular state or quality of mind characterized by heightened activity.

The word *menos* as it occurs in epic poetry has been treated in some detail by Nagy,[14] who suggests that it is the kind of strength that has to be remembered *(mi-mnē-skomai, me-mnē-mai)* to be effective, the very conception of which can be posited in the relationship between the roots *men-* and *mnē-*. As I will show later, the verb *mimnēskomai* is

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9. On the relationship between *mnaomai* and *memnēmai*, see Benveniste 1954.15.
10. Vernant 1959.
11. Detienne 1967.15.
12. For example, Pucci 1977.22-25, Thalmann 1984.147-48, Nagy 1990b.58-60.
13. Vernant 1959.7 (my translation). The original reads: ". . . la remémoration cherche non à situer les événements dans un cadre temporel, mais à atteindre le fond de l'être, à découvrir l'originel, la réalité primordiale dont est issu le cosmos et qui permet de comprendre le devenir dans son ensemble."
14. Nagy 1974.266-69.

used overtly and programmatically in connection with *alkē* and its derivatives, and represents a systematic relationship between memory, or strength of mind, and war. For the present, though, let us continue to examine the less direct ways in which Iliadic poetry coordinates *memona* + *alexō* with *menos*, which, taken together, suggest a connection between memory and warfare, remembering and physical strength.

When Zeus sends Hera and Athena to bolster the Achaeans after a particularly brutal onslaught by Hektor and Ares, they arrive at Troy at the place where the Simoeis and Skamandros rivers come together:

> αἱ δὲ βάτην τρήρωσι πελειάσιν ἴθμαθ' ὁμοῖαι,
> ἀνδράσιν Ἀργείοισιν ἀλεξέμεναι μεμαυῖαι.
>
> *Iliad* 5.778-79
>
> And the two went in steps like timorous doves
> mindful to defend the Argive men.

After the two have arrived, they divide up their responsibilities. Hera will make an exhortatory speech to the Argives (5.787-91), and Athena will replace Sthenelos, Diomedes' chariot-driver, and drive Diomedes into battle with Ares. There are some interesting points to note, however, with respect to their activities. Hera's role in the intervention is relatively passive compared to Athena's, in that she will only make a speech to the Argives. After her speech urging the Argives to fight, she is described as stirring the *menos* and *thumos* of each man (Ὣς εἰποῦσ' ὄρτυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου, 5.792). This expression suggests that her responsibility to the Argives, as signalled in the phrase *alexemenai memauiai* 'mindful to defend', is to rouse their *menos*, which is, as we have seen, a word for strength that is connected to memory. Indeed, the very strategy of her speech is to recall the time when Achilles came into the fighting, and to contrast how the Trojans would not venture beyond the Dardanian gates then as they do now (5.787-91). Although no word for memory is used in her speech, her appeal directs the memory of the Achaeans to an earlier time, and we may infer that her appeal stirs the *menos* of each of them. Hera activates the memory and the *menos* of each man in carrying out her

charge 'to defend' (*alexemenai*) them, which from my point of view means that she rouses a mental *cum* physical energy in them. She is, of course, rousing them to continue fighting against Hektor. So in this context, for Hera to defend (*alexemenai*) the Argives means that she must prepare them for battle by raising their mental (mnemonic) and physical (*menos*) energies to a certain pitch. We shall see the association between *alkē/alexomai* and *menos*/mnemonics time and again in Homeric poetry.

If Hera's role in the encounter with the Argives is passive and limited to reminding them of a significant event, even though she actively stirs the *menos*—the strength of mind, strength of memory—of each man, Athena's role with respect to them is aggressive and forward. She too begins by appealing to memory, but this time to Diomedes' alone, recalling to him the time when his father Tydeus defeated the Kadmeians (5.806-8). This forces Diomedes himself into a mode of remembering signalled by the verb *memnēmai*, which is the word he uses to recall her previous orders not to fight anyone but Aphrodite (5.818). Shortly thereafter Athena takes the driver's seat in Diomedes' chariot and is described, significantly, as the 'mindful goddess' (*emmemauia thea*, the participle being an intensified form built from *en* 'in' + *memauia* 'mindful'). The word *emmemauia* is certainly to be connected with Athena's, and Hera's, description earlier as *memauiai*. The intensified form *emmemauia* suggests that Athena has achieved an even more heightened state of mind than previously, and in turn roused that of Diomedes in preparation for their imminent combat with Ares. In the actual combat with Ares, Ares first casts a spear at Athena and Diomedes, but then Athena drives Diomedes' spear into Ares' midriff (5.856-57), showing that Athena takes an active role in this confrontation. Once again, we can see how the verb *alexomai*, which was used to describe Hera and Athena, can mean defensive action in one sense, but active, offensive engagement in another. Their description as *alexemenai memauiai* 'mindful to defend/fight for' the Achaeans becomes even more significant if we recall that earlier in this same book, before the two went to Zeus for help, they both had resolved to stop Ares, saying:

ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ νῶϊ μεδώμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς

Iliad 5.718

but come let us both be mindful [*medomai*] of eager *alkē*

Thus their entire expedition to the Achaeans is framed in terms of conciously and deliberately acting (*medomai*, in the sense discussed earlier) with respect to their *alkē*. It may also be significant that in comparison to the *alkē* with regard to which Hera and Athena defend (*alexomai*) the Achaeans, Ares, himself a god who can fill someone with *alkē* (like Hektor at *Iliad* 17.210-12), is twice referred to in this same book as 'maddened' (verb *mainesthai* at 5.717 and 831), which is also connected through the root *men-* to *menos* and memory. The chain of associations is rounded out: Ares, who is capable by nature of producing *alkē*, has reached a heightened mental state (of being 'maddened' [*mainesthai*]) that results in destruction against the Argives; Hera and Athena, by conciously regarding (*medomai*) their *alkē* and by being mindful (*memauiai*) to defend/fight for (*alexomai*) the Argives, rouse the memory and *menos* of the Argives, ultimately enabling Athena to help Diomedes attack Ares. There is, I suggest, a deeply archaic association at work here between heightened states of mind, as reflected in words built from the roots *men-*, *mnē-*, and *med-*, and martial activity, as reflected in words built from the roots **h₂l-ek-* and **h₂el-k-*.

In Homeric poetry generally, Athena is extensively associated with words based on these two sets of roots, which represent military engagement on the one hand, and enhanced mental activity on the other. We begin with the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, personified *Alkē*, along with *Phobos* 'Terror', *Eris* 'Strife', and *Iōkē* 'Pursuit', hangs around the shield of Athena as a crown (*Iliad* 5.739-40). At the end of *Iliad* 5, Athena is called *Alalkomenēïs* 'Defender/Fighter' (908), which is a reduplicated form based on *alkē*.[15] She is also given this name once earlier in the *Iliad* (4.8). The symbolic *Alkē* on her shield, as well as her epithet *Alalkomenēïs*, highlight Athena's close relationship to war in the *Iliad*: she can be represented directly in terms

15. Chantraine 1968 s.v. ἀλέξω. Cf. the forms of *alalkon* (aorist) 'to defend' (e.g. *Iliad* 9.605, 21.548, 22.196, etc.; *Odyssey* 3.237, 4.167, 13.319, etc.).

of *alkē*, which is a fighting force that, as we have seen, can have either a defensive or offensive coloration. It is worth noting that the importance of the name *Alalkomenēïs* for Athena actually extends beyond Homeric poetry into local Greek cult. Pausanias describes a small Boeotian village called *Alalkomenai*, and then reports a local legend wherein the village was named after a man called *Alalkomeneōs*, who is said to have raised Athena (9.33.5-6). According to Pausanias, a different local story tells that the village was named after a girl, *Alalkomenia*, who was one of the daughters of Ogygus (ibid.). Pausanias also records that there was a temple of Athena built some distance from the village (ibid.), which at the very least suggests that the local people felt some religious relationship with the goddess.

If we return to archaic poetry, we may note that in *Homeric Hymn* 28 (line 3), Athena is called *alkēessa* 'warlike'.[16] In the *Odyssey*, which is an epic that does not have war as its primary focus, Athena is never called *Alalkomenēïs*. Instead she intermittently assumes the names and the roles of *Men-tēs* (1.105) and *Men-tōr* (2.268), which from a morphological point of view mean something like 'he who reminds'.[17] The assumption of these epithets instead of the *Alalkomenēïs* that she bore in the *Iliad*, argues strongly that her entire role in the *Odyssey* has changed to one of 'Reminder' rather than of 'Defender/Protector'. In passages that I shall discuss in more detail later, Athena, in the guise of *Men-tēs/Men-tōr*, is described as imparting *menos* to Telemakhos ('putting' [*tithēmi*] + *menos* at 1.88-9; and 'reminding' [*hupomimnēskō*] + *menos* at 1.320-22),[18] which suggests further that part of her role in the *Odyssey* is to deliver strength and memory, or perhaps strength through memory. In one of the most stunning collocations, Athena, disguised as *Men-tōr*, goads Odysseus to retaliate against the suitors by retrieving his *menos* and *alkē* (22.226), and then boasts that she would know how to repay them because she is *Men-tōr*, son of *Alkimos*

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16. Cf. Pindar, *Dithyramb* 2.17 SM, where the *aigis* 'shield' of Athena is called *alkaessa* 'warlike' (ἀλκάεσσά τε Παλλάδος αἰγὶς). This description of Athena's *aigis* reminds us of *Iliad* 5.740, where *Alkē* personified hangs around Athena's shield like a garland.

17. Nagy 1974.267.

18. Nagy 1974.267 and 1990a.113.

(22.235). This is the only place in Homeric poetry where Athena identifies herself by the name *Mentōr Alkimidēs*, and we shall have ample opportunity later to explore the *ad hoc* occasion that may account for why, in assuming this name at that moment, she integrates her "Iliadic" role of 'Defender/Protector' with her "Odyssean" role of 'Reminder'.

For the present, let us round out our survey of the instances of *memona* + *alexō* as this expression occurs in conjunction with *menos*. We have one final passage to consider. The opening of *Iliad* 3 compares the loud and disorderly assembly of Trojans to the cranes who fly clamorously toward Okeanos with the aim of bringing destruction to the Pygmies (3.1-7).[19] In contrast, the Achaeans are described as proceeding in silence and quiet confidence:

> οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν σιγῇ μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,
> ἐν θυμῷ μεμαῶτες ἀλεξέμεν ἀλλήλοισιν
>
> *Iliad* 3.8-9

> but the Achaeans went in silence breathing *menea* [*menos*, pl.],
> mindful in the *thumos* to defend each other.

This passage presents for the first time that we have seen a direct correspondence between being 'mindful to defend' (*memaōtes alexemen*) and possessing *menos*. In the earlier example from *Iliad* 5, we observed how Hera and Athena were 'mindful to defend' (*alexemenai memauiai*, 5.779) the Achaeans, and then how Hera made a speech that stirred their *menos* (5.792). Here the Achaeans themselves are mindful to defend one another and, in correlation to this disposition, we are told that they themselves breathe *menos*. In their capacity to breathe *menos*, the Achaeans are here nearly equated to divinities.[20]

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19. For more on the meaning of the crane simile describing the Trojans, see Muellner 1990.

20. Nagy 1990a.114. Significantly, only the Achaeans and gods can breathe (*pneuō*) *menos* in the *Iliad*, but the comparison is not identical: Achaeans can 'breathe *menea*'=*menos* (pl.) + *pneuō* in the *Iliad* (2.536, 3.8, 11.508, 24.364), only in the sense of exhaling or snorting it, while gods can actually 'breathe

The background to this passage is the battlefield formations of Achaeans and Trojans, and every effort is made to contrast the disorder of the Trojans with the orderliness of the Achaeans. For example, the word 'cry' (*klangē*) is used three times to describe both the Trojans (3.2), and the cranes (3.3 and 5) to which they are compared. In contrast to this overt and loud display of military disorder, the Achaeans proceed in silence (*sigēi*) and in thought. Attention is drawn in this passage not so much to the outward physical disposition of the Achaeans, as to their inward state of mind. Already in *Iliad* 2 we read that the Achaeans stood on the plain 'mindful to destroy' (*diarrasai memaōtes*, 2.473) the Trojans, which we may compare with the expression *memaōtes alexemen* in the passage above. We examined previously how the participle *memaōtes*, built from the perfect form *memona*, can serve to highlight mental functioning. The Achaeans' state of mental readiness for war, signalled by the use of *memaōtes*, is then reinforced by their description as breathing *menos*, which simultaneously signifies mental and physical strength. Yet because breathing *menos* is generally reserved for the gods, the physical and mental confidence of the Achaeans at this moment is given a divine quality.

The expression *memaōtes alexemen allēloisin* 'mindful to defend each other' in the passage above also brings out another dimension to the Achaeans' readiness that we have seen before. In chapter 2, we reviewed how both Agamemnon (*Iliad* 5.529-32) and Ajax (*Iliad* 15.561-64) admonished the Achaeans to respect (*aideomai*) one another in the fighting because, in the words of both:

> αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἠὲ πέφανται·
> φευγόντων δ' οὔτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτέ τις ἀλκή

Iliad 5.531-32=15.563-64

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menos'=menos pneuō into another organism (Hermes breathes *menos* into horses and mules at *Iliad* 24.442; god (*theos*) breathes *menos* into the Trojans and Achaeans at *Iliad* 19.159). Cf. the expression *empneō* 'breathe into' + *menos*, which is used only of divinities in Homeric poetry (*Iliad* 10.482, 15.60 and 262, 17.456; *Odyssey* 9.381, 24.520).

> in respecting [*aideomai*] men more are safe than are killed;
> but in fleeing there is no glory [*kleos*] and no *alkē*

As I mentioned in chapter 2, neither Agamemnon nor Ajax specifies any further as to what exactly 'respecting men' (*aidomenōn andrōn*) means, but now we can offer at least one answer. Respecting men, and thereby gaining *alkē*, means being 'mindful to defend/fight for' (*memaōtes alexemen*) one another, as the Achaeans are described in the passage above from *Iliad* 3. The important point illustrated by bringing together the passage from *Iliad* 3 and the speeches of Agamemnon and Ajax is that preparation for military activity entails a vital mental dimension. Emphasis is significantly placed on having the right state of mind, along with the necessary physical capacity, to ensure military preparedness. Without having *aidōs* for one another, and without being 'mindful to defend/fight for' (*memaōtes alexemen*) one another, lives are lost unnecessarily.

The emphasis on remembering *alkē* that we have reviewed up to this point has as its counterpart incidents where the *Iliad* represents the mental preparedness necessary for war as capable of being easily lost. A survey of the factors that contribute to the potential loss of *alkē*, and occasionally to the loss of an accompanying *menos*, will illuminate some of the dangers that threaten a warrior's concentration. The fear repeatedly voiced in Iliadic narrative is the fear of becoming distracted and thereby losing one's *alkē*. In this sense, warfare is represented as a delicate matter. Despite the obstacles that an adversary might have set against victory, successful warfare demands a constant psychological vigilance over one's own powers of self-control. We shall treat later the ultimate danger of losing one's *alkē* which results, as might be expected, in death. For the present, however, I note that this outcome is never confronted in the *Iliad*, but it is realized retrospectively in the *Odyssey*. As I suggest below, warriors in the *Iliad* can temporarily lose their *alkē* as the sway of battle oscillates in favor of the Trojans or the Achaeans, but a complete and permanent loss of *alkē* never occurs.

Much of the information concerning the loss of *alkē* arises in conjunction with the combination *lanthanō* 'forget, escape the notice of' + *alkē*. The verb *lanthanō*, as well as its other epic form *lēthō*, are built

on the root *lāth-*, which signifies 'forgetting'.[21] This root resurfaces in the Homeric words *lēthē* 'forgetfulness', and *a-lēth-eiē* 'truth', which are terms that we shall return to later in connection with the verb *mimnēskomai.* The loss of *alkē* in the *Iliad* (*lanthanō* + *alkē*) can result from a spectrum of causes that range from the direct confrontation with divinity to mere intoxication from wine. In *Iliad* 15, Apollo intervenes on behalf of Hektor and the Trojans, brandishing the *aigis* 'shield' that Hephaistos gave to Zeus "to carry to the terror (*phobos*) of men" (φορῆμεναι ἐς φόβον ἀνδρῶν, 15.310). His seizure of the Achaeans' concentration is complete:

> ὄφρα μὲν αἰγίδα χερσὶν ἔχ' ἀτρέμα Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,
> τόφρα μάλ' ἀμφοτέρων βέλε' ἥπτετο, πῖπτε δὲ λαός.
> αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατ' ἐνῶπα ἰδὼν Δαναῶν ταχυπώλων
> σεῖσ', ἐπὶ δ' αὐτὸς ἄυσε μάλα μέγα, τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν
> ἐν στήθεσσιν ἔθελξε, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς.
>
> *Iliad* 15.318-22

> As long as Phoibos Apollo held the aegis still in his hands,
> so long did the projectiles of both sides take hold, and men fell.
> But when he looked straight into the face of the fast-horsed Danaans
> and shook [the aegis], and himself shouted greatly, he spellbound
> [*thelgō*]
> the *thumos* in their breasts, and they forgot their eager *alkē*.

Direct visual and auditory confrontation with Apollo is described as 'charming' or 'spellbinding' (*thelgō*) the Danaans, and this suggests that their concentration has been seized and diverted. Although we do not have the space to go into great detail here, I note that the verb *thelgō* 'to charm, spellbind, beguile' is used in Homeric poetry to suggest a "taking control," as it were, of one's perception, awareness, or intention, often by a divinity, in order to take advantage of this lapse

21. See Frisk 1960 and Chantraine 1968, s.v. λανθάνω.

of awareness.[22] In the passage above, for Apollo to take control of the *thumos* of the Danaans means that they are no longer in control of it themselves, which suggests in turn that their concentration has been broken, allowing them to forget their *alkē*. The passage above also suggests that that the concentration necessary to retain *alkē* is located in the *thumos*, just as many other mental faculties represented in Homeric poetry are.

By creating a lapse of awareness in the Achaeans and leaving an emotional vacuum, Apollo can now fill them with *phobos* 'terror'. As the Achaeans scatter, they are first compared to a herd of cattle or sheep stampeded by two wild beasts:

> ὣς ἐφόβηθεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἀνάλκιδες· ἐν γὰρ Ἀπόλλων
> ἧκε φόβον, Τρωσὶν δὲ καὶ Ἕκτορι κῦδος ὄπαζεν.
>
> *Iliad* 15.326-27

> just so the Achaeans fled in terror [*phobeisthai*], lacking *alkē* [*analkis*]; in them Apollo
> sent terror [*phobos*], and gave glory [*kudos*] to the Trojans and Hektor.

As we noted in the first chapter, there is an inverse relationship between *phobos* and *alkē* attested in several places in the *Iliad*.[23] Since they are both essential attributes of war, in their most exalted form they can be symbolically represented as personified around the shield of Athena (*Iliad* 5.739-40). For the moment, I draw attention to the suggestion in the passage above that *phobos* and *alkē* are conceived as emotional antipodes mediated by a conscious mental faculty, which is

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22. Briefly, we can mention instances of *thelgō* that prove the point: it is used to describe how Zeus takes control of the *noos* 'mind, intention' of the Achaeans (*Iliad* 12.255); how Hermes (*Iliad* 24.343, *Odyssey* 5.47, 24.3) and Poseidon (*Iliad* 13.435) can take control of a person's eyes; as well as how lies (*Iliad* 21.276), flattery (*Odyssey* 1.57), and song (*Odyssey* 12.40 and 44, 17.514) can take control of a person's awareness, forcing one to behave differently than intended.

23. Trümpy 1950.220.

perhaps contained in the *thumos*. The loosening of control over that faculty, which in this case is usurped by divine means, allows *alkē* to slip away and to be replaced by its opposite, *phobos*.

Apart from divine interference, however, the mental faculty that controls emotion and retains *alkē* is also subject to disruption by emotion itself. This idea furnishes a basis on which to interpret other instances of *lanthanō* + *alkē*, where what causes the loss of *alkē* is the experience of a traumatic or otherwise emotionally provocative event. The important point is whether the emotional reaction generated by a given event is strong enough to overwhelm the intellectual faculty, which can subject the individual to what is then, by definition, irrational behavior. For example, after a particularly brutal spate of killing by Hektor, whose Achaean victims are compared to ocean froth (*akhnē*) sprayed by the force of the western wind, Odysseus exclaims to Diomedes:

> Τυδεΐδη, τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς;
> ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἐμ' ἵστασο· δὴ γὰρ ἔλεγχος
> ἔσσεται εἴ κεν νῆας ἕλῃ κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ.
>
> *Iliad* 11.313-15

> Son of Tydeus, what have we experienced [*paskhō*] that we have forgotten [*lanthanō*] our eager *alkē*?
> But come here, friend, stand next to me; surely there will be shame if gleaming-helmed Hektor should reach the ships.

We are told that the Achaeans would have fled (*pheugō*) back to their ships were it not for this exchange between Odysseus and Diomedes (11.311), and we can see the opposition emerge once again between verbs of fleeing (*pheugō*, *phobeō*) and *alkē*. But what draws our attention more specifically is the relationship between experiencing (*paskhō*) something and the loss of *alkē*. The verb *paskhō* 'to suffer, undergo, experience negatively', is used in Homeric poetry programmatically to designate a troubling or difficult situation.[24] In

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24. For example, *Iliad* 2.667, 3.99 and 128, 5.886, 9.492; *Odyssey* 1.4 and 49, 2.174 and 179, 4.81, etc.

reaction to situations of this sort, the use of *paskhō* implies the generation of an emotional response of some sort. The Homeric usage of *paskhō* does not differentiate clearly between mere experience, and negative experience or suffering. In classical Greek, however, this distinction is more fully articulated, for example, both in the verb and in its derivative noun *pathos*, which can mean 'suffering', 'experience', or 'emotion'.[25] For the purposes of the present discussion, the relevant point is that the slaughter of Hektor has provoked emotion, signalled by *paskhō*, which threatens to overtake the concentration necessary to maintain *alkē*.

On the other hand, part of maintaining *alkē* is to stand firm, as implied in the sense of the verb *alexomai* 'to defend/fight for', and this idea is expressed in Odysseus's request to Diomedes to come and stand near him (ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἔμ' ἵσταο, 11.314), the key verb here being *histēmi* 'to position, stand'. The idea seems to be that a potential loss or forgetting of *alkē* can be prevented by standing firm and not giving way, even though this conflates the emotional and physical dimensions of *alkē*. Negative emotion (such as *phobos*) may threaten to overwhelm the mental faculty that maintains *alkē*; in compensation one can respond physically by standing firm, which thereby bolsters the emotion that underlies or is necessary to *alkē*. The significance of Odysseus's statement and the thought process that underlies it will have resonance elsewhere in Homeric epic, as we shall see this very line again when Athena urges Odysseus himself to withstand the suitors in the *Odyssey* (22.233).

A little later in *Iliad* 11, when Odysseus and Diomedes see Hektor coming at them, Odysseus exhorts his companion:

> ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ στέωμεν καὶ ἀλεξώμεσθα μένοντες
>
> *Iliad* 11.348
>
> but come, let us stand [*histēmi*] and, by remaining [*menō*], let us defend/fight [*alexomai*]

25. See *LSJ* s.v. πάθος.

For Odysseus and Diomedes to accomplish this task, which they do, obviously they must not have literally forgotten their *alkē*, as Odysseus had said earlier. In addition, this passage enlarges the circle of verbs to include now *histēmi* 'to position, stand' and *menō* 'to remain, withstand' that are conceptually organized under the rubric of *alkē*, *alexomai*. In a passage that will bear much irony with respect to Odysseus's plight in the *Odyssey*, and to which we shall return later, Odysseus will confess to his *thumos* that 'standing strongly' (*hestamenai kraterōs*, *Iliad* 11.410) is the only way to distinguish (*aristeuō*) oneself in battle. This same idea can be illustrated once more in a passage where Meriones demands from Idomeneus that the Cretan general recognize his fighting abilities:

> οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐμέ φημι λελασμένον ἔμμεναι ἀλκῆς,
> ἀλλὰ μετὰ πρώτοισι μάχην ἀνὰ κυδιάνειραν
> ἵσταμαι, ὁππότε νεῖκος ὀρώρηται πολέμοιο.
>
> *Iliad* 13.269-71

> For I say that neither am I one who has forgotten [*lanthanō*] his *alkē*,
> but among the foremost in battle where men win glory [*kudos*]
> I stand [*histēmi*], whenever the quarrel of war should arise.

In this way, standing firm (*histēmi*), at the front line of battle is directly equated to not forgetting (*lanthanō*) one's *alkē*. But the use of *lanthanō* also suggests the notion of 'escaping one's notice', and so there is a double meaning here when Meriones says that he takes his place among the foremost in battle: on the one hand, this bravery means that he has not 'forgotten' (*lanthanō*) his own *alkē*, but on the other hand, it means that he has not escaped the notice (*lanthanō*) of others by remaining visible in the front lines of battle. This very idea is conveyed explicitly in Meriones' next words to Idomeneus:

> ἄλλον πού τινα μᾶλλον Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
> λήθω μαρνάμενος, σὲ δὲ ἴδμεναι αὐτὸν ὀΐω.
>
> *Iliad* 13.272-73

> Let my fighting escape the notice of [*lanthanō*] some other bronze-armored Achaean, but I think you yourself know of it.

This passage, in conjunction with the previous one, shows how the same verb, *lanthanō*, can represent a process interior to Meriones of retaining his *alkē*, but at the same time can also represent his exterior position in the perception of others. If Meriones does not forget, or let escape from notice, his *alkē*, then his fighting (*marnamai*) and taking his stand (*histēmi*) among those in front—in other words, the demonstration of his *alkē*—should not be forgotten by, or escape the notice of, his leader Idomeneus. I stress here that the meaning behind not forgetting (*lanthanō*) one's *alkē* is that direct action of some kind is taken, and the most common action taken is represented by verbs of 'standing/withstanding' like *histēmi* and, as we saw earlier, *menō*.

The verb *menō*, in fact, occurs in conjunction with not forgetting (*lanthanō*) *alkē* in a passage that recalls the moment in *Iliad* 15 (318-22) where Apollo shouted and made the Achaeans forget their *alkē*:

> Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ἡγήσατο· τοὶ δ' ἅμ' ἕποντο
> ἠχῇ θεσθεσίῃ, ἐπὶ δ' ἴαχε λαὸς ὄπισθεν.
> Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἑτέρωθεν ἐπίαχον, οὐδὲ λάθοντο
> ἀλκῆς, ἀλλ' ἔμενον Τρώων ἐπιόντας ἀρίστους.
>
> *Iliad* 13.832-36
>
> So [Hektor] spoke and took the lead; and [the Trojans] followed him with an immense noise, and the men shouted behind him.
> The Argives on the other side shouted in response, and they did not forget [*lanthanō*] their *alkē*, but withstood [*menō*] the best attackers of the Trojans.

The difference here, of course, is that the shouting of men in their bravado does not generate the kind of emotional reaction experienced upon hearing the threatening shout of a god like Apollo. In contrast to the shouting of Apollo, which terrorizes by creating *phobos*, the opposite of *alkē*, and which results in flight, the shouting of the Trojans here hardens the Achaeans in their determination to keep *alkē* in mind, and to express that mindset by withstanding (*menō*) their opponents.

Divine or human shouting is not the only kind of sound that is associated with *phobos* and is connected with the remembering of *alkē*. The sound of one's fellow warriors being killed in battle can also provoke the need to keep *alkē* in mind. Early in *Iliad* 16, as the disguised Patroklos leads the Myrmidons against the Trojans, we read of how the Danaans for a while take the upper hand in battle. The Danaans are compared to wolves who overtake a helpless, disintegrating flock of sheep:

> οἱ δὲ ἰδόντες
> αἶψα διαρπάζουσιν ἀνάλκιδα θυμὸν ἐχούσας·
> ὣς Δαναοὶ Τρώεσσιν ἐπέχραον· οἱ δὲ φόβοιο
> δυσκελάδου μνήσαντο, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς.
>
> *Iliad* 16.354-57
>
> and [the wolves] seeing them
> suddenly seize them, who have a *thumos* lacking in *alkē* [*analkis*];
> just so the Danaans attacked the Trojans; and [the Trojans]
> remembered [*mimnēskomai*] the ill-sounding terror [*phobos*], and they
> forgot [*lanthanō*] their eager *alkē*.

From the use of the adjective *duskelados* 'ill-sounding' to describe the terror (*phobos*) at the sound of the Trojans being attacked and killed, we see that *phobos* can also be generated by the sound of one's dying companions. As the Trojans are being killed, it is this sound that causes the remembering (*mimnēskomai*) of *phobos*, and in turn causes them to forget (*lanthanō*) their *alkē*. In contrast to the direct action implied by not forgetting (*lanthanō*) *alkē*, forgetting *alkē* means passively experiencing or suffering a negative outcome. This is an important distinction because, in a larger sense, it connects memory with action, and loss of memory with passive suffering and even death. Unlike the shouts of bravado by the Trojans that embolden the Achaeans not to forget (*lanthanō*) their *alkē* (*Iliad* 13.832-36, quoted above) and to withstand the Trojan onslaught, the Trojans are confronted in the passage above with the sound of their own men dying which, we may infer, by causing them to forget their *alkē* and to remember *phobos*, in turn leads more of them to die.

We have seen the idea of a traumatic or disturbing event causing a forgetting of *alkē* before, in the passage where Odysseus asks Diomedes, "Son of Tydeus, what have we experienced [*paskhō*] that we have forgotten [*lanthanō*] our eager *alkē*?" (Τυδεΐδη, τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς;, *Iliad* 11.313). But now we are ready to take our conclusions one step further: not only can *alkē* be forgotten as a result of the passive experience of some disturbing event, but once it has been forgotten, it may cause one to suffer negatively until the point of death. The danger of forgetting *alkē*, as the passage above illustrates, is thus ultimately the danger of being killed, and this suggests in turn that the faculty of memory is powerfully connected to staying alive. Earlier I argued for the importance that the group of verbs **mao*, *medomai*, *lanthanō*, and *mimnēskomai* + *alkē* placed on the notion that mental faculties were indispensable to the proper conduct of war. Unifying all of these verbs is the conscious mental activity that they each direct toward *alkē*: **mao* and *medomai* may be classed together as verbs that represent a deliberative mental activity, yet *lanthanō* and *mimnēskomai* are no less active for representing memory. The extraordinary thing is the lengths to which Homeric poetry goes to associate the pure fighting strength of *alkē* with these different realms of mental activity. More importantly, the passages that we have examined suggest that it is these very mental realms, and especially those of memory, that by keeping *alkē* as their focus keep the warrior alive.

As William Moran[26] has shown, the verb *mimnēskomai* designates a wide variety of meaning in Homeric poetry, including 'to remember, recall, remind, keep in mind, etc.' Moran draws attention in particular to one specialized usage of *mimnēskomai* in Homeric narrative: that of "remembering" epic stories that occur outside of Homeric poetry. As Moran sees it, *mimnēskomai* is used to introduce an extra-Homeric tale, which is perhaps an epic in its own right, and the person introducing such a tale thereby becomes an epic poet momentarily.[27] In concluding his article, Moran summarizes his survey by saying that *mimnēskomai* in the contexts examined "may probably be a technical term of bards

26. Moran 1975.
27. Moran 1975.201-204.

meaning 'I will remember-sing' because remembering, commemorating and singing are all one inseparable phenomenon in the Archaic mind."[28]

Although I disagree with the synchronic character Moran attributes to the "Archaic mind," I believe that he has demonstrated that the actions of remembering, recalling, recounting, and singing can all be described by *mimnēskomai*. With reference specifically to examples such as *mimnēskomai* + gen. of *eris* 'strife' at *Iliad* 19.64 and *mimnēskomai* + gen. of *aretē* 'skill' at *Odyssey* 8.244, Moran argues that the terms *eris* and *aretē* actually refer to deeds recorded in epic song.[29] For our purposes, I want to stress that *mimnēskomai* + *alkē* does not function to represent a retrieval of epic information. However, the important point here is that, whatever the object of *mimnēskomai*, it is actively recalled and made the focus of a present situation. In other words, the object of *mimnēskomai* is remembered with the intention of making it a vivid recollection with application to immediate circumstances.[30] In this sense, I think Moran's insights help us to understand *alkē* when it is made the object of *mimnēskomai*.

We shall have to examine the verb *mimnēskomai* 'to remember' + *alkē* in more detail in order to elaborate further on the relationship between memory and warfare. We saw it used in the passage quoted earlier, where the Trojans are compared to dying sheep, in conjunction with *phobos*. But this verb is used frequently with *alkē* and, moreover, it shares a particular relationship with the verb *lanthanō* in archaic Greek poetics generally.[31] Let us begin with an interesting reversal. In a passage quoted earlier, the Trojans were attacked by the Achaeans and compared to dying sheep. Then we read:

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28. Moran 1975.211.

29. Moran 1975.207-209. On the semantics of *mnē-*, cf. now the reassessment of Nagy 1996b.122-23.

30. Cf. Martin 1989.80: "as a general rule, characters in the *Iliad* do not remember anything simply for the pleasure of memory. Recall has an exterior goal." As I will show later, this might equally be said of the *Odyssey*.

31. The foundation for this discussion is based on Detienne 1967.18-22 but, as I shall remark below, Detienne's conclusions pertain to the function of poetry, while my interest is in the mental and physical state of a warrior in the midst of warfare as they are represented by Homeric poetry. For a more recent survey of the oppositional semantics of *mnē-* and *lēth-*, see Nagy 1996b.126.

οἱ δὲ φόβοιο
δυσκελάδου μνήσαντο, λάθοντο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς.

Iliad 16.356-57

and they remembered [*mimnēskomai*]
the ill-sounding terror [*phobos*], and they forgot [*lanthanō*] their
eager *alkē*.

Similarly, in a scene where Poseidon assumes the form and voice of the seer Kalkhas to urge on the Achaeans, we read his command to the brothers Ajax:

Αἴαντε, σφὼ μέν τε σαώσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν
ἀλκῆς μνησαμένω, μηδὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοιο.

Iliad 13.47-8

Ajaxes, both of you, must save the Achaean host
by remembering [*mimnēskomai*] *alkē*, and not chilling terror [*phobos*].

From the point of view of poetics alone, the verb *mimnēskomai* can have for its object either *phobos* or *alkē*, unlike any of the other verbs of mind or memory that we have examined. Clearly remembering *alkē* is the more desirable option, but it is a testament to the versatility of this verb of memory that it can be paired with *alkē* as well as its opposite, *phobos*. We had occasion to observe earlier in the context of the discussion of *lanthanō* + *alkē*, in particular with reference to the scene where Apollo intervenes and spellbinds (*thelgō*) the Achaeans (*Iliad* 15.318-22), that *alkē* and *phobos* were two emotional antipodes, apparently mediated by a conscious mental faculty. Only by seizing that faculty could one be replaced by the other. Now we see that *alkē* and *phobos* can both be products of memory, as it is represented by the verb *mimnēskomai*. This suggests that, despite whatever conscious mediating faculty may be present, the negotiation of *alkē* and *phobos* can take place completely within the realm of memory. To the extent that *alkē* and *phobos* can represent success or failure in war in the *Iliad*, once again we see that the function of memory, in this case represented

by *mimnēskomai*, controls a warrior's, or a host's, ultimate disposition.[32]

As I suggested earlier, the remembering of *alkē* as a mental act can translate directly into physical action. A vivid illustration of this correspondence can be seen in a passage where Ajax is battling the Trojans. Zeus has caused him a temporary setback by stirring up fear (*phobos*) in him (*Iliad* 11.544). But then Ajax regains himself:

> Αἴας δ' ἄλλοτε μὲν μνησάσκετο θούριδος ἀλκῆς
> αὖτις ὑποστρεφθείς, καὶ ἐρητύσασκε φάλαγγας
> Τρώων ἱπποδάμων.
>
> *Iliad* 11.566-68

> But again Ajax remembered [*mimnēskomai*, iterative] his eager *alkē*
> and having turned around, he beat back [*erētuō*, iterative] the phalanxes
> of the horse-taming Trojans.

The iterative aspect of both the verb of memory (*mimnēskomai*) and the verb of fighting (*erētuō*) vividly connects the mental with the physical act. For the first time we see that *mimnēskomai* can be characterized as an act that needs to be repeated, and not necessarily as one that instantly creates a permanent state of being. Clearly there is a

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32. To step outside of epic for a moment, I note that the Homeric theme of remembering *alkē* to succeed, and of remembering *phobos* or forgetting *alkē* to lose in war is found in Herodotus in his description of the defeat of the Persians at Plataea. Once the Athenians arrive to reinforce the Lacedaemonians, and the Persians recognize their imminent defeat, Herodotus says οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι οὐδὲν ἔτι στῖφος ἐποιήσαντο πεσόντος τοῦ τείχεος, οὐδέ τις αὐτῶν ἀλκῆς ἐμέμνητο, ἀλύκταζόν τε οἷα ἐν ὀλίγῳ χώρῳ πεφοβημένοι τε καὶ πολλαὶ μυριάδες κατειλημέναι ἀνθρώπων (9.70). "The barbarians [Persians] did not still make a close array once the wall had fallen, and no one of them remembered [*mimnēskomai*] *alkē*; they were distressed, as men terrified [*phobeomai*, from *phobos*] in a small space where many myriads of men are forced together." The language here is Homeric and attests, I believe, to the continuing meaningfulness of the theme to Herodotus's audiences in the 5th century B.C.E.

coordination implied here between memory and action, but more specifically it is the effort involved in the act of remembering *alkē* that is being highlighted. A warrior's ability to fight, and thereby to survive and triumph in war, depends upon the vigilant command that he maintains over his own mental resources. If he cannot remember and sustain his strength, then he will remain vulnerable, unlike Ajax in the passage above, to a *phobos* that may plague him at any time. In this very narrow sense, a warrior must overcome himself through memory in order to overcome his enemy.

The role of memory in the disposition of a warrior or host is further signalled by the relationship between *alkē* and *menos*, the word for strength that is etymologically related through its root *men-* to the root *mnē-*, which is the basis of the verb *mi-mnē-skomai*. In a set of curious correspondences, *menos* frequently appears in connection with the remembering (*mimnēskomai*) of *alkē*. For instance, in the passage just cited where Poseidon urges on the brothers Ajax, after he has spoken he strikes them with his staff (*skēpanion*) and "filled both of them with superior *menos*" (ἀμφοτέρω κεκόπων πλῆσεν μένεος κρατεροῖο, *Iliad* 13.60). In this case, Poseidon gives the Ajaxes *menos* as an aid to their remembering (*mimnēskomai*) *alkē*. But the connection between *menos*, *mimnēskomai*, and *alkē* can be even more direct. The most common phrase containing *mimnēskomai* + *alkē* appears seven times in the *Iliad*. It usually begins a speech of exhortation, and it looks like this:

> ἀνέρες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς
>
> Be men, dear friends, and remember [*mimnēskomai*] your eager *alkē*

This sentence is most frequently spoken by Hektor (*Iliad* 6.112, 8.174, 11.287, 15.487, 17.185), but it is also spoken by Ajax (15.734) and Patroklos (16.270). In several places after the speech containing this line, there is the statement "so in speaking he stirred the *menos* and *thumos* of each" (Ὣς εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου, *Iliad* 11.291, 15.500 (ὤτρυνε), 16.275). We may recall in this connection that this same line was used to describe the effect of Hera's and Athena's speech on the Achaeans (*Iliad* 5.792), in the context of their desire to be 'mindful to defend/fight for' (*alexemenai memauiai*) them (5.779).

And in his speech in *Iliad* 8, after delivering the *mimnēskomai* + *alkē* line cited above, Hektor says upon reflection that the Achaean fortifications "will not restrain his *menos*" (τὰ δ' οὐ μένος ἀμὸν ἐρύξει, *Iliad* 8.178). I suggested earlier, following Nagy,[33] that *menos* was a kind of strength that needs to be remembered to be useful. Here we can see the ideology at work: speeches in which the remembering (*mimnēskomai*) of *alkē* is called for, can also represent the stirring of a man's *menos*, which itself means a kind of strength that is connected to memory. The physical force of *alkē* and the mental force of *menos* are unified in a warrior through memory, and thus made into an active, externalizing disposition without which the warrior will be killed.

In passages that we have not considered containing the verb of memory, *lanthanō*, which complements *mimnēskomai*, we can observe a similar relationship between *alkē* and *menos*. It is worthwhile to digress for a moment and consider these passages, as they will add depth to our understanding of how memory is related to *menos* and *alkē*. Through memory, for example, *alkē* can act as a catalyst for *menos*. When Glaukos kills the famed Myrmidon Bathykles, the Achaeans are not overwhelmed in their loss by the Trojans:

οὐδ' ἄρ' Ἀχαιοὶ
ἀλκῆς ἐξελάθοντο, μένος δ' ἰθὺς φέρον αὐτῶν.

Iliad 16.601-2

but the Achaeans
did not forget [*ek-lanthanō*] their *alkē*, and bore their *menos* straight
at them.

Here the remembering of *alkē* facilitates the exercise of *menos*, which seems to take on an externalizing, almost weapon-like quality.[34] However, it is not clear from the text whether bearing (*pherō*) *menos* means anything physical, and our examination suggests that there is in any case a certain play in the Greek between *menos* as a physical and

33. 1974.266-69.
34. Cf. *Iliad* 5.505 and 20.172.

mental strength.

The unifying mental faculty is that of memory, but its successful activation is not always assured. In their final confrontation in *Iliad* 22, Hektor accuses Achilles of speaking to swindle him, and the potential loss from memory could be devastating:

> ἀλλά τις ἀρτιεπὴς καὶ ἐπίλοπος ἔπλεο μύθων,
> ὄφρα σ' ὑποδείσας μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.
>
> *Iliad* 22.281-82
>
> but you were someone clever at fitting words together and cunning in speech,
> so that in fearing you I might forget [*lanthanō*] my *menos* and *alkē*.

Along with some of the other things that can cause one to forget (*lanthanō*) *alkē*, we now have to add sly speech. Again the consistent theme here is that by some manner of distraction one's concentration can be broken, making it easier for one to be taken advantage of and then to be killed. Yet in this confrontation with Achilles, Hektor is less concerned with being killed, which is an outcome that he acknowledges to be quite possible, than he is of being killed ignominiously. In the lines that follow the passage above, for example, Hektor says hypothetically that Achilles will not stab him in the back as he runs away (*pheugō*), but only in his chest 'while being eager/mindful' (*memaōti*, dative participle from **maō*), if this is granted to him by god (*Iliad* 22.283-85). Hektor's language here is programmatic: that he will not forget his *menos* and *alkē* is signalled on the one hand by his use of *pheugō*, a verb that we have seen is used systematically to represent the opposite of *alkē*; and, on the other, by his description of himself as *memaōti* 'while being eager/mindful', which is a verbal form that we have observed in regular association with *alkē* and *alexomai*.

The pair *menos* and *alkē* that Hektor fears forgetting actually has an organic, physiological relationship to the individual, as they are represented in Homeric poetry. As an example, let us consider what Diomedes says to Agamemnon and the other Achaeans after hearing the report of Odysseus that Achilles is not yet to be consoled. Rather than advocating more action, instead he urges them to tend to their basic

needs for the moment:

> νῦν μὲν κοιμήσασθε τεταρπόμενοι φίλον ἦτορ
> σίτου καὶ οἴνοιο· τὸ γὰρ μένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλκή.
>
> *Iliad* 9.705-6

> now go to sleep, you whose dear heart is satisfied
> with food [*sitos*] and wine [*oinos*]; for this is the *menos* and *alkē*.

Basic bodily needs are met with food and wine, and these in turn furnish the energy necessary for a warrior to maintain himself on the battlefield.[35] The same thing is said by Odysseus to Achilles, in fact, in *Iliad* 19, when Achilles wishes to rush the hungry Achaeans back into battle (161). In that exchange, Odysseus gives a fuller explanation of how it is only when men have been fed and have drunk wine that they have the stamina necessary to fight all day (162-70). I draw attention to the nature of the pair *menos* and *alkē*, as they are expressed in the passage above, where together they represent the total physiological disposition necessary for warfare. I have argued more specifically throughout this chapter that *menos* represents the mental dimension, while *alkē* represents the physical; and, just as importantly, that the two are unified ideologically, which is why they and their derivatives occur together with such frequency. Even in the following excerpt from Odysseus's explanation of the importance of food and wine to Achilles in *Iliad* 19, we may observe how he draws attention to both the mental and physical dimensions of the warrior in language that should now be familiar:

> εἴ περ γὰρ θυμῷ γε μενοινάᾳ πολεμίζειν,
> ἀλλά τε λάθρῃ γυῖα βαρύνεται, ἠδὲ κιχάνει
> δίψα τε καὶ λιμός, βλάβεται δέ τε γούνατ' ἰόντι.
>
> *Iliad* 19.164-66

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35. Cf. *Odyssey* 4.363, where the disappearance of food (ἤϊα) is compared to the disappearance of the *menea* (*menos*, plural) of men.

even if a man desires eagerly [*menoinaō*, from root *men*-] in his *thumos* to fight,
but unnoticed [*lathrēi*, root *lēth*-] his limbs grow heavy,
and thirst and hunger catch up with him, and his knees break down while he is moving.

This is what happens to a man who has not eaten and drunk wine, and thus who does not have *menos* and *alkē*. We have overt references in this passage to the mental and physical dimensions of a man, as signalled for example in words like *thumos* and *guia* 'limbs', respectively. But note the emphasis at the etymological level on the mental dimension: no matter what a man eagerly desires (*menoinaō*,[36] root *men*-), if he lacks *menos* and *alkē*, there will be a forgetting or an escaping of one's notice (*lathrēi*, root *lēth*-) that ensues, causing a physical breakdown. Even the dissolution of physical energy is not described without reference to mental faculties, and the fact that these references are etymological suggest that in Iliadic poetry the connection between mental and physical energy is *paradigmatic* rather than *syntagmatic*.[37] To put it another way, the meaning of the association is not made "horizontally" at the level of syntax, but rather it emerges "vertically" from the recurrent association of ideas.[38]

The work of Roman Jakobson is fundamental here, as he speaks of the vertical, or paradigmatic, dimension as an axis of selection, in which a word is chosen on the basis of all the other words related to it by equivalence, similiarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and antonymity.[39] On the other hand a horizontal, or syntagmatic, choice is

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36. For an analysis of Homeric *menoinaō* as a dead metaphor dealing with parturition, see Watkins 1985.

37. The terms paradigmatic and syntagmatic are taken from Saussure 1985.170-75, with slight modification. What I call syntagmatic, Saussure calls *syntagmes* (170), and what I call paradigmatic Saussure calls *rapports associatifs* (171) and *paradigmes de flexion* (175). Cf. the summary in Ducrot and Todorov 1972.139-46.

38. On these terms, cf. Ducrot and Todorov 1972.142.

39. Jakobson 1956.60 and 1960.358. Cf. the corrective remarks of Ducrot and Todorov 1972.146 on Jakobson's view of what constitutes a paradigmatic selection.

also made at the same time, according to Jakobson, along an axis of combination, in which linguistic units such as phonemes, morphemes, nouns, and verbs combine to produce a meaningful utterance.[40] Jakobson can also describe the axis of selection as being one that involves a metaphorical association, while the axis of combination involves a metonymical association.[41] Now what I am suggesting is that the connection between mental and physical energy in Homeric poetry is motivated vertically, that is to say metaphorically in Jakobson's formulation, whereby the dissolution of a man's physical energy is described with reference to "mental" terms (namely the use of *menoinaō*, root *men-*, and *lathrēi*, root *lēth-*). This accords with our observation made earlier on the functional opposition in archaic Greek poetics between words with the roots *men-* and *lēth-*. Furthermore, the vertical association between mental and physical energy is also reflected in the pair *menos* and *alkē*, which are presented in the last passage quoted as the key to preserving one's constitution during battle. And finally, because we find the connection between mental and physical energy repeatedly motivated at the levels of diction, etymology, and theme, altogether this makes a cogent argument for the association to be traditional.

The fear of forgetting one's *menos* and *alkē* in these examples, then, can be counteracted by the proper consumption of food and wine. And yet there must be measure taken in the consumption of food and wine, or they too can result in a loss of *menos* and *alkē*. In *Iliad* 6, for example, Hekabe tells her son Hektor to drink wine, that he may grow strong, since "in a weary man wine greatly increases *menos*" (ἀνδρὶ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει, *Iliad* 6.261). But Hektor refuses the offer, saying:

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40. Jakobson 1956.60.

41. Jakobson 1960.370. On the usage of these same terms as applied to Homeric poetry, cf. now Nagy 1996a.50, and especially Nagy ibid. 64-67, on the ideas of *sewing* (as attested, for example, in the noun *rhapsōidos*, 'he who sews together [*rhaptō*] the song [*aoidē*]') and *weaving* as metaphors that combine the vertical and horizontal axes in their representation of poetic composition.

μή μοι οἶνον ἄειρε μελίφρονα, πότνια μῆτερ,
μή μ' ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος, ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.

Iliad 6.264-65

Do not take up the honey-hearted wine, honored mother,
lest you deprive me of *menos*, and I forget [*lanthanō*] my *alkē*.

Our other examples suggesting the importance of wine (and food) somewhat belie Hektor's claim, and lead us to conclude that an immoderate amount of wine is the real problem. Nevertheless what is interesting is that Hektor is the only figure in the *Iliad* to say, on the occasion in his confrontation with Achilles (cited above), and then again here with his mother, that he fears forgetting (*lanthanō*) both his *menos* and *alkē*. One wonders if in the *Iliad* Hektor is made to feel especially susceptible of losing his mental and physical faculties.

This digression into the further associations between *menos*, *alkē*, and the act of remembering or forgetting as expressed in the verbs *mimnēskomai* and *lanthanō*, poises us to consider how the *Odyssey* treats memory and strength. Let us commence with another vivid illustration of what happens to a warrior when he forgets his *alkē*. In Menelaos's depressing discussion with Proteus, in which he learns of the death of his brother, there is a passage describing how Aigisthos planned Agamemnon's death. Before Agamemnon returned home, Aigisthos plants a watchman (*skopos*), whose duties are precise:

φύλασσε δ' ὃ γ' εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,
μή ἑ λάθοι παριών, μνήσαιτο δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς.

Odyssey 4.526-27

and he guarded for a year,
so that [Agamemnon] would not, going by, escape his notice [*lanthanō*] and remember [*mimnēskomai*] his eager *alkē*.

Part of the task of the watchman is to be inconspicuous to ensure that Agamemnon does not return home and see him. This idea is expressed, in a manner that we have seen before, by the verb *lanthanō*. The Greek

usage of *lanthanō*, unlike the convention in English, takes as its subject what we regard as the object, thus placing the responsibility of not being noticed on Agamemnon himself. So the Greek idiom already draws attention to Agamemnon's mental powers with *lanthanō*. But the Iliadic expression *mimnēskomai* + gen. of *alkē* more directly focuses attention on the issue of memory. We learn from the remainder of Proteus's narrative that Agamemnon is ambushed and killed at a feast prepared for him by Aigisthos (4.530-35), so we may conclude that Agamemnon did not remember his *alkē*. This conclusion is consistent with what we observed in the *Iliad*, where death could be implicitly if not explicitly viewed as the result of not remembering *alkē*. In Agamemnon's case, not remembering *alkē* means not being able to recall it for immediate application, and it is worth stressing that the emphasis here is placed on the idea that Agamemnon did not remember (*mimnēskomai*) *alkē*, not that he forgot (*lanthanō*) it.

However, the *Odyssey* does not celebrate the aftermath of events at Troy in general, and characters often make a point specifically of regretting it.[42] With this as a wider thematic background, the contexts of the occurrences of *alkē* deserve careful scrutiny, because they may reflect overarching attitudes of the *Odyssey* itself toward warfare as represented in the *Iliad*. If at a macrocosmic level the attitude of the *Odyssey* is one in which the memory of Troy is difficult or painful, then I suggest that at a microcosmic level, as in the example of Agamamenon above, remembering (*mimnēskomai*) *alkē*—in other words, remembering *alkē* as it was realized in the *Iliad*—is also represented as difficult, or perhaps impossible. In choosing the expression *mimnēskomai* + *alkē* to describe Agamemnon, the *Odyssey* represents the cause of Agamemnon's death—namely his failure to remember *alkē*—by the very process that defines successful military engagement in the *Iliad*. The irony between the perspectives of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* on Agamemnon's ability to remember his *alkē* is

42. To take only two examples, consider Odysseus's weeping at Demodokos's song of Troy (8.83-92), on which see Nagy 1979.100-101, and Achilles' famous regret that he would rather work as a thrall in the land of the living than rule the dead in the underworld (11.489-91), on which see Rüter 1969.252-53, and Nagy 1979.35.

sharpened when we recall that Diomedes had publicly reproached Agamemnon, and asserted that Zeus had not given him *alkē* (*Iliad* 9.38-9). In summary, not only is *alkē* and the remembering of *alkē* the source of Agamemnon's undoing, the *Odyssey* at the same time furnishes us with a subtle criticism, in line with its more overt criticisms elsewhere, of a military value that is represented as fundamental in the *Iliad*.

More of the *Odyssey*'s attitudes toward values in the *Iliad* can be traced through the figure of Athena, who in the *Iliad* is the patron military deity of the Achaeans, while in the *Odyssey* she is a helping figure who makes Odysseus and Telemakhos her special charges. In her capacity as a helping figure, Athena often appears in the guise of one *Men-tōr* or *Men-tēs*, names that are both connected to the root *men-*, and therefore make her names mean something like 'he who reminds, the Reminder'.[43] As I noted earlier in this chapter, by way of the root *men-*, the names *Men-tōr/Men-tēs* are connected to *menos*, and we actually find Athena as *Men-tōr/Men-tēs* delivering *menos*. For example, before Athena, in the form of *Men-tēs*, leaves Olympos to help Telemakhos, she says:

> αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν Ἰθάκην ἐσελεύσομαι, ὄφρα οἱ υἱὸν
> μᾶλλον ἐποτρύνω, καί οἱ μένος ἐν φρεσὶ θείω.
>
> *Odyssey* 1.88-89

> I will go to Ithaca, in order to stir up his son
> some more, and I shall put *menos* in his breast.

But the connection between *Men-tēs* delivering a *menos* that leads one to remember can appear even more strikingly. After Athena/*Men-tēs* departs from Telemakhos in the form of a bird, the narrator says the following:

> τῷ δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
> θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὑπέμνησέν τέ ἑ πατρὸς

43. Nagy 1974.266-68.

μᾶλλον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν.

Odyssey 1.320-22

into his *thumos*
she put *menos* and courage, and she reminded [*hupo-mimnēskō*, note the active voice] him of his father,
still more than before.

These words show, perhaps more clearly than any other passage that we have seen, how *menos* can represent a mental, as well as a physical, strength that directly corresponds to memory. As we can see from this as well as the previous passage, Athena's role as 'Reminder' *vis-à-vis* Telemakhos is to instill *menos* in him by making him remember it.[44] But this is not a generic *menos*. Instead, it is specifically the *menos* of his father, Odysseus, that she instills. Assuming the form of *Men-tōr*, for example, she tells Telemakhos elsewhere:

Τηλέμαχ', οὐδ' ὄπιθεν κακὸς ἔσσεαι οὐδ' ἀνοήμων,
εἰ δή τοι σοῦ πατρὸς ἐνέστακται μένος ἠΰ.

Odyssey 2.270-71

Telemakhos, you will not be cowardly or thoughtless in the future
if indeed the good *menos* of your father has been instilled in you.

So Athena's task is to remind Telemakhos of his father, specifically by way of instilling the *menos* of his father into him.

Now Telemakhos has not been to war like his father, and so we should expect not only that he lacks, but that he knows nothing of, *alkē*. His very name, in fact, *Tēle-makhos* suggests either that he is 'one who fights from afar', or 'one who fights far away'.[45] The distance suggested by the prefix *tēle-* is surely metaphorical for the distance that separates Telemakhos from his father. I would add that the distance between son and father is not just geographical but also spiritual.

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44. Nagy 1974.266-67.
45. Cf. Nagy 1979.146n2.

Telemakhos has never been to war, and thus knows nothing of the *alkē* of war. At an assembly of Ithacans loyal to Odysseus, Telemakhos admits as much. While complaining to Aigyptios that none of them has the resources to defeat the suitors besieging Odysseus's home, he says:

> ἡμεῖς δ' οὔ νύ τι τοῖοι ἀμυνέμεν· ἦ καὶ ἔπειτα
> λευγαλέοι τ' ἐσόμεσθα καὶ οὐ δεδαηκότες ἀλκήν.
>
> *Odyssey* 2.60-61

> We are not the ones to avert them; in such an event
> we will be miserable, not men skilled in *alkē*.

This lack of *alkē* of which Telemakhos speaks is what Athena attempts to convey to him by means of his father's *menos*, by means of reminding him of his father. Telemakhos cannot remember *alkē* because he has not been to war, and so Athena, in her Odyssean role as 'Reminder' backgrounded by her Iliadic role as goddess of war, becomes the perfect divine vehicle to convey strength through memory to Telemakhos. By the end of the *Odyssey*, after Odysseus and Telemakhos have killed the suitors, we can see the progress that Telemakhos has made, with the help of Athena, in becoming like his father as he tells him:

> ἡμεῖς δ' ἐμμεμαῶτες ἅμ' ἑψόμεθ', οὐδέ τί φημι
> ἀλκῆς δευήσεσθαι, ὅση δύναμίς γε πάρεστιν.
>
> *Odyssey* 23.127-28

> and we shall follow mindfully [*en-memaōtes*, from **maō*], and I do not think
> that we shall lack *alkē*, as long as the strength [*dunamis*] is present.

We may note first the familiar collocation of the verb **maō* and *alkē* in these lines, which once again underscores the coordination of mental and physical power necessary for military preparedness. These same two lines occur in the *Iliad*, in a scene where Paris (Alexandros) is trying to make amends for his cowardice with Hektor (13.785-86). In the passage above, there may be a certain intertextual or, from the point

of view of oral poetics, intertraditional meaning here that relates to the *Iliad*, but Telemakhos's words are more significant within the context of the *Odyssey* itself. They show his progression from an immature young man who proclaims before an assembly of his father's supporters that he lacks *alkē*, to a more mindful young man—made more mindful by Athena's instilling of his father's *menos*—who can now assure his father that he will not come short in *alkē*. Moreover, Telemakhos's emotional growth has been aided by his visits to former Iliadic warriors—Nestor in Pylos and Menelaos in Sparta—who told him their war stories. So on one level Athena actually instills Odysseus's *menos* into him, the kind of strength connected to memory, into Telemakhos, while on another level Telemakhos learns what it means to become a warrior through the memories of Iliadic heroes. Both processes are indirect, in that they do not involve Telemakhos in warfare, but they are nevertheless effective, perhaps too effective, in preparing him to oust the suitors.

For the "progression" that Telemakhos makes into manhood leads him to accomplish deeds that will seem inappropriate to a domestic setting. I shall argue below that while these deeds in one respect confirm Telemakhos as a warrior—they act specifically as his *rite de passage* into manhood—at the same time they also reflect the *Odyssey*'s ambivalence toward the warrior that he has become. Let us look more closely at the depths to which Telemakhos descends in the *Mnēsterophonia*. It is Telemakhos who, at the request of his father (22.437-45), has the disloyal maidservants first clean up Odysseus's palace and then by his own choice has them strung up and hanged outside the palace wall (22.457-73). Odysseus had requested that Telemakhos kill them by sword (22.443), and this actually would have been, in the manner of things, a less hideous execution. But Telemakhos, against his father's orders, decides not to give the maidservants a 'clean death' (*katharos thanatos*, 22.462-64), but decides instead to make them suffer. There is no direct criticism here made of Telemakhos's actions by the narrator, except perhaps for the dubious detail that the maidservants did not struggle for long:

ἥσπαιρον δὲ πόδεσσι μίνυνθά περ, οὔ τι μάλα δήν.

Odyssey 22.473

> Although for a short while they convulsed with their feet, it was not very long.

However, it is not clear that this comment is actually a criticism of the action to which it refers. Wilamowitz thought that the narrator, in fact, related the whole scene detailing the execution of the maidservants with relish.[46] Yet this opinion seems unwarranted by the text. What we are told by the narrator is that Telemakhos strings the women together by their necks "so that they would die most pitifully" (ὅπως οἰκτιστα θάνοιεν, 22.472), which is as close as we come to an overt criticism.

Following the death of the maidservants, the equally disloyal goatherd, Melanthios, is mutilated in another ghastly display (22.474-77) that rivals any battle scene in the *Iliad*, which is made worse by the fact that Melanthios is defenseless and not even a warrior. Again there is no overt criticism of this action, yet it is impossible not to question the *alkē* that Telemakhos has learned in the course of the *Odyssey*, if only because these executions do not resemble any description of a dying warrior in the *Iliad*. They are overbearing here, and I suggest that the *Odyssey* is commenting on what it means for a young man who shall one day be a king to "not to have fallen short in *alkē*." In the social setting of Ithaca, to exercise *alkē* means to realize a kind of military strength that is appropriate for the battlefield, for the *Iliad*, but not for a community whose members must be reconciled with one another in order for it to endure. I shall return to this point later.

For now, let me emphasize that in a more explicit fashion Odysseus will have to remember *alkē*, as well as *menos*, in order to overcome the suitors. Athena will help him in this, as she helped Telemakhos, but she will do so in an extraordinary convergence of theme and action as Odysseus begins to fight the suitors. To undertake the aid of Odysseus Athena does not just appear to him, as she had to Telemakhos, as *Mentōr*. She refers to herself by an additional epithet, and her two names together embody everything that I have been saying about *menos* and *alkē*. After killing many but not all of the suitors, Odysseus appeals for

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46. Wilamowitz 1927.67: "Dann wird das Strafgericht an ihnen (die Mägde) vollzogen, vom Dichter mit Behagen ausgemalt."

help to Athena, who has come to the threshold of the palace as *Men-tōr*. But Athena resists, saying:

> οὐκέτι σοί γ', Ὀδυσεῦ, μένος ἔμπεδον οὐδέ τις ἀλκή

Odyssey 22.226

> No longer, Odysseus, is the *menos* steady and there is no *alkē* in you

Later, in the same reprimand of Odysseus, she says:

> πῶς δὴ νῦν, ὅτε σόν γε δόμον καὶ κτήματ' ἱκάνεις,
> ἄντα μνηστήρων ὀλοφύρεαι ἄλκιμος εἶναι;
> ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἐμ' ἵστασο καὶ ἴδε ἔργον,
> ὄφρα ἰδῇς οἷός τοι ἐν ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσι
> Μέντωρ Ἀλκιμίδης εὐεργεσίας ἀποτίνει.

Odyssey 22.231-35

> How is it now, when you have returned to your home and possessions,
> that you complain of being *alkimos* before the suitors?
> But come here, friend, stand next to me and watch this deed,
> so that you may see what kind of man *Men-tōr* son of *Alkimos* is
> and how against your enemies he repays your good services.

With respect to both of these passages, we can see that Athena reminds Odysseus of what powers he had, specifically, when he was at Troy. She does this by making reference to his *menos* and *alkē* which, as we have seen, represent the sum total of a warrior's mental and physical energies. But in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is not primarily a warrior, and therefore these energies have to be reinfused in him by *Men-tōr*. Yet it is not merely Athena in the guise of *Men-tōr* who accomplishes this, because she also calls herself *Alkimidēs*, the son of *Alkimos*. The epithet *Alkimidēs* only occurs this one time in both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and it has a particular meaning here. *Alkimos*, the adjective of *alkē*, is actually the name of a warrior who appears briefly, but with distinction, in the *Iliad*. He is a follower of Achilles, along with Automedon

(19.392), and is said to be a 'follower of Ares' (*ozos*[47] *Arēos*, 24.474). Most significantly, this Alkimos and Automedon are described as the two companions Achilles honored the most after the dead Patroklos (24.574-75). However, *Alkimos* never appears in conjunction with a *Men-tōr* or *Men-tēs*, who themselves appear once in the *Iliad* (13.171 and 17.73, respectively). In fact, at *Iliad* 13.171, the warrior Imbrios is said to be the 'son of *Mentōr*' (*Mentoros huion*), not *Alkimos*. All of this is to say that Athena's epithet, *Alkimidēs*, appears to be an *ad hoc* contrivance, but one that is constructed strictly in accord with what I have been arguing is a traditional association between *menos* and *alkē*. Rather than diminishing its importance, however, the contrived nature of the epithet draws all the more attention to itself and to what it might imply for the story line at that moment.

At the moment before the threshold of Odysseus's palace, when there were suitors who still remained inside arming themselves, Athena is compelled to assume a provocative stance with regard to Odysseus. The task of killing the suitors is not yet done, and could easily be reversed were matters to get out of hand, so Athena responds not only by reminding Odysseus to be *alkimos*, but also by becoming the very embodiment of Memory and Strength. In such a form, she becomes the essence of *menos*, memory (*men-*), and *alkē*, which, from what our survey of these words and their derivatives has shown, means that she has invoked a central set of relationships between mental and physical strength as represented in the *Iliad*. As I argued earlier by using the formulation of Jakobson,[48] the association between *menos* and *alkē* is paradigmatic, taking place along the axis of selection, and the resurfacing of the components in the name *Mentōr Alkimidēs* suggests strongly that the association is deeply traditional.

Unlike the more critical view of Iliadic values that we discussed earlier, here the *Odyssey*, through the medium of Athena as *Mentōr Alkimidēs*, suggests on a thematic level that Odysseus cannot regain his kingdom without remembering those same martial values.[49] Athena's

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47. On the semantics of *ozos* 'follower', which in this sense relates to *therapōn*, see Nagy 1979.295n8.

48. Jakobson 1956.60.

49. Cf. Cook 1995.52.

statement to Odysseus to come and stand by her (ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἔμ' ἵσταο, *Odyssey* 22.233) is the exact thing Odysseus had said to Diomedes in the *Iliad* at a time of crisis, when he wondered what they had suffered such that they had forgotten their *alkē* (11.313-14). However, it is important to emphasize here that the *Odyssey* is not just invoking passages and terms that merely reflect the *Iliad*, but I suggest that it is transforming them in the process.[50] Broadly stated, the key to the *Odyssey*'s poetics of *alkē* is that it is constantly working to integrate and revise the Iliadic poetics of *alkē* according to its own worldview.

Another striking example of how the *Odyssey* transforms the Iliadic valuation of *alkē* can be found in the *Apologoi* during Odysseus's adventures with Polyphemus. In *Odyssey* 9, Odysseus tells the Phaiakians that he brought along provisions and the wine given him by Maron:

> αὐτίκα γάρ μοι ὀΐσατο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
> ἄνδρ' ἐπελεύσεσθαι μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν,
> ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας.
>
> *Odyssey* 9.213-15

> for immediately my proud *thumos*
> thought that I would encounter a man clothed in great *alkē*,
> savage, knowing well neither justice or divine laws [*themis*].

As I have had occasion to mention earlier, the expression *epiennumi* 'to clothe' + *alkē* is found several times in the *Iliad* (7.164, 8.262, 18.157, all of the Ajaxes), but by being used here to describe the lawless Polyphemus, the meaning of *alkē* itself is being revised. Even if we suppose that at this moment Odysseus is unaware that he will meet a Cyclops, his employment of *alkē* nevertheless characterizes someone who is 'savage' (*agrios*) and has no regard for the justice and customary laws that govern culture. I suggest that the *Odyssey* is directly challenging the value of *alkē* as it is represented in the *Iliad*, and revising the definition of *alkē* to suit its own preoccupations with

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50. Cf. Cook 1995.150-52.

civil rather than martial order.[51] When Polyphemus taunts Odysseus that he, too, expected from Telemos's prophecy to encounter a man 'clothed in great *alkē*' (ἐνθάδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι, μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν, *Odyssey* 9.514), the *Odyssey* urges a reevaluation of the meaning of *alkē* in the context of this assertion by one who represents the forces of disorder and lack of culture.[52] Rather than assume that Polyphemus's and Odysseus's comments are merely boastful or are, more deceptively, ironic with respect to one another, the implicit basis for their statements seems to be that the value of *alkē* as a socially meaningful force has changed. Hence Odysseus expected to meet someone "clothed in great *alkē*" who lacked the refinements of culture (9.214-15), and Polyphemus expected to meet someone "clothed in great *alkē*" who was handsome and tall but not, in his estimation, the small man of no account who is Odysseus (9.514-15).

Another example of how the *Odyssey* revises the Iliadic conception of *alkē* occurs in the *Nekuia*, when Odysseus and Achilles encounter one another. I refer specifically to Achilles' statement that he would rather be a thrall to another man, who did not have much land, than to rule all the dead in the realm of Hades (11.488-91). Drawing attention to Von der Mühll's[53] statement that the character of Achilles in the *Iliad* is incompatible with his confession to Odysseus in Hades, Klaus Rüter suggests instead that Achilles' statement reflects the exchanged roles of Odysseus and Achilles in the *Odyssey*.[54] But Von der Mühll is not off the mark, and his dissatisfaction with Achilles' statement reflects what in my view appears to be an overall "censoring" of Achilles by the *Odyssey*. In more specfic terms, the domestic and civil setting of the *Odyssey* makes it unfitting for Achilles to express himself in military terms. It certainly seems just as likely that Achilles could have compared himself to a man of the lowest military rank, such as a

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51. Cf. Cook 1995.152.

52. On Polyphemus and the Cyclopes generally as the antitheses of Greek culture, see Cook 1995.101-110.

53. Von der Mühll 1940.2214: "Wer das Wesen Achills in der *Ilias* begriff, der hätte ihn nicht bekennen lassen können, er wolle lieber im Leben ein Dienstknecht sein als ein Fürst unter den Toten."

54. Rüter 1969.252-53.

Thersites, rather than to the lowest class of Greek laborer. But the world of the *Iliad* in which Achilles thrived has been suppressed from the point of view of the *Odyssey*, which now revises the preeminent warrior in epic tradition and represents his thinking in terms more suitable to a domestic setting.

From these examples, I argue that the *Odyssey* is reflecting critically upon the value of *alkē* as represented in the *Iliad*.[55] More specifically, the martial value of remembering *alkē*, which is unequivocally regarded as essential for victory in the *Iliad*, is also being drawn into question when it is used in the *Odyssey* to describe Agamemnon, who seems to lose all feel for martial preparedness once he returns home. Yet it would overstate the case to suggest that the *Odyssey* is universally condemning the force represented by *alkē*. As we saw earlier during Athena's attempts to remind Odysseus of his *alkē*, the *Odyssey* suggests that this martial value has to be transformed within the civil and internecine environment of Ithaca into the means necessary for a king rightfully to reassume his throne.

However, in the final analysis it is not Athena's task to fight Odysseus's battles for him, and so the efficacy of *alkē* still remains with mortal men. Odysseus must overcome the suitors himself, with the help of his son, Telemakhos. This can be illustrated in the same scene where Athena disguised as *Mentōr Alkimidēs* has come to help Odysseus. Immediately following her request to Odysseus to come and stand by her, the narrator says:

> Ἦ ῥα, καὶ οὔ πω πάγχυ δίδου ἑτεραλκέα νίκην,
> ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἄρα σθένεός τε καὶ ἀλκῆς πειρήτιζεν
> ἡμὲν Ὀδυσσῆος ἠδ' υἱοῦ κυδαλίμοιο.

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55. To the examples given I might add the dog Argos's loss of *alkē* in the sense of "loss of vigor" at *Odyssey* 17.315, where we are perhaps to draw some connection between both Argos's and Odysseus's weakened state. On this passage cf. Segal 1962.52. Also at *Odyssey* 12.120 Circe tells Odysseus that "there is no *alkē*" against Charybdis, despite his constant concern with 'fighting' (*ponos*) and 'martial deeds' (*polemēia erga*, both terms at 12.116), which strongly suggests, at a general level, that what was appropriate in the world of the *Iliad* will simply not be appropriate in the world of the *Odyssey*.

Odyssey 22.236-38

She spoke, but did not yet completely give them decisive[56] [*heter-alkēs*] victory,
but still tested the strength [*sthenos*] and *alkē*
of both Odysseus and his glorious son.

Thus Athena is testing both father and son, and her incitement of them suggests that they are the ones on whom the *Odyssey* is placing the primary responsibility of regaining Odysseus's kingdom. Furthermore, Odysseus and Telemakhos are the ones in whom *alkē* has to be transformed into a civilian and civilizing power. As we saw in the case of Polyphemus's usage of *alkē*, the *alkē* of the *Odyssey* is not the same as that of the *Iliad*: Odysseus is not at war, and therefore limits must be placed on his fighting strength if only because the enemy includes his very subjects—people with whom he must eventually get along. A strong hint of this Odyssean design is implicit in the passage above, in the expression 'to give decisive victory' (*heter-alkēn nikēn didōmi*). This expression occurs several times in the *Iliad* (7.24-5, 8.171, 16.362, 17.627), sometimes without the verb, and in every case a divinity fully gives victory to one side,[57] even if temporarily. Athena, however, witholds giving such decisive victory to Odysseus and his son, preferring instead to continue testing (*peirētizō*) their *alkē*. Thus it is they, and especially Odysseus, who have to make the internal transformation.

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56. My reason for translating *heter-alkēs* as 'decisive' will be made clear below, n.57.

57. As Trümpy 1950.273-74n555 has shown, the etymological meaning implied in the adjective *heter-alkēs* (*heteros* 'other' + *alkē*) is not "in der *alkē* wechselnd," but "die *alkē* nur des einen Teils enthaltend." Hence my translation 'decisive'. Trümpy's analysis is consistent with other Homeric usages of *heter-alkēs*, cited above, where a divinity gives victory to one side, and with the general findings of my analysis of *alkē* as a force that always implies absolute victory or defeat.

Whether they fully achieve such a transformation is actually questioned by the *Odyssey*, as Athena and ultimately Zeus must intervene in the end to prevent the continuation of factional strife (24.531-32). In my judgment, this is the scene in which the *Odyssey* casts the value of *alkē* in the most negative light—negative from the point of view of its positive valuation in the *Iliad*—because it shows us that men with *alkē* alone are not yet able to resolve their differences. This final divine intervention in turn challenges the meaning of the last words of Odysseus spoken to his son in the epic, which should now be familiar to us:

> Τηλέμαχ', ἤδη μὲν τόδε γ' εἴσεαι αὐτὸς ἐπελθών,
> ἀνδρῶν μαρναμένων ἵνα τε κρίνονται ἄριστοι,
> μή τι καταισχύνειν πατέρων γένος, οἳ τὸ πάρος περ
> ἀλκῇ τ' ἠνορέῃ τε κεκάσμεθα πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν.
>
> *Odyssey* 24.506-9

> Telemakhos, you, being present yourself in the place
> where the best out of the men doing battle are judged, should know
> not to bring shame upon the line of your fathers, we who even in
> time past have excelled all across the world in *alkē* and manhood.

Telemakhos agrees to this, and father and son then enter the final fighting, but the question that the *Odyssey* leaves open is whether the *alkē* of the past, of the *Iliad*, which Odysseus so proudly invokes here, can ever be completely suitable to the present. The *Odyssey* certainly does not present the challenge of recalling the *alkē* of the *Iliad* as easy or inevitable. And if, as in Odysseus's description of Polyphemus, one who is "clothed in great *alkē*" (9.214) is one who thereby fully lacks regard for the order of civilization, then it becomes a monumental task for a warrior to exercise that martial side of himself in a manner that will benefit society.

We have finally to consider the broader issue of what remembering (*mimnēskomai*) *alkē* and what forgetting (*lanthanō*) *menos* and *alkē* means in the context of Homeric poetry as a whole. As I mentioned earlier, the work of Marcel Detienne has shown that there is a functional opposition in archaic poetics, particularly with reference to

Hesiod, between *Mnēmosunē* 'Memory' and *Lēthē* 'Forgetfulness', and more specifically between the roots *mnē-* and *lēth-*.[58] It is true, for example, that the *Iliad* already treats *mnēmosunē* (8.181) and *lēthē* (2.33) as autonomous entities in themselves. Yet Detienne is concerned with what this polarity, if it may be so called, signifies for poetry and the poet as repositories of cultural truth.[59] Our problem is somewhat different. We have seen a great many examples of how words built on the roots *men-*, *mnē-*, *med-*, and *lēth-* operate with respect to *alkē* in Homeric poetry. The analysis presented here shows, however, that the two most prominent verbs in Detienne's formulation, *mimnēskomai* and *lanthanō*, function with respect to *alkē* more in parallel than in opposition. The more salient opposition is between remembering and forgetting *alkē*, and this can be signified uniformly with either verb. When *lanthanō* is negated, it means the same thing as *mimnēskomai*, and when *mimnēskomai* is negated, it means the same thing as *lanthanō*. The point is always to remember and not to forget *alkē*.

Of the two types of strength that we examined, *menos* and *alkē*, it is curious that *menos* is never remembered in Homeric poetry by means of the verb *mimnēskomai*, while *alkē* can be remembered or forgotten by both *mimnēskomai* and *lanthanō*. This may have to do with the etymological closeness between *menos* (*men-*) and *mi-mnē-skomai* (*mnē-*), where *menos* is already a kind of strength that implies the activity of memory or mind. So the question of remembering *alkē* deserves even more attention.

I posited earlier that remembering *alkē* has to be paradigmatic rather than syntagmatic because the regularity of the association between memory, broadly understood, and *alkē* can occur both at the level of the verse as well as at the level of etymology. Consider once again how the *menos* and *alkē* can disappear from a man 'unnoticed' (*lathrēi*, from *lēth-*) at *Iliad* 19.165, which suggests that some form of memory is unconsciously involved in maintaining one's physical energy. Homeric poetry preserves for us a deep association between the activity of memory and the activation of physical strength represented by *alkē*. Memory is not simply the recalling of past deeds to motivate present

58. Detienne 1967.18-24.
59. Detienne 1967.27.

undertakings; rather, its essential activity seems to represent the source from which physical strength derives. To state it another way, it is not the content but the process of memory, whatever its mechanics, that makes the exercise of physical strength possible. This line of thinking in turn allows Homeric poetry to imagine *alkē*, which in one aspect is the most potent of physical strengths, actually to be conceived as residing within memory as its objective content.

The consequence of remembering *alkē* means that one will be triumphant, even if momentarily, while to forget *alkē* means that one will suffer adversity and at worst death. Yet the Homeric epics differ in their regard for remembering *alkē*. In the *Iliad*, remembering *alkē* is the lifeline of a warrior, without the activation of which he will die at the hands of his adversaries. In the *Odyssey*, the theme (and the expression, *mimnēskomai* + *alkē*) is revived specifically for Agamemnon, the king of the martial world, and inverted to show how not remembering *alkē* can have fatal results. Yet the *Odyssey* also presents itself as concerned primarily with the restoration of civil order and, to that extent, Agamemnon's failure to remember *alkē* can be interpreted as a critique of a military worldview that has no place in a domestic setting. Agamemnon's failure to remember *alkē* not only recalls his problems with *alkē* in the *Iliad*, but it marks him as unfit for kingship even in peacetime. For Odysseus, the king of the domestic world of Ithaca, *alkē* has to be remembered to enable him to overcome the suitors, but its results are wholesale slaughter with no forseeable resolution. Odysseus does regain his throne, however, and is supported in this task by Telemakhos and Athena. This suggests that the *Odyssey* is reviving the military thematics of *alkē* to show that a potentially successful king must take matters into his own hands, and forcibly reinstate order in the community. Telemakhos, too, is presented as learning the ways of *alkē*—through being reminded of his father's *menos* by Athena, and through visiting the Iliadic heroes Nestor and Menelaos who recount their experiences to him—yet his brutal killing of the maidservants and Melanthios leaves open the question whether *alkē* can be appropriately employed by him. Telemakhos has indeed matured and become a warrior, but the problem remains that the warrior of the *Iliad* has become an artifact in the *Odyssey*. The final intervention by Athena and Zeus to quell the fighting between Odysseus and the relatives of the suitors casts, in my judgment, the *Odyssey*'s

darkest shadow over whether *alkē* can ever be transformed into a beneficial force that will ensure order for the community.

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About the Author

Derek Collins is an Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Texas at Austin. He is currently working on another book about archaic Greek poetry.